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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines two simultaneous and convergent processes. One is the mechanism of 
heteropatriarchal nationalism in Russia, in which white ethnic Russian heteronormativity is idealized and 
employed for maintaining symbolic and physical boundaries of the state. Another is the process through 
which Russia’s heteropatriarchal nationalism interacts, diverges from, or overlaps with homonationalism 
and homotransnationalism on a global scale. In order to unravel these complex processes four political 
case studies are presented: Chapter 1 explores how Russian gender and sexuality studies were affected by 
the Western gaze and the Russian government’s repression on queer and feminist scholars and discusses 
the resistant practices in academic contexts. Building on this foundation, Chapter 2 employs visual 
analysis to examine the links between notions of patriotism and representations of gender and sexuality in 
Russian popular culture. Chapter 3 applies semiotic analysis to examine the use of sexual signs and 
metaphors in political cartoons in the context of Russia–Ukraine war. Finally, Chapter 4 applies critical 
discourse analysis to investigate the discursive and representational practices embedded in oppositional 
media reporting on the persecution of Chechen gay men. These political case studies demonstrate how 
codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity are employed to sustain the physical and symbolic national 
borders in the Russian centre and in two peripheral militarized zones—the Republic of Chechnya and the 
recently annexed Crimea. This thesis argues that both nationalist sexual politics and resistance to it are 
saturated by the concomitant processes of racialization/ethnic othering and the ascendancy of white 
Russianness. Located at the crossroads of Russian studies and transnational sexuality studies, this 
dissertation expands our understandings of the intersections of nationalism and sexuality, global 
homonationalisms, and the links between sex, gender, and race/ethnicity in the post-Soviet region. 
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Introduction 
In the Spring of 2018, just days before the Russian presidential elections, the U.S.-based news 
magazine The Economist published a commissioned article titled “From Russia with Youth: Meet the 
Puteens” (Sneider & Monteleone, 2018, March 15). In this extensive project, which included interviews 
and portraits of twelve Russian 18-year-olds, the journalists sought to create “a collective portrait of a 
generation, where the parts would add up to a whole like a mosaic” (Sneider, 2018, March 15). The 
creators went to Moscow, Novosibirsk, Dagestan (“to capture a bit of Russia’s oft-overlooked ethnic 
diversity”), and Murmansk (“for a flavour of the Far North”) (Sneider, 2018, March 15). As the 
journalists explained in an accompanying article, “The Making of The Puteens” (Sneider, 2018, March 
15), the project was based on an extensive questionnaire; however, the final text omitted the interview 
questions and presented the teenagers’ responses in the form of heavily edited monologues. As a result, 
the reader was left with a somewhat disjointed set of opinions on diverse topics: from whether it’s good to 
live in Russia to whether they were going to vote and their perspectives on women’s and gay rights. The 
article was accompanied by a playlist of the interviewees’ favourite music. The journalists had a special 
interest in 18-year-olds due to the fact that they have spent their whole lives with Vladimir Putin in 
power: How did Putin’s Russia (the years 2000–2018) shape them? How much are they affected by the 
Kremlin’s propaganda and censorship? Are they going to rock the boat in order to change their realities? 
The final mosaic created by the journalists was rather muddy. The Puteens seem to be quite a 
diverse bunch; the only common feature in their interviews was a vague sense of ambivalence and 
incongruence illustrated by eerie portraits. Most of the portraits were taken against the dark and gritty 
landscapes of urban winter: worn-down grey apartment buildings, imposing monuments in the style of 
social realism, dirty snow on unplowed roads. The Puteens posed for the camera standing tall or sitting on 
benches with calm serious looks on their faces, which were always directed at the camera. Strangely, 
almost none of the teenagers photographed outside wore coats. One of the interviewees, a 
telecommunications student, was pictured holding a rifle in the middle of an empty residential street in 
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Novosibirsk. Why a rifle? The reader was offered no clues, since the interview did not suggest an 
occupation or anything else that would explain bearing arms on a residential street.  
The interview texts complemented the eeriness of the portraits. For example, Mikhail, 
photographed shirtless in a gym, passionately supported women’s rights and gay visibility but said he 
liked Putin because “he is a real man.” Anastasia, who was critical of Putin’s repressions and planned to 
vote for oppositional candidates, wholeheartedly admired Stalin, saying that he was “a great leader” and 
“the smartest, strongest man.” The interviews (and accompanying playlists) demonstrated that Russian 
teenagers knew North American cultural references quite well and expressed opinions that North 
American youth are not that different from them. But despite the focus on sameness, these interviews and 
photographs left the reader with feelings of strangeness, distance, and grimy melancholy. These uneasy 
affects were strengthened by the emphasis of the interviews on gender equality and sexual diversity. 
The inclusion of the teenagers’ opinions on women’s and gay rights—but not, say, anti-racist 
values or (dis)ability rights—seemed to be an important focus for The Economist. Nested among opinions 
on who to vote for, what music to listen to, and whether Russia is the greatest country, these questions 
evaluated what Jasbir Puar (2013) would call the “personal affective investment” in neoliberal discourses 
of self-determination, tolerance, and equality (p. 337). The special interest in these issues comes from the 
global understanding of Putin’s Russia as a patriarchal and homophobic country. There is a long history 
of imagining Russia as lagging behind in terms of civilizational achievements and sexual liberation (for 
critiques, see Baer, 2002; Engelstein, 1992a; Wolff, 1994). However, in the last decade, the emphasis on 
heterosexism has been especially entrenched by the circulation of news, signifying an increase in violence 
against feminists and LGBT people. The issues publicized on the global scale include the imprisonment 
of the members of the feminist punk band Pussy Riot in 2012, the “gay propaganda” law adopted in 2013, 
the wave of violence against gay people in the North Caucasus in 2017, and the ongoing pressure on 
feminist and queer academics of the European University in St Petersburg.  
In this context, the questions posed by The Economist about women’s and gay rights were meant to 
gauge individual values of a young Russian population (the “Puteens”) vis-à-vis Russian repressive 
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politics. Had the interviewees expressed sexism and homophobia, the reader would think that Putin’s 
politics really got the people stuck in the past; had the responses demonstrated some degree of tolerance, 
it could be taken as a sign of protest despite the repressive politics. Not surprisingly, the teenagers did not 
provide a united position; their answers ranged from “I believe a wife exists for her husband” and “men 
kissing on the streets is a violation of physics or nature” to enthusiastic support for gay members of their 
families. However, the very interest of The Economist in these questions underscores a key measure of 
modernity; opinions about gender and sexuality locate Russia on a geotemporal map wherein Europe and 
North America occupy the space of (sexual) modernity while the rest of the world must catch up with 
Western standards of sexual tolerance, liberation, and rights. In its approach, this article by The 
Economist highlights the complicated ways in which gender and sexuality emerge as sites through which 
Russia is constructed as a subject of knowledge, an identity, and a place that is located in relation to other 
places, most prominently the West. It is this foundational belief that allows opinions about women’s 
equality and gay rights to become one way to know Russian teenagers and, by extension, a way to 
understand Putin’s Russia. This way of knowing rests on the assumption that one can gauge the extent of 
the impact of Putin’s repressive politics on the Russian people by the levels of misogyny, homophobia, 
and tolerance expressed in simple for-or-against statements. 
Concerned with this limiting narrative, I seek to complicate the positioning of Russia as backwards 
but perpetually on its way towards sexual modernity. Situating my research in discursive and 
representational practices located in Russia, I hold four main objectives for this dissertation: First, to 
examine the uses of hegemonic codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity for nationalist ideology and 
for cases of resistance to nationalism. Second, to examine how issues of gender, sexuality, and 
race/ethnicity animate the positioning of Russia vis-à-vis the rest of the world by diverse actors within 
this country, including government, media, activists, scholars, and artists. Third, to question how the 
manifestations of political tensions in the sphere of gender and sexuality intersect with nationalism, 
racial/ethnic identities, and control of the internal and external national borders. And fourth, to investigate 
the links between Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism and global processes of neoliberal 
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homotransnationalism, which seek to include homonormative LGBTQ subjects into ideologies, structures, 
and practices of nation-states. 
Research Questions and Dissertation Structure  
Given that the discourses created in Western media––including in The Economist’s article above––
utilize questions of women’s liberation and gay tolerance as epistemological tools for understanding 
Russia, I explore the ways in which discourses on and representations of gender and sexuality are 
instrumental in Russia’s positioning of itself in the geopolitical scene. The research questions that guide 
this project are as follows: How are issues of gender and sexuality employed for the project of 
nationalism in Russia? How do gender and sexuality connect with questions of whiteness and 
race/ethnicity in Russia? What are the links between discourses on gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity in 
Russia and those which are dominant on the global level? How do those resisting the official ideologies 
employ gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity in their actions? Where does resistance come from within 
this context and in what forms does it appear? 
Since it would be a mistake to treat Russia as a monolith, I recognize that the imagination of 
national identity varies among different actors; the way politicians, media makers, and activist groups 
understand Russianness are necessarily diverse. Given this reality, I have chosen to focus on four social 
spheres of political tension in Putin’s Russia: (1) the crackdown on gender and sexuality studies, their 
positioning as a non-Russian discipline, and the links between scholarship and contesting Russian 
nationalism; (2) popcultural representations of white Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism and the 
challenges presented by counter-cultural movements, such as Pussy Riot; (3) the employment of codes of 
gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity in political cartoons addressing the Russia–Ukraine conflict and the 
annexation of Crimea; and (4) oppositional media discourses on anti-gay violence in Chechnya and 
construction of the figure of the racialized gay man in Russia.  I believe that these four areas of cultural 
and knowledge production illuminate the most significant points of contention at the crossroads of 
gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, and nationalism during Putin’s third (2012–2018) and fourth (2018–
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present) presidential terms. The main thesis of this dissertation is that within Putin’s Russia, the 
hegemonic political discourse on gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity is one of nationalist 
heteropatriarchy, which is then used to assert Russian exceptionalism against the West and justify 
colonial expansion. In this context, I identify three types of resistance: (1) scholarship and activism that 
seeks to decentralize white Russianness and build coalitions among post-Soviet diaspora; (2) Russian 
countercultural movements that satirize Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism; and (3) oppositional media 
that appeals to Western forms of homonationalism via marking Russia’s racialized/ethnic Other as 
backwards, sexist, and homophobic. 
Chapter 1 discusses the development of gender and sexuality studies in Russia and the recent 
crackdown on educational and research institutions that work from feminist and LGBTQ perspectives. 
Overviewing works produced by Russian scholars, I explore the main perspectives of and achievements 
by gender and sexuality studies, the processes of censorship and political pressure on queer and feminist 
academics, and queer and feminist modes of resistance. This chapter demonstrates that after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the support and resources from European and North American scholars and foundations 
were crucial in developing education and research centres that studied gender and sexuality. This 
enabled––though simultaneously limited––scholarship in the field. In Putin’s Russia, hubs of gender and 
sexuality scholarship were positioned as being driven by foreign interests. In this chapter, I describe the 
complexities of these processes as well as look for locations of resistance to pressure both from the 
Russian government and the Western gaze. 
After establishing what has been happening in the field of gender and sexuality studies in Russia in 
Chapter 1, I turn to discursive and representational practices that reflect similar cultural trajectories. At 
the centre of my analysis in Chapter 2 is the interaction between hegemonic representations of national 
heteropatriarchy and counter-cultural performances. My objects of inquiry include the pervasive images 
of President Putin’s naked torso––as a national hypermasculine ideal and as an object of female desire––
and representations of female sexual aggression. I discuss how these gendered and sexualized 
representations of white Russian bodies function to sustain national ideals and how they are challenged by 
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Russian art-activism. Inspired by the series of protests in 2012 that led to the incarceration of the punk 
feminist art collective Pussy Riot, I explore practices of resistance, censorship, and negotiation of the 
gendered, sexual, and nationalist representational codes in the Russian public sphere. Zooming in on 
several cultural flashpoints, including the circulation of images of President Putin’s body, scandals around 
portrayals of homoeroticism, and protest performances by Russian art-activists, this chapter illuminates 
the connections between representations of the normatively gendered, sexualized, and white Russian body 
and narratives of patriotism.  
Chapter 3 analyzes political cartoons produced in the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict 
(2014–present). These cartoons employ oppressive gendered and sexual representations for explaining the 
conflict and, at the same time, articulate a specific view of the world and of Russia’s place in it. In this 
chapter, I ask, what power do these political cartoons have within the shaping of sociopolitical 
discourses? How might they reflect contemporary codes of gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, and class? 
And, more generally but no less importantly, what kind of world do they describe? Reading political 
cartoons through codes of gender and sexuality, I argue that they serve to articulate class, race/ethnicity, 
and whiteness in relation to Russianness, Ukrainianness, and the abstract notion of “the West.” I further 
claim that together with other representational practices, such as advertising of the resorts in annexed 
Crimea that targets white Russian heteronormative families, these cartoons work to maintain symbolic 
and geographical borders. 
Finally, Chapter 4 turns to news coverage of the persecution of gay people in Chechnya in 2017 
and the involvement of Russian oppositional media in resisting this violence. Analyzing discursive and 
visual representations of anti-gay violence in the media, I discuss the diverse ways homophobia and 
heteropatriarchy are formulated and imagined as quintessentially Chechen and/or Russian cultural traits. I 
argue that Russian oppositional investigative media, which was largely responsible for generating a 
world-wide response to this case of persecution, at once exploited homotransnationalist discourses and 
further racialized gay people in Chechnya. Exploring the ways in which this issue was covered by the 
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media, I argue that creating the discursive figure of “the gay Chechen” enabled the ascendancy of 
whiteness in the Russian context. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this dissertation builds on scholarship in transnational sexuality 
studies and on theories of representation within cultural studies. Although the field of transnational 
sexuality studies is quite rich, there is a lack of scholarship on sexuality in post-Soviet spaces that 
considers processes of neoliberalism, racialization, and inclusion of queer subjects into nation-building 
projects. The key works in transnational sexuality studies provide context for formulating the research 
questions, theoretical framework, and methodology of this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation 
builds on the following ideas: (1) the regulation of gender and sexuality is a building block of 
nationalism; (2) heteropatriarchy and homophobia are implicated in social and political systems and 
intersect with oppressions related to race and class; (3) in global neoliberal discourse, the questions of 
women’s rights and LGBTQ liberation are framed as markers of sexual modernity; and (4) discourses 
and practices of sexual modernity are saturated by processes of racialization and the ascendancy of 
whiteness. 
First, this dissertation starts with an understanding that the regulation of gender and sexuality is 
a building block of nationalism. Nationalism has been theorized as both an ideology and a set of 
institutional practices that rests on the imagining of a close community with shared past and values 
(Anderson, 1991) and on invented traditions that maintain feelings of historical coherence and affinity 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). Poignantly, Michael Billig (1995) conceptualizes “banal nationalism” 
as “the collection of ideological habits (including habits of practice and belief) which reproduce 
established nations as nations” (p. 6). This conceptualization is particularly useful for this dissertation, 
which aims to demonstrate mundane and habitual use of gender and sexuality for reproduction of the 
idea of the Russian nation. 
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Gender is central to the construction of national communities since, as Anne McClintock argues 
(1993), national identity is highly dependent on gender difference––i.e., the asymmetrical binary 
opposition between “masculine” and “feminine.” Nations are generally organized as communities of 
men, which maintain and control homosocial forms of male bonding through shared care and 
protection of the motherland, specifically, the nation’s women and children (Nagel, 2010). By 
contrast, women are included in nations primarily through their reproductive capacity: as biological 
reproducers of the nation and the workforce, as transmitters of culture, and as symbolic signifiers of 
national difference (Yuval-Davis, 1996). Controlling gendered differences and sexual behaviours 
helps to maintain the boundaries between normal and abnormal, healthy and pathological, and 
associates these boundaries with the categories of national and foreign. For example, the classic 
historical study by George Mosse (1985) shows how the notion of “respectability” was central from 
the very beginnings of Western European nation-states in the eighteenth century, as it connected ideas 
of sexual decency to national ideals of male and female beauty and virtue through processes of 
normalization.  
Such heteronormative systems of regulation maintain material and symbolic structures of the 
nation-state, which exclude those subjects whose sexual identities and practices do not fit into 
perceptions of what is “natural” and, by extension, become historically and culturally incoherent 
within the nation. However, heterosexual nationalism is complicated by the inclusion of some queer 
subjects into processes of nation-building and boundary control. A large body of scholarship on 
homonormativity and homonationalism demonstrates that queer subjects become instrumental to 
nationalist ideologies when discourses on and affective investments in LGBT inclusion and 
homophobic patriarchal “others” justify and enable military interventions, incarceration, and torture 
(Agathangelou, Bassichis, & Spira, 2008; Alexander, 2006; Feitz & Nagel, 2008; Haritaworn, 
Kuntsman, & Posocco, 2013; Puar, 2007, 2013; Razack, 2005). This scholarship questions the classic 
understanding of nationalism as an ideology that rests exclusively on heteronormativity; it shows that 
it is necessary to pay close attention to how non-heteronormativity can be recruited for the project of 
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nationalism. As I discuss in this dissertation, within contemporary nation-states based on 
heteropatriarchy, such as Russia, homonationalism emerges in calls of oppositional agents for 
inclusion of homonormative subjects in the structures, processes, and ideologies of the state and 
through appeals for the Russian state to replicate Western forms of neoliberalism and inclusion and, in 
this way, become more “civilized.” 
Second, this dissertation holds as a central idea that heterosexism and homophobia are 
implicated in social and political systems, and they intersect with oppressions related to race and class. 
Instead of taking a psychological approach to homophobia that centres issues of stigma, interpersonal 
violence, and private attitudes, I believe it is more productive to focus on institutionalized and 
politicized homophobia as a set of discourses and practices that use prejudice to sanction violence, 
pathologization, and criminalization, and to maintain hegemonic gender and sexuality norms in 
intersection with the norms and hierarchies of race and class. Gregory Herek (2004) defines 
heterosexism as “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any non-heterosexual 
form of behavior, identity, relationship or community” (p. 16). Homophobia, as a discriminatory 
practice of aversion to homosexuality, supports the entrenchment of heterosexism in social 
institutions. Some theorists link homophobia to gender as the performance of hegemonic masculinity 
in interpersonal relationships (Pascoe, 2005) and at the level of state politics, particularly when state 
politics are bolstered by metaphors and qualities of hard masculinity (Boellstorff, 2004; Novitskaya, 
2017).  
The conceptualization of homophobia is closely related to discourses on LGBT rights, meaning 
that a focus on homophobic violence and the fight against it is central to human rights discourses 
(Bryant & Vidal-Ortiz, 2008, p. 391). In this way, homophobia becomes a discursive tool against 
oppression that produces affects and practices, such as claims for visibility, while it forecloses others 
and simultaneously reestablishes hegemonic norms of gender, class, and race. This can be illustrated 
through cases of queer reclamation of urban spaces inhabited by Muslim populations in London 
(Bachetta, El-Tayeb & Haritaworn, 2015) and in Toronto (Wahab, 2015): in these cases LGBT/queer 
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citizens protest homophobia by marching in spaces marked as racialized/ethnic and poor and in turn 
reproduce Islamophobic claims, racializing practices, and erasure of queers of colour. As Martin 
Manalansan (2009) argues, “homophobia and its dismantling has become part of the queer 
empowerment agenda of queer activist groups and nonprofit organizations” (p. 34). Such practice and 
the term “homophobia” itself, as he further writes, “obfuscates racial, class, and other social 
hierarchies which maintain and prop up particular privileged and hegemonic groups” (p. 35). The 
popular imaginary often sees homophobia in racialized communities as an inherent pathology and fails 
to recognize the role of Western countries in spreading homophobia through policy and practice 
(Hoad, 2007; Kaoma, 2013; Rivkin-Fish & Hartblay, 2014; Wahab, 2016). The essentialist 
understanding of homophobia in post-colonial societies is also complicated by analyses of 
homophobia as an expression of anti-colonial or post-colonial views and identities (Boellstorff, 2004; 
Hoad, 2007; Murray, 2012).  
In the context of transnational gay activism, which rests on human rights discourses and politics 
of visibility, identity, and representation, some scholars interpret homophobia in non-Western regions 
as a response to LGBT visibility and rights claims (Boellstorff, 2004; Renkin, 2009), and sometimes 
as pre-emptive measures even before LGBT movements and identities have arisen (Wahab, 2016; 
Weiss, 2013). This kind of anticipatory homophobia, which develops in absence of gay visibility, is 
discussed by David Murray (2012) in his development of the concept of “spectral sexuality.” In this 
case, the social threats, real or imagined, are projected on the invisible “homosexual,” creating a 
cultural figure and providing it with attributes of horror and abjection. Throughout this dissertation, I 
build on the diverse literature on homophobia to interpret how homophobic codes are employed in 
discourses and representations of national belonging, race/ethnicity, and narratives of sexual 
modernity. 
Third, the concept of sexual modernity, as developed through the field of transnational sexuality 
studies, is also key to my analysis in this dissertation. Within global neoliberal discourse, the questions 
of women’s rights and LGBT/queer liberation are framed as markers of sexual modernity and 
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progress. The term “sexual modernity” points towards a Western-centric understanding of 
geographical and cultural places evolving at different paces towards an ideal notion of “full” gender 
equality and LGBT/queer inclusion in social life. Under this framework, patriarchy and homophobia 
are markers of the past, while countries in the West are understood as having achieved an exceptional 
level of gender equality and tolerance of sexual diversity. A sense of belonging within sexual 
modernity is a quintessential element of national consciousness for most countries in Western Europe 
and North America. As Puar (2007; 2013) has formulated, this self-identification of sexual 
exceptionalism works to support homonationalism, a set of biopolitical practices that includes 
homonormative queer subjects in state institutions such as marriage, military, and representational 
governance while entrenching hierarchies of race and class and processes of imperialism, 
displacement, and capitalist accumulation. 
Critiques of sexual modernity discourses are further strengthened by discussions about the 
effects of sexual exceptionalism and homonationalism on vulnerable populations. In a variety of 
geopolitical contexts, subjects of multiple intersecting marginalizations—trans*, racialized, sex 
working, undocumented, colonized people—are included in the circulation of expendable bodies 
available for spectacularization, injury, death, and neglect in the name of imperialism, policing, and 
security discourses. This is the process which Achille Mbembe (2003) calls “necropolitics.” As many 
transnational sexuality scholars have argued, the discourses and affects of white gay national subjects 
work to bolster the availability of these marginalized subjects for necropolitical control (Bhanji, 2018; 
Haritaworn, Kuntsman & Posocco, 2014; Puar, 2017). Even when queers of colour are represented in 
neoliberal discourses, these subjects are not necessarily able to escape necropolitical practices. As 
Haritaworn, Tauqir, and Erdem (2008) argue in their examination of queer Muslim visibility in Britain 
and Germany, representations of queers of colour as both victims of homophobia and exceptional 
liberated queers further proliferate the racism and Islamophobia of white imperialism and nationalism. 
One of the central concerns of this dissertation is how contemporary Russia participates in these 
global processes. Russia occupies a paradoxical space on the map of sexual modernity. On one hand, it 
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has been framed as inherently more sexually diverse than the West (Baer, 2002; Essig, 1999), but on 
the other hand, global homonationalist discourses construct it as significantly more homophobic and 
patriarchal, which places it within a rhetoric of development (for critique of political discourse and 
media representations, see Rivkin-Fish & Hartblay, 2014; Wiedlack, 2017). Theorists of sexualities in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) point out that the developmental understanding of sexuality, 
modeled on North American and Western European sexual politics, suggests a linear progression––
from widespread homophobia and the criminalization of homosexuality to gay visibility and overall 
tolerance to the inclusion of some queers into state institutions and national imaginary––and projects 
this expected trajectory to spaces outside of the West. However, as Mizielinska and Kulpa (2011) 
propose, sexual time in the CEE is not linear but “knotted”; LGBT representational and visibility 
politics exists alongside queer anti-identitarian politics. Although an overall understanding of the West 
as following a model of linear progression has also been critiqued (Navickaite, 2014), studying the 
CEE means doing away with the expectations that are modeled on the histories of sexual politics in 
Western European and North American countries. Thus, in this dissertation, I pay attention to the ways 
in which (hetero)sexual nationalism coexists with neoliberal gay rights discourses as well as with 
radical queer anti-Western-centric critiques. 
The final key theoretical idea that grounds my research is the way discourses and practices of 
sexual modernity are saturated by processes of racialization and the ascendancy of whiteness. 
Historically, colonization and imperialism employed regulations of gender and sexuality in order to 
create and sustain whiteness. In the course of colonization, as Ann Stoler (1997) explains, European 
colonizers sought to educate the “native” in supposedly proper gendered and sexual behaviors in order 
to secure white racial and civilizational superiority and prevent miscegenation. This sexual history of 
colonization has its legacy in contemporary forms of post-colonial sexual modernity, where 
civilizational superiority means bringing gay people––primarily white and male––into a model of 
consuming global citizens and positioning them as under threat of local homophobias. As Jacqui 
Alexander (2006) has written, these processes of normalization under post-colonial capitalism leave 
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out lesbians, working-class gay men, and queers of colour, while equating the discourse of gay 
liberation with homonormative male gayness, consumerism, and whiteness.  
My approach to understanding and articulating whiteness is heavily informed by bell hooks, 
Sara Ahmed, and Beth Loffreda and Claudia Rankine. bell hooks (1992) demonstrates that whiteness 
expects a lack of interrogation, observation, and description as an object of knowledge. Moreover, 
whiteness is assumed to universally represent “all that is benign and non-threatening,” even though in 
the Black imagination, whiteness is often represented as a terrorizing imposition (p. 340-341). In her 
phenomenological analysis, Sara Ahmed (2007) conceptualizes whiteness as a background to 
experience: “whiteness could be described as an ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates 
bodies in specific directions, affecting how they ‘take up’ space” (p. 150). A similar approach is taken 
in Claudia Rankine’s fiction and analytical works. For instance, in an essay with Beth Loffreda, 
Rankine (2015) proposes that race be understood as a structure of feelings. In their discussion of race 
in the practice of fiction writing, the authors point to a culturally set repertoire of narrative 
opportunities, kinds of feelings, situations, subjects, tropes, and plots “available” to characters of 
different races and their authors. Rankine calls this repertoire “the racial imaginary” and describes its 
limitations, namely the way in which the racial imaginary hides the dynamics of power. What emerges 
from these approaches is an understanding of whiteness as a power dynamic that structures 
imagination, feelings, and embodiment, and forms them into habits. Therefore, in my analysis, I pay 
attention to the way in which discourses and representations maintain the creation of narratives, 
feelings, and expectations of bodily expression from a white Russian perspective. 
Theorizing how bodies become racialized, Sara Ahmed (2002) points out that racialization is a 
process of investing skin colour with meaning. Race is popularly understood as an intrinsic property of 
the body and skin, while ethnicity points to cultural belonging and acts as a descriptor of a social 
rather than corporeal origin. This popular understanding explains how Russia and other post-Soviet 
countries are seen to be non-racial, because they are perceived as spaces of whiteness––i.e., spaces that 
are inhabited exclusively by white bodies. Discourses on race are also largely absent from the 
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academic analysis on Russia.1 Due to the denial of racial distinction, whiteness in Eastern Europe 
remains invisible, and so do the processes of investing bodily properties with meanings of difference 
and hierarchy. The result is that whiteness, as a moral category and as a concept underlying racism, 
colonization, and cultural imperialism (hooks, 1991), is often seen as “irrelevant” in Russia and post-
Soviet spaces. Due to presumption of racial homogeneity of Eastern Europe, the term “ethnicity,” as a 
descriptor of cultural belonging, takes the place of race, a concept that is popularly understood to 
describe intrinsic properties of the body. Ethnicity, by its relationship to culture and history, holds the 
potential to destabilize essentialist constructions of difference (Hall, 1997). However, Ahmed (2002) 
cautions against replacing the term “race” with “ethnicity,” because such a replacement erases the 
processes of racialization––i.e., the process of investing bodily properties with meaning and the 
violent consequences of this investment. 
Analyzing the processes of racialization is a complicated task in post-Soviet spaces; people of 
the same non-Russian geocultural background often have diverging opinions on their own racial and 
ethnic identities—while some of them see themselves as white, others self-identify as racially non-
white or “off-white” (for a vast array of terms to describe non-whiteness and non-ethnic Russianness, 
see Zakharov, 2015). Recently, I witnessed the complexity of discussing race among post-Soviet 
scholars and activists during a conference at the University of Vienna (see Chapter 1). During the 
conference, some of the participants from non-Russian post-Soviet spaces passionately protested being 
described as racialized (especially when Western scholars were the ones doing this describing), and 
others argued that it would be more appropriate to talk about ethnicity rather than race. Due to such 
diverging opinions and the complex histories of this terminology, I have resolved to use the combined 
 
1 A notable exception is a sociological study by Nikolay Zakharov (2015), which demonstrates how the idea of race 
provides a new ideology of social cohesion in post-Soviet Russia. The main arguments of this book are that ideas of 
race in Russia are used to articulate class and labour relations, which the author demonstrates by examining 
discourses on migrant labour, and that today Russia strives to become as white as possible. Zakharov shows how 
white Russianness symbolizes belonging to a “civilized country,” provides distance from the Soviet era, and 
differentiates a Russian middle class from those who work menial jobs and those who make cultural choices 
associated with the Soviet past. 
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terms of “race/ethnicity” and “racialization/cultural othering” in this dissertation to refer to the 
processes of ascribing hierarchical meanings and meanings of difference to bodily and cultural traits. 
This combined terminology also seems appropriate for pointing out the fluidity between markers of 
cultural belonging and markers of bodily difference. I demonstrate this slippage between ethnicity and 
race particularly in Chapter 4, which discusses how, during the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Ukrainian 
cultural traditions, such as the consumption of fatty foods, crossed over into bodily difference by 
stereotypical representations of Ukrainians as possessing fat bodies and basking in over-indulgence. In 
this case, ethnicity crosses over into race when Ukrainians are further racialized as off-white through 
visual references to their proximity to Muslim and Black bodies and juxtapositions with Russian white 
bodies. These representations simultaneously contribute to the ascendancy of whiteness in Russia. 
My understanding of the ascendancy of whiteness is influenced by Puar’s (2007) formulations, 
which connect this process to narratives and practices of sexual modernity. The ascendancy of 
whiteness refers to the process by which white privileges and rights become entrenched in sexual 
civilizational narratives through demands for equality with heterosexual norms such as gay marriage.  
Queers of colour are also employed for homonationalist projects and the ascendancy of whiteness as 
model minorities who participate in homonormative capitalism. They are further leveraged as proof of 
homophobia in their own communities of colour. Puar (2007) states:  
The queer or homonormative ethnic is a crucial fractal in the disaggregation of proper 
homosexual subjects, joining the ranks of an ascendant population of whiteness, from 
perversely sexualized populations. As with the class fraction that projects a model 
minority, we have here a class, race, and sexual fraction projected to the market as 
homonormative gay or queer consumer. (p. 28) 
In the chapter on the anti-gay violence in Chechnya, I discuss the similar employment of the queer 
ethnic––the figure of the gay Chechen––in the Russian context. 
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Within post-socialist states, whiteness occupies a peculiar place. Eastern Europe is popularly 
imagined as void of race; nevertheless, whiteness expresses cultural and economic belonging. As 
Aniko Imre (2014) writes, “East European nations’ unspoken insistence on their whiteness is one of 
the most effective and least recognized means of asserting their Europeanness” (p. 82). In Eastern 
Europe, some state actors seek to protect their whiteness against the multiculturalism of the West as 
well as against racialized migrants. Whiteness is articulated as sexual purity while multiculturalism is 
understood through metaphors of racial and ethnic sexual mixing. Although heavily under-researched, 
ideas of whiteness influence constructions of gender and sexuality in Russia and post-Soviet spaces. 
For example, in the context of the Russian colonization of Eurasia, colonial understandings of gender 
constructed Russian women as aggressive and sexually promiscuous, in contrast with notions of 
Islamic pious femininity (Tlostanova, 2010). However, the Eastern European region itself has been 
also imagined as preserving traditional European whiteness against a multicultural West. As the 
boundaries of Eastern European nationalism are unstable, sexuality helps to secure them through 
symbols of white sexual purity of Eastern European cultures. 
Methodology 
Since I take a multi-sited approach to answering the key questions of the dissertation and each 
chapter uses somewhat different methods, I include a brief note on methodology in each chapter. 
Chapter 1 builds on an overview of literature and conference materials in order to examine gender and 
sexuality studies in the Russian context. Chapter 2 is based on observation and interpretation of 
several cultural flashpoints that highlight the link between gender, sexuality, and nationalism in visual 
representations in Russian popular culture. Chapter 3 uses the Cultural Studies Approach to image 
analysis and relies on the terminology of semiotics in order to read the codes of gender, sexuality, and 
race/ethnicity in political cartoons and place them in the geopolitical context of the Russia-Ukraine 
conflict. Finally, my inquiry in Chapter 4 employs techniques of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
and the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) for exploring the media discourses 
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surrounding cases of anti-gay violence in Chechnya. CDA is an approach to discourse that is attuned 
to power dynamics and intersections of oppressions in the use of language. The goal of CDA is to 
produce insights into how discourse establishes and reinforces structural inequalities. SKAD is based 
on a sequential analysis that involves coding and mapping of text in order to show how different actors 
understand and interpret a specific social problem. The combination of these two approaches to 
discourse forms my methodology for analysis of media representations in Chapter 4. 
In the current global order, the construction of imagined national communities is affected by 
fluid and unpredictable flows of people, ideologies, technologies, media, and capital (Appadurai, 
1990); therefore, representations are particularly potent for maintaining feelings of national affinity 
and enmity, as well as challenging the established norms. My approach to analyzing representations 
stems from Stuart Hall’s (2012 [1997]) suggestion that representation is not an indexical reflection of 
reality but a process of making meaning through language and codes that are established and 
maintained by culture. This conceptualization is significant because it requires us to examine 
representations not in terms of their accuracy but in terms of the way in which they are embedded in 
and also support the power structures. The interrelated processes of normalization and resistance 
happen through establishing or rejecting hegemonic representations, stereotypes, and controlling 
images (Collins, 2008).  
In conducting visual analysis of popular images, I want to consider not only what images mean 
and what they represent, but also what they do. This question comes from the field of visual 
anthropology and the call for considering how images possess agency (Bakewell, 1998) and desire 
(Mitchell, 2005). Lisa Bakewell (1998) suggests that images are not so much descriptive as they are 
categorizable as actions, similarly to speech acts. Meanwhile, J. W. Mitchell (2005) advocates for 
considering what images want. I am particularly interested in this question, because in the Russian 
public sphere, certain images —especially those of the gendered and sexual body—seem to hold a 
particular power; they are said to be able to inspire—like images of President Putin—or to offend—
like images depicting particular sexual bodies and acts or the ones questioning white superiority. 
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Positionality 
My interpretation of the material in this dissertation is affected by my specific position. I am 
writing this dissertation as a queer migrant from Lithuania currently living in Toronto, Canada. I was born 
in the Soviet Union and grew up in a Russian family, surrounded by Russian language and culture. Since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, I have spent some time in Russia and Ukraine and maintain relationships 
with my extended family in these countries. My relationships with queer members of my family living in 
Russia enriched my understanding of Russian realities significantly. Having spent my adulthood freely 
moving through various spaces in Europe and North America, I do not see myself as an insider to Russian 
culture, even though this is the language, culture, and people that I understand the best. Instead, I see 
myself as a member of a Russian queer diaspora that maintains connections with friends and family in 
Russia. In 2015, I spent a month doing fieldwork in St Petersburg, acquiring literature unavailable in 
Canada and collecting background information on the topics of my chapters. I have also attended 
academic and activist conferences on sexualities in post-Soviet regions, which has bolstered my 
understanding of gender and sexuality studies in Russia. In 2017, I worked as a translator for the gay and 
lesbian refugees from Chechnya in Toronto, which informs Chapter 4 of this dissertation, even though I 
decided against interviewing the refugees out of safety concerns. Although I am committed to challenging 
Western-centric perspectives, I am bound by my positionalities and must acknowledge my outsider status 
and the way it may limit my interpretations of events and representations. Throughout this research, I 
have done my best to mediate the specific conditioning I have received through my training in Western-
based queer and transnational sexualities studies. This is, however, an unescapably subjective reading of 
the topics at hand. 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I explore some of the pivotal cases in which the Russian heterosexist 
militaristic patriarchy meets the image of a liberatory Western model of sexual citizenship—notably, I am 
writing in a moment when Russianness and Russian queerness and feminism is being redefined, 
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reconstructed, and replayed anew. The cases of this dissertation seemingly build on models of a “global” 
gendered and sexual subject—a riot grrrl, an LGBT/queer activist, a queer refugee. Resting on the 
imperial models of sexual modernity, these subjects fall under the systemic oppression of the Russian 
state before finding supposed relief in Western democratic salvation—through the world witnessing and 
embracing these subjects, through politics of protest and outrage, and/or through seeking asylum. The 
stories I examine fall under the Western model of liberal ethics and freedom, creating the ethical Western 
subject while condemning Russian values and constructing them as outdated. In this dissertation, I hope 
to complicate the view presented by The Economist mentioned in the beginning of this introduction, in 
which the opinions of young Russians on gender equality and sexual diversity become an epistemological 
tool. My goal is not to describe Russian people in some more “accurate” way, but rather to call for a more 
complex consideration of describing and knowing Russia. It is my hope that the cases I analyze in this 
dissertation will illustrate that the employment of gender and sexuality in discourses and representations 
does not follow a predictable pattern of authoritarian repression towards the (imagined) Western model of 
sexual liberation. Rather, the Russian sexual modernity includes multiple and contradictory modes of 
sexual politics concomitantly. 
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Chapter 1 
Scholarship as Resistance: Gender and Sexuality Studies between Russian 
Censorship and the Western Gaze 
 
Introduction 
In 2015, I traveled to St Petersburg for one month to conduct research. My plan was to strengthen 
my contacts in Russian academic and activist worlds and to collect materials in preparation for writing 
this dissertation. Among the professors, students, and activists I met was Evgeny Shtorn, a young 
sociologist from the Centre for Independent Social Research. At the time, Shtorn was also a translator of 
multiple languages, a co-editor of the special issue on sexuality in the Sociology of Power journal, and a 
research fellow at the Laboratory for Sexuality Research, conducting a legal study on hate crimes against 
LGBTQ people in Russia (Shtorn, 2018). Over the last four years, the life of this bright scholar has 
changed drastically. In 2017, Shtorn was threatened and intimidated by the Federal Security Service 
officials, who were attempting to recruit him as an informant on the activities of LGBTQ academics and 
activists. Shtorn’s passport was annulled and he was forced to urgently flee Russia in the beginning of 
2018. At the time of this writing, he is an asylum seeker in Ireland and is facing numerous challenges. 
Shtorn has been writing about his difficulties with immigration, financial hardship, housing, and 
mental health on social media and his blog (Shtorn, n.d.), not only documenting his personal journey but 
also creating an ethnographic account of refugee lives in Ireland. As Shtorn explained in an interview for 
the Irish Times (Pollack, 2018, November 28), he had been particularly vulnerable to intimidation due to 
his queerness and his migrant background in Russia (he was an immigrant from Kazakhstan). Queer 
immigrants from Central Asia are particularly vulnerable to intimidation because of the ease with which 
the Russian state can annul their passports and immigration documents. They also face the threat of 
violence in cases of deportation to their home countries after their LGBTQ status had become known to 
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the public.2 Sadly, this story of an established queer studies scholar being targeted is not unique; many 
other LGBTQ scholars, activists, and writers, especially those with precarious immigration status, face 
pressure and intimidation from state agencies. Such stories illustrate that gender and sexuality studies in 
Russia is not just a matter of theory, research, and education—it is also a political site in which 
marginalization and exclusion influence individual lives as much as they do the development of the 
discipline. 
The field of gender and sexuality studies in Russia is thus politicized and connected to questions 
of Russian nationalism. It is also utilized in drawing boundaries around what is considered to be national 
or foreign, pro-government or anti-government, Russian or non-Russian. The development of the field has 
historically been determined by several key areas: relationships with Russian authorities, access to 
international academic communities, physical and symbolic border controls, and the marginal status of 
the discipline both within academia and in larger socio-political contexts. The Soviet regime imposed 
decades of censorship and restrictions on the social sciences, which ensured scholars were not always able 
to access archival and empirical data, collaborate internationally, develop and apply innovative theories, 
or conduct research projects on topics considered unconventional in social sciences, such as gender and 
sexuality (see Kon, 2008; Zaslavskaya, 2007). At the same time, the Soviet space has also been 
influenced by the Western gaze of Western European and North American scholars and activists, which 
has positioned it as a place of repression and otherness, and more recently as a space of transition towards 
modern liberal democracy. Thus Russia has been produced as an object of study for the West (Baer, 
2002). Although the conditions of censorship and isolation of Russian sexuality and gender studies have 
changed since the Soviet era, I contemplate in this chapter how Russian researchers of gender and 
sexuality have to navigate two challenges simultaneously: the authorities’ perception of these fields as 
 
2 A similar story was that of a queer journalist Ali Feruz, an immigrant from Uzbekistan, who worked for the 
independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta covering issues of anti-gay violence, among others. Feruz was targeted by 
the Russian state agencies in 2017 and faced deportation. While in detention Feruz attempted suicide and later 
claimed that if deported, he would be tortured due to his sexual orientation and his refusal to become an informant 
for Uzbek and Russian secret services (Amnesty International, 2018, February 15). 
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suspicious, unnecessary, and quintessentially anti-Russian, and the Western gaze that consistently and 
persistently projects ideas of otherness onto Russian sexuality. 
For reasons outlined above, it is impossible to consider gender and sexuality research without 
seeing it as a site of social and political tension itself. Therefore, the goals of this chapter are (1) to 
explore the achievements of gender and sexualities studies in Russia, and (2) to outline links between 
scholarly research and Russian social and political contexts. This overview will provide background for 
the subsequent chapters, in which I examine representational and discursive practices that employ 
discourses on sexuality, gender, and race/ethnicity for nation-making. Reviewing anthropological, 
sociological, and cultural studies literature on sexuality, gender, and sexual politics in Russia, I first 
provide a short history of gender and sexuality studies as a field as well as the social and political contexts 
in which it developed. Next, I discuss the political and structural pressures faced by institutions and 
academics working in this discipline and the resulting problems and limitations. Finally, I highlight sites 
of resistance employed by Russian academics and activists working in the field of sexuality studies. These 
tactics not only resist political pressures from the Russian government but also challenge the Western 
academic gaze. As I argue in this chapter, contemporary gender and sexuality studies scholars are in a 
difficult position both in terms of politics and theory. Scholars working from feminist, LGBTQ, anti-
oppressive and intersectional critical perspectives are positioned as harming the “Russian national 
interest” and are subjected to intimidation, censorship, and pressure to either collaborate with the 
government or to leave the country. To continue academic work, Russian and other post-Soviet scholars 
are often required to adopt the Western-centric theoretical language of gender and sexuality studies and to 
produce scholarship that conforms to the Western exoticizing and orientalizing gaze. 
From communist utopias of genderlessness to gender studies centres 
In contemporary Russian scholarship, “gender studies” and the related “sexuality studies” 
amalgamate methodological and analytical tools from Western feminism with historically rooted Russian 
theorizations and analyses of gender relations. Concern over the social realities of Russian women were 
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widely articulated during the first period of activity of Russian women’s movements in the mid-
nineteenth through early-twentieth centuries. For example, the political analysis of sexual relations was 
central in works by Alexandra Kollontai, a prominent communist ideologue in the early 1920s who 
promoted sexual liberation and the full inclusion of women in work, social, and political life (Yukina, 
2007). Still, despite the rich history of Russian/Soviet feminist thought, the country’s modern vocabulary 
of gender and sexuality studies rests predominantly on Western conceptions that were legitimized and 
institutionalized in Russia alongside processes of liberalization, economic privatization, and 
democratization that were imported to Russia from the U.S. in the late eighties (Tlostanova, 2015). As a 
result, terms and concepts are applied unevenly and evoke various contexts. 
The terms “gender,” “patriarchy,” and “feminism” in Russian are awkward, rootless, ahistorical 
transplants from English; however, they stand at the centre of contemporary Russian gender and sexuality 
studies. Moreover, the term “gender” has also entered Russian religious discourse, where it is explicitly 
associated with the threat of sexualization and feminism infiltrating from the West (Temkina, 2012). 
Political and legislative discourses also use a strange concoction of terms related to sexuality. Within 
these fields, it is not rare to find the archaic term “muzhelozhestvo” (literally, “man lying with man”), 
coming from religious texts, next to terms that have been adopted from English, such as “lesbianstvo” 
(“lesbianism”), “biseksualizm” (“bisexualism”), and “transgendernost” (“transgenderism”) (for analysis 
of terminology relating to sexuality in legal discourse, see Kondakov, 2010). Russian vocabulary 
describing gender categories—such as “pol” (biological/physiological sex) and “rod” (“kin” and 
grammatical “gender,” which, in Russian, includes masculine, feminine, and neutral)—are used less often 
by Russian scholars and activists than the terms “gay,” “lesbian,” “transgender,” and “queer,” which all 
come from Anglophone scholarship and LGBTQ movements. As a result, there are no analytical concepts 
within contemporary Russian scholarship that derive specifically from Russian gender vocabulary. 
Intersectional approaches to studying gender and sexuality are also quite limited in Russian 
scholarship. While the analysis of intersections of gender, sexuality, and class categories are present in 
some research (e.g. Kay, 2006; Stella, 2015), scholarship analyzing intersections of gender, sexuality, and 
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race or ethnicity is very rare. The are several reasons for this shortage. First, the analytical categories of 
“race,” “racialization,” and “ethnicity” have been absent from Russian scholarship for decades due to 
Soviet ideology, which actively sought to erase ethnic and cultural differences and replace them with a 
notion of a universal Soviet citizen. This, as Zakharov (2015) points out, made race a “legally 
unacceptable means for identity construction” (p. 5). What emerged in scholarship instead was the 
biological concept of “etnos” that allowed scholars to study social groups as biological organisms, to 
exclude ethnicities from their social and national histories, and to omit questions of racialization, 
marginalization, and oppression (Oushakine, 2009).3 The result of this erasure is the still widespread 
understanding of Russia as a racially and ethnically homogenous country, which is only ethnically diverse 
on the periphery4. Second, the study of race/ethnicity is seen as a field that is separate from and even 
competing with the field of gender and sexuality studies. The rare study of gender and/or sexuality in non-
ethnic Russian populations is either situated in the disciplines of ethnology and physical anthropology 
(Oushakine, 2009, pp. 79-129), or is conducted or commissioned by international agencies under the 
umbrella of “gender mainstreaming” (Shakirova, 2006), which I discuss further in this chapter. Devoid of 
critical analysis of colonialism and privileging essentializing understandings of racial/ethnic groups, such 
scholarship produces a predictable set of narratives in what Loffreda and Rankine (2015) would call “the 
scholarly racial imaginary.” This contributes to processes of racial/ethnic othering and the orientalization 
 
3 As Oushakine (2009) explains, etnos is based on the essentialist understanding of social groups as “etnos units” 
rooted in the natural world (as opposed to the constructivist view of ethnicity) and is used to describe “bio-psycho-
social” collectivities or “cultural genotypes”—not unlike scientific racism of European and American physical 
anthropology with a twist of Darwinian evolutionism. The discipline of etnologia (“ethnology”) was, and still is, 
concerned with studying natural conditions under which “etnos units” would develop and change. Oushakine’s study 
points to the revival of etnos theory in post-Soviet scholarship concerned with Russia’s “demographic problems” of 
low birth rates, high death rates, and the growing proportion of non-Russians in the country. For more criticism of 
Russian scientific ethnic taxonomies and their employment for purposes of colonization of Caucasus and Central 
Asia, see Tlostanova, 2008. 
4 According to the latest census data (Federal State Statistics Agency, 2012), there are approximately 200 different 
ethnicities and/or nationalities in Russia. Russia’s total population consists of 78% Russians, 3.7% Tatar, 1.4% 
Ukrainians, and 1% or less of every other ethnicity and/or nationality. The non-Russian and non-Slavic populations 
are predominantly residing in peripheral Southern and Northern provinces of Russia, and therefore people of white 
Slavic ethnicities constitute 90-98% in central territories of Russia. Although it is not a reason to underestimate the 
need for research decentralizing white Russianness, these numbers provide some explanation of why Russia is 
perceived as an ethnically homogenous country and why the ethnic Russian is prioritized as an object of scholarship. 
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of non-Russian population. Third, the limited access to financial, human and intellectual resources and the 
small number of gender and studies researchers (see Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2014) means that white 
Russianness is prioritized as the object of academic study and largely remains unmarked as a racial/ethnic 
category. Although very small, there are a number of scholars who started developing critical analytical 
language on race, racialization, ethnicity, and (post/neo)coloniality in the last decade (Reznikova, 2014; 
Tlostanova, 2010; Zakharov, 2015). I discuss these works further in this chapter. 
Some scholars of post-Soviet society describe this lack of Russian analytical vocabulary in 
gender and sexuality studies and studies of race and ethnicity as a symptom of colonial consciousness. A 
Russian anthropologist Serguei Oushakine (2002) characterizes colonial consciousness as “a deeply 
engrained crisis of identity, distrust for the creative possibilities of its own language, suspicion towards its 
own history and its own frames of reference” (p. 18). While Russia is itself a colonial power in terms of 
political and cultural influence in the Eurasian geographical region, what is meant by the term “colonial 
consciousness” here is the dependency of frames of explanation, theory, and research on post-Soviet 
politics and cultures on Euro-Atlantic theoretical and methodological constructions of knowledge 
(Tlostanova, 2015). Some scholars, however, argue that using the vocabulary, theory, and methods 
developed by gender and sexuality scholars in the West enriches Russian scholarship, which had, for 
decades, stagnated due to Soviet censorship (Vorontsov, 2014). Recently, adaptations of the theoretical 
vocabulary developed by feminists of colour in the Caribbean and North America have found their way 
into studies of gender and sexuality in Russian (post)colonial spaces through the work of a young 
generation of scholars who are in the process of their graduate studies (Kreolex.Center, n.d.; Reznikova, 
2015; discussed further in this chapter).  
The theoretical constraints of gender and sexuality studies stem from systemic problems in 
Russian academia and the historically marginalized position of not only gender studies, but social 
sciences in general. In his autobiographical book Eighty Years of Solitude (2008), Igor Kon, the first—
and for the longest time only—Soviet/Russian scholar working on topics of sex and sexuality from a 
position of sociology rather than medicine, described the deep feeling of intellectual loneliness 
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surrounding his work in the Soviet Union. As he explains, even though sexuality was a rich area of 
academic and medical inquiry before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, all of this knowledge was 
condemned, censored, and destroyed during the first several years of communist rule. Under Soviet 
ideology, sexuality was virtually non-existent, and sex was treated as the exclusive domain of medical 
doctors. Writing about sexuality from non-medical perspectives was nearly impossible under these 
conditions. Kon (2008) describes how some foreign books, even those kept in libraries, could only be 
accessed via special permits and were heavily censored for “anti-communist” content. Foreign books sent 
to him by mail were sometimes confiscated, and travelling to conferences across the border required 
special permission. Decisions regarding permission for travel and access were arbitrary and unpredictable. 
Therefore, Kon’s texts were first translated and published abroad in the late seventies. They were only 
published in Russian much later, in the nineties. Similarly, Tatyana Zaslavskaya (2007), a sociologist of 
Soviet economy, describes how the theory of political economy taught in Soviet universities was based on 
communist dogmas and ideology rather than on real economic situations. Publishing academic texts also 
required adherence to communist ideology and citations of party documents. Due to these limitations, 
scholars learned to read and write in double-speak, conveying their true meaning between the lines. The 
result of this complex relationship to official discourse, as Alexei Yurchak (2005) notes, was “the creation 
of an unanticipated cultural ‘surplus’ of meanings and realities that did not necessarily oppose the state’s 
communist goals but did not necessarily follow them either” (p. 287). 
As Kon explained in several of his texts (1993, 2008, 2010), the Communist Party during the 
Soviet period (1922-1991) hoped to desexualize women and transform the codes of gender relations that 
prevailed in tsarist Russia—those which Communist ideologues saw as outdated. Soviet 
conceptualizations of citizenship determined the value of individuals by their contribution to and place 
within the state’s collective production, as well as to their belonging within a specific community, such as 
a communist youth organization, a factory, or a collective agricultural unit (Bratochkin, 2014). Therefore, 
the Soviet doctrine on gender and sexuality was built on the rationalization of production, the 
standardization of modes of belonging, and a utilitarian view of the body that saw it as a tool of 
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production, separated from any aesthetic or sexual pleasure. As Helena Goscilo (2006) eloquently writes, 
“the politics of unanimity had rendered the Soviet body a predictable semiotic center subject to minimal 
variation” (p. 270). Everything, including the workplace, housing, public spaces and the way people 
looked, was organized around ideas of efficiency and functionality. This resulted into silencing of 
discussion on sex and sexual pleasure.5 
To improve the efficiency of production, early Soviet ideology aimed to eliminate historically 
established gender differences that oriented men towards the workplace and women towards the domestic 
sphere. Instead, communist ideologues proposed the establishment of a different gender regime, one 
where women and men were equally devoted to serving the needs of the people and the communist state 
at both work and home (Ashwin, 2000; Stella, 2015; Yukina, 2007). These new ideas were central to the 
creation of a new “Soviet citizen” and were established and maintained by the same mechanisms used to 
sustain the ideology of the party-state. These mechanisms included presence of party representatives in all 
workplaces, communal houses, institutions and organizations; mass propaganda campaigns; and large 
events, celebrations, and mobilizing initiatives that organized and structured the everyday involvement of 
individuals in communal citizenship. These communism-building mechanisms normalized new gendered 
discourses and dampened any visibility of sex and sexuality across all Soviet republics. 
In the “absence” of sexuality in public discourse were romantic communist ideas of pure love and 
intimacy that were expressed through one’s service to their family and workplace. These ideals, in turn, 
ultimately represented a Soviet citizen’s devotion to the state (Chuykina, 2002). These expressions were 
rooted in the work of Friedrich Engels, who criticized bourgeois family models that were based on 
economic relations and the ownership of private property (Yukina, 2007). Engels argued that men and 
women, respectively, represented the bourgeois exploiters and exploited proletariat. Thus, the liberation 
of women from the domestic sphere and their equal participation in a workforce was seen to be an issue 
 
5 A great interpretation of this can be found in a conversation between Nikolay Oleynikov and Keti Chukhrov 
(Oleynikov, 2014) about Soviet underwear; they exclaimed the underwear was so standardized, functional, and 
painfully ugly that if someone caught a rare glimpse of it in a movie, one would think about economics rather than 
sex. 
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of class emancipation. Soviet rhetoric also constructed homosexuality as a form of bourgeois decadence, 
which the state sought to eradicate by means of criminalization and complete negation of its existence.  
As Svetlana Chuykina (2002) shows, the Soviet ideological position on issues of love can be 
summarized in the popular slogan, “Domestic life is inseparable from politics!” (p. 102). The domestic 
sphere was described by the ideologues of the Communist Party as a synecdoche of communist society 
and was, therefore, a place where the personal was inevitably always political. Individual behaviour in 
sexual and familial relationships was viewed as a manifestation of one’s political stance: loyalty to or 
betrayal of the Communist Party. This created rigid norms of “good” gendered and sexual behaviour and 
prompted an omnipresent scrutiny of intimate relationships. This disciplinary policing was continuously 
enforced by one’s own family members, neighbours, employers, coworkers, fellow members of clubs, 
communities and associations. Such continuous surveillance also rested on the idea that a “good” person 
has nothing to hide and thus does not need a personal life. The notion of “the personal” in Soviet culture 
was associated with egoism, individualism, guilt, and a sense of personal duty, such as personal 
responsibility to sacrifice for the fatherland (Boym, 1995). The fact that there is no single word for 
“privacy” or “personal life” in Russian further points towards the absence of “the personal.” The closest 
alternative available (chastnaya zhizn), has rather negative connotations—something close to “secret 
life”. As a result of Soviet ideological postulates that made individual intimacy a political—as well as a 
public—matter, mainstream discourses romanticized heterosexual spiritual love and completely 
suppressed any public discussion or visibility of sex. 
In the context of authoritarian communism, scientific research on gender and sexuality also had to 
serve official state ideology. Sexuality was studied exclusively through a medical lens under the 
discipline of sexopathology, a section of Russian/Soviet clinical medicine that studied sexual disorders, 
including behavioural, personal, and social deviations (Shcheglov, 1993). From the end of the nineteenth 
century until the early sixties, sexopathology primarily collected encyclopedic knowledge of sex, such as 
information on sexual dysfunctions and statistics on the age of sexual maturation and entry into marriage. 
Yet, starting in the early sixties, due to a growing concern about low birth rates and rising instances of 
29 
 
divorce, the medical community led a resurgent interest in sex. This interest encouraged public debates on 
sex education and sexual hygiene, inspired medical research and publications on sexual diseases and 
behavioural disorders (including sexual “perversions,” prostitution, and transsexualism), and resulted in 
the establishment of “family guidance” clinics that provided medical and psychotherapeutic services to 
the public (Shcheglov, 1993). 
The monopoly sexopathology had on sexual discourse and representation, however, did not mean 
there were no alternatives; although heteronormativity, abstinence, and functionality defined the officially 
proclaimed sexual utopia of Soviet Russia, there existed informal expressions of everyday sexualities, 
including cruising spots, hidden same-sex relationships, sex for money, and other dissident sexualities 
(Kondakov, 2016a). Moreover, even though the official discourse reached for linguistic purity, Russian 
and everyday expressions have always been full of references to sexualized body parts and sexual acts in 
the form of folklore, jokes, and crude language (Kon, 1997). As Laura Engelstein (1992a) argues, 
dissident discourses on sexuality, from erotic literature of Russian authors to black-market porn, 
employed sexual taboos to protest the prohibition of pleasure and censoring regimes imposed on the 
Russian population. These underground sexual expressions were, unfortunately, replete with misogyny, 
homophobia, and sexual violence (Borenstein, 2007). Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) define this 
twofold reality of sexual culture—an official one that negated, moralized, and romanticized sex, and a 
colloquial, everyday one that highly vulgarized and rationalized sex—as a “hypocritical sexual regime.” 
The social circumstances of everyday living, such as housing shortages and constant surveillance, limited 
privacy and intimacy for citizens, making it difficult for them to develop discourses that would, on the 
one hand, escape the romanticized and unrealistic ideals of sexual purity, and, on the other hand, avoid 
succumbing to violent and exploitative representations of sex. I maintain that this hypocritical 
employment of both discourses, that of respectability and that of sexual violence, is a characteristic of 
political discourse in contemporary Putin’s Russia. One can spot it in Putin’s pro-natalist family-praising 
rhetoric and metaphors of sexual aggression and crude language in his passionate anti-terrorist speeches 
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(see Chapter 2). It is also present in popular representations of political conflicts, such as in sexist and 
transphobic political cartoons in the context of Russia-Ukraine conflict (see Chapter 3). 
In post-Soviet Russia, gender and sexuality became sites of engaging with both nostalgia (Boym, 
2001; Nadkarni & Shevchenko, 2004) and consumption (Humphrey, 2002; Shevchenko, 2002). Led by 
Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the nineteen-eighties, the political reforms of glasnost (“openness”) and 
perestroika (“economic restructuring”) ended Soviet-style censorship in the media and initiated a 
reorientation away from the country’s communist centralized economy towards economic competition, 
privatization, and the establishment of a free neoliberal market. These changes greatly affected the 
knowledge and politics of sex, gender, and sexuality in Russia. Officially liberated from omnipresent 
surveillance and communist propaganda in 1991, post-Soviet Russians were enthusiastic about getting rid 
of the old gender regime. This meant discarding ideas of gender equality, retiring gendered ideals of 
serving the state, regaining a separation between private and public spheres of life, and reinstating 
essentialist gender roles. Russian sociologists called this return to essentialism a “patriarchal renaissance” 
(Posadskaya, 1993; Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2014). Contemporary moral panics over the loss of 
idealized “pure love” and the simplicity of life without sex can also be seen as expressions of a nostalgic 
longing for Soviet times, imagining oneself in a time and place that has been lost. In contrast, 
consumption, became a way of constructing identity and expressing individual agency in a fast-changing 
and unstable post-communist world (Shevchenko, 2002).  
Democratic reforms and cultural changes prompted the rapid proliferation of discourses on sex 
and sexual pleasure, as well as a large-scale commodification of sexuality—processes the old Soviet 
regime had, for decades, associated with the moral decline of the West. Seeking inclusion in the European 
community, Russia decriminalized homosexuality in 1993 and incorporated a series of anti-discrimination 
directives into its legal system (though, whether these legal advancements were actually followed is 
another issue). Russia’s revived interest in sex produced a variety of expert knowledge, including 
television programs discussing all matters related to sex, sex advice columns in Cosmopolitan magazine, 
which was first published in Russia in 1994, and the legitimization of research on gender and sexuality 
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through newly established gender studies institutes. A talk show “Pro Eto” (“About That”) ran on the 
National TV channel from 1997 to 2000. It was dedicated exclusively to sex, addressing issues such as 
homosexuality, bisexuality, sexual health, and sexual harassment (Borenstein, 2007). These multiple sites 
of debate on sexual matters demonstrate how previously silenced and negated realities—such as, sex for 
pleasure, sexual orientation, sex work, STIs and HIV/AIDS—were suddenly normalized aspects of 
everyday life. The explosion of sexual discourses came with some backlash; as sex became omnipresent 
in public spaces and visual cultures, the public concern regarding promiscuity, pornography, and sexism 
in the media rapidly increased (Kon, 1993; Attwood, 1993). Sexuality emerged as a vessel for post-Soviet 
citizens to channel their hopes, dreams, anxieties, and the emotional challenges of adjusting to a new 
model of the self. The national conceptualization of the individual moved from the old homo sovieticus, a 
model-citizen that desired labour, dreamed of high production outputs, and was faithful to the state, to a 
new citizen that was driven by individual desires and the consumer market. 
Gender politics, research, and education developed in Russia and other post-Soviet countries as 
part of a wider social, political, and economic modernization project. The project was prompted, 
monitored, and sustained by international organizations and private Western funds (Shakirova, 2006; 
Zimmerman, 2005), and the renewed openness of Russia’s physical and symbolic borders provided new 
collaborative opportunities between Western and Russian researchers. Russian scholars could now go 
abroad, attend conferences, and work together with researchers in the West, while Soviet archives were 
reopened and became accessible to both Russian and Western historians. Russian social science projects 
started to receive substantial funding from international foundations, including the MacArthur, Ford, 
Open Society, and Heinrich Boll Foundations (Kondakov, 2016b; Shakirova, 2012; Temkina & 
Zdravomyslova, 2014). The move from Russian government-sponsored funding for research to 
international and private project funding meant that Russian scholars had to adapt the language, topics, 
and methodology of research to the requirements of international foundations—quite a difficult task for 
many researchers who were not fluent in English (Kon, 2008). At the same time, these funding 
opportunities attracted many anti-feminist and pseudo-scientific projects, which used the analytical 
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language of gender studies without actually applying feminist theory and methods. This created a 
paradoxical situation in which some scholars who self-identified as feminists executed research that 
advocated for a return to distinct gender roles and otherwise supported pronatalist nationalist ideologies of 
the state (Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2014). 
The other problem that international funding brought was constraints to theoretical, 
methodological, and political approaches. A gender studies scholar and activist from Kazakhstan, 
Svetlana Shakirova (2006), writes that with funding post-Soviet spaces had to adopt international research 
and a political agenda of gender mainstreaming. This stifled and orientalized both scholarship and 
activism and was only somewhat efficient in driving political and legal changes. As Shakirova (2006) 
poignantly explains the main problem:  
In international networks of women’s movements, we frequently take the role of the exotic 
Other to water-down the ‘norm.’ The fact that we have to focus on the worst forms of gender 
discrimination and inequality [in our communities] in order to justify legitimacy of our 
activities also points toward our orientalist service to the West. Proliferation of the themes of 
bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan, sex trafficking in Central Asia, women’s self-immolation in 
Uzbekistan, arranged marriages in Tajikistan, prostitution in Kazakhstan, etc.—what is that 
if not following orientalist clichés? (para. 5) 
Similarly, Tlostanova (2008) further extrapolates that Russian peripheries and non-European post-Soviet 
states are subjected to what she calls “secondary orientalism,” defined as “the copying of western 
orientalism with a slight deviation and necessarily, with a carefully hidden, often unconscious feeling that 
Russia itself is a form of a mystic and mythic Orient for the West” (p. 1).   
In spite of these challenges, the political conditions for developing and institutionalizing gender 
studies were overall favourable after the collapse of the Soviet Union, since Russia sought political 
integration into the international sphere and was rapidly making legal advances in the spheres of human 
rights and feminism. Yet the fact that sexuality and gender studies developed primarily through the 
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collaboration with and funding from foreign investors deeply affected the theoretical and thematic foci of 
the scholarship and the position of gender studies as a discipline in Russia. While Russian scholars saw 
gender studies as an innovative and modern field, the government and society saw it as foreign-born and 
anti-Russian. 
Framing gender and sexuality studies as non-Russian disciplines 
In Russian academia, gender studies formed under the marginal discipline of “public sociology,” 
which had been a locus for criticism of the political regime and advocacy for democratic reforms in the 
nineties. The concept of gender as a social category that describes the experience of women under 
patriarchy began to develop in Russia in 1989. In the early nineties, it was at least partially legitimized as 
an object of study within the newly established gender research centres in Moscow, St Petersburg, Tver’, 
and Samara. The European University in St Petersburg was established in 1996 and became a leading 
institution in sociological research on gender and sexual identities, behaviours, and politics from feminist 
and LGBTQ-inclusive perspectives. These gender research centres generated many research projects that 
gathered statistical and ethnographic data across Russia. Having previously been cut off from the 
international academic community due to Soviet censorship, Russian researchers were now eager to 
incorporate Western sociological and gender theory into their studies. However, they also introduced 
some new theoretical concepts to describe the gendered realities of Russian society, such as “state 
patriarchy,” “etacractic gender order,”6 and the previously mentioned “patriarchal renaissance” (Temkina 
& Zdravomyslova, 2014). Thematically, gender scholars of the nineties focused on women in the labour 
market, discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, the feminization of poverty, the 
underrepresentation of women in politics, the prevalence of abortion, the lack of sex education, and 
problems facing sexual minorities (Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2014; Tartakovskaya, 2010). This 
academic research and analysis provided a gendered criticism of post-Soviet realities, warning against the 
 
6 Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) describe the etacratic gender order as a monopoly of the party-state on the 
production of stable and homogenous gender roles and norms that are implemented through strict institutional 
surveillance. 
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pitfalls of returning to essentialist understandings of gender. The opening of the Soviet borders and 
archives also made it possible for Western researchers to conduct historical and ethnographic studies of 
sexuality in Russia. This resulted in Laura Engelstein’s (1992b) history of sexuality in late imperial 
Russia, Dan Healey’s (2001) study of homosexuality in Stalin’s Gulag camps, Eric Naiman’s (1997) 
work on sex in early-Soviet ideology, and Laurie Essig’s (1999) rich, ten-year long ethnographic study of 
queer communities in Moscow. 
At the end of the nineties, feminism and gender studies in Russia stopped being a priority for 
international funding organizations and private funds. This situation caused serious financial challenges 
for gender studies centres and research projects (Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2014). In addition, research 
that was primarily focused on gender—and even the term “gender” itself—was increasingly perceived as 
a threat to “authentic” Russian discourse and to building a new nationalist society under Vladimir Putin. 
During Putin’s presidency, gender and sexuality have become sites of conflict over nationalist values, and 
sexuality has increasingly been framed as a social problem (Stella, 2015). Putin’s public image campaigns 
exploited gender and sexuality by promoting essentialist and pronatalist discourses and bolstering the 
image of a strong patriarchal leader (see Chapter 2). Further, a series of laws have been implemented that 
support patriarchal gender roles and nationalism. This includes the federal law “For the Purpose of 
Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values,” which is 
widely known as the “gay propaganda” law, approved in 2013. Additionally, in 2017 the reformulation of 
the laws criminalizing domestic violence significantly reduced women’s protection from battery. Putin’s 
administration has also promoted panics regarding low birth rates in the country, increased conservative 
mobilization, executed an authoritarian crackdown on mass protests, and strengthened the Russian 
Orthodox Church, which has always seen feminism and discourse on sex as a threat to morality. These 
legal and social changes have significantly affected the discipline of gender studies in Russia. 
The attempt to undermine feminist and LGBTQ-inclusive research is epitomized by the state’s 
current attempts to shut down the European University in St Petersburg (EUSP). According to the 
efficiency rankings conducted by the Ministry of Education and Science in 2016, the EUSP is the top 
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university in the country in terms of scientific and research accomplishments among 830 universities 
(EUSP, 2016a). Despite this recognition of its high-quality work, the EUSP was ordered to relinquish its 
scientific and educational work and to vacate the building in December 2016 (EUSP, 2016b). This 
decision was made following a series of audits initiated by the Ministry of Education’s inspectorate and 
members of Russian parliament, who had previously criticized the institution for carrying out anti-
Russian research, receiving sponsorship from abroad, serving foreign interests, and hosting foreign 
professors and students. The audits cited several minor administrative and technical issues as reasons for 
the institution’s closure, such as a lack of sport facilities. However, none of the audits revealed substantial 
violations in relation to conducting research, publishing, or educating. Additionally, no financial 
violations were found. The university issued a statement (EUSP, 2016b) detailing a long process of 
appeals and corrections to the violations. This statement concluded that the primary reasons for the 
initiation of the audits and final decision to close the institution were political, since the university is a 
leading institution in LGBTQ and feminist research in Russia. After the University moved to a different 
building and after long series of additional audits, the license allowing the university to continue 
educational activities was reinstalled in August 2018. The suspension of the license and requirements to 
change the location of the University significantly interfered with its work and demoralized its students, 
faculty, and administrative staff (EUSP, 2018). 
The EUSP is not the only institution that has been targeted by the government. In 2012, Russia 
passed a federal law that requires independent groups receiving any foreign funding—including as little 
as $8 for a newsletter subscription from abroad (Amnesty International, 2016)—and engaging in political 
activity to register with the Justice Ministry as “foreign agents,” a term historically associated with 
treason and espionage in Russia. Many organizations have protested and boycotted the law, but they were 
added to the “registry of nonprofit organizations performing the functions of a foreign agent” against their 
consent. Since passing the law, the registry has listed 158 groups, among them the Centre for Social 
Policy and Gender Studies in Saratov, the Arkhangelsk regional LGBT organization, the Samara Centre 
for Gender Studies, the Women’s League in Kaliningrad, Women of the Don in Rostov region, and 
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Women of Eurasia in Chelyabinsk. According to the Human Rights Watch report (HRW, 2017), About 
30 organizations have shut down, while others must deal with the consequences of a negative reputation, 
increased scrutiny, and potential criminal charges for treason. 
The persecution of gender and sexuality studies has been occurring within the context of national 
discourse on the low birthrates embedded in the nationalist ideology of pronatalism (Rivkin-Fish, 2006). 
Pronatalism includes concerns for the health and morality of women, the fear of changes to stereotypical 
gender roles, the belief that sex education and family planning programs are morally outrageous, the 
distrust of foreign influences, and a preoccupation with the ethnic purity of the Russian population. 
Serguei Oushakine (2009) connects the concern with a decline in the Russian population due to low birth 
rates and to the prevalent feeling of mourning over what he calls “ethnic trauma.”  This “ethic trauma” 
stems from the loss of Russianness as spiritual (“Russian in vastness of the soul”) and national (“Russian 
in enormity of territory and population”). The language of feminism and LGBTQ rights used by gender 
and sexuality studies becomes a target for pronatalist nationalism not only because it challenges 
heteropatriarchal norms but also because it is perceived as harming white Russianness. As Rivkin-Fish 
(2006) suggests, there is little activism against pronatalist discourse and policies because the rhetoric of 
pronatalism is contextualized within concerns for the nation’s future. Therefore, opposition risks being 
seen as betraying the nation altogether and working in concert with foreign interests against the Russian 
people.  
In the early 1990s, Russian scholars were already demonstrating that the resurgence of gender 
essentialism and patriarchal structures of society were some of the most significant changes in post-Soviet 
Russian culture and politics (Posadskaya, 1993). The popularization of feminist discourse and its 
association with notions of progress, modernity, and democracy, which occurred immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, were brief. During the democratization process, a commitment to gender 
equality was established through the Constitution of the Russian Federation as well as in newly adopted 
anti-discrimination laws. Furthermore, multiple committees on women’s issues were put into place within 
governmental and administrative institutions. However, feminist scholars have demonstrated that these 
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changes were purely nominal; the anti-discrimination laws were not followed in practice and were 
therefore ineffective. Participation of women in representational politics was extremely low, and by the 
early 2000s, almost every women’s group within Russia’s political and administrative institutions were 
either disbanded or had effectively ceased to function (Aivazova, 2007). The organizations that 
represented Russian feminism in the nineties de-radicalized and disassociated themselves from feminism. 
For example, in the nineties, women’s crisis centres fought against domestic violence against women, 
criticized male gender roles that legitimize such violence, and advocated for women-only spaces. By the 
end of Putin’s second presidential term in 2012, the few remaining crisis centres were framing the issue of 
domestic violence in gender-neutral terms, as violence against anyone by anyone in the family, and had 
abandoned the idea of women-only spaces (Johnson & Saarinen, 2013). Moreover, post-Soviet discourse 
condemned the Soviet era’s principles of gender equality and its idealization of the androgynous worker-
woman. Instead, post-Soviet culture embraced the previously non-existent separation of public and 
private spheres and conceptualized these spaces as “naturally” gendered (Kay, 2006). This patriarchal 
renaissance only further intensified with the consolidation of Putin’s rule. 
Many scholars of Russia have documented that since the beginning of Putin’s presidency in 2000, 
public discourse, popular values, and gendered representation have relied heavily on patriarchal gender 
stereotypes. The research of sociologists Tatyana Riabova and Oleg Riabov (2010) shows a strong 
countrywide idealization of Putin as a “real man,” with his wit, determination, physical toughness, and 
strength of opinion cited as the most desirable traits of Russian virility. Similarly, Valerie Sperling (2015) 
argues that the sexualization of Putin’s hypermasculinity was one of the most successful tactics of his 
political campaign and served to legitimize his governing. Neotraditional models of masculinity, which 
are characterized by aggression and excess, have also been popularized in public discourse through 
advertising (Kay, 2006) and popular culture (Borenstein, 2007). Not surprisingly, neotraditional models 
of femininity place women as a vulnerable segment of the population in need of paternalist social 
policies. This ideology also stresses that women have a gender-determined civil function: the 
demographic reproduction of the nation. Sociologists Elena Zdravomyslova and Anna Temkina (2007) 
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claim that this hegemonic ideology of pronatalist nationalism leaves women with only three available 
behaviour models: working mothers, housewives, or hypersexual women (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 
2007). According to Elena Gapova (2016), the revival of gender essentialism, with its masculine 
competitiveness and objectification of women, fits neatly into the post-Soviet goals of establishing 
systems of class stratification and a culture of consumerism, both of which have been legitimized and 
prioritized as central features of a progressive, market-driven post-Soviet Russia. Overall, these analyses 
of Russian patriarchal gender regimes demonstrate that the conservative change in conceptualizing, 
governing, and representing gender is closely related to economic and political changes in contemporary 
Russia.  
The paternalist, nationalist ideology of modern-day Russia is further fueled by public debate on a 
variety of social crises that are seen to be threats to modern Russian identity. As mentioned above, these 
crises include the country’s demographic decline, its crisis of masculinity, and the loss of national identity 
under Western liberal influence. However, as historians of gender politics show, these social realities are 
nothing new for Russia; they were a popular focus of political discourse during the late Soviet period 
through the nineties (Meshcherkina, 2000; Prokhorova, 2006; Rivkin-Fish in Goscilo & Lanoux, 2006). 
Soviet leaders often framed low birth rates and high mortality as direct threats to the strength of the 
Russian nation, claiming they were a result of Western influence and, in particular, its sexual liberalism 
(Rotkirch, Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2007). Nowadays, the moral decline of the West and its 
acceptance of homosexuality are again favourite tropes of contemporary religious and nationalist Russian 
discourses (Riabov & Riabova, 2014). The nationalist rhetoric of Putin’s administration capitalizes on 
these public anxieties by framing the demographic decline as one of the nation’s most-threatening 
problems (Rotkirch et al., 2007).  
In addition to concern over the country’s demographic decline, a crisis of masculinity is also 
frequently mentioned as a national problem. Political and media sources paint a picture of Russian men 
being unable to provide for themselves and their families, feeling unfulfilled, and failing to lead 
meaningful lives. Scholars also name low life expectancy, alcoholism, and high suicide rates as symptoms 
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of this crisis. These concerns about masculinity, although often exaggerated and dramatized, are quite 
real. For example, Rebecca Kay’s (2006) extensive ethnographic study of masculinity in both urban and 
rural Russia demonstrates the contradictory situation that Russian men find themselves in: on the one 
hand, they are seen to be strong, protective, dangerous, unrestrained and prone to excessive risk-taking, 
alcohol consumption, and violence, yet on the other hand, men are failing financially, are unable to adapt 
to socio-economic changes, and are burdensome on hard-working and resourceful women. The large-
scale demoralization of low-income men in particular sits in stark contrast to the Russian nouveau riche, a 
relatively small group of men who rapidly accumulated an incredible amount of wealth as a result of the 
economic reforms in the nineties and whose consumerist and violent masculinities fit the modern national 
ideal (Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004; Goscilo & Azhgikhina, 2002). As the Soviet-style model of productivity-
based masculinity no longer guarantees economic and symbolic status, working-class men commonly 
aspire to neoliberal types of masculinity that are based on individuality, self-expression, and consumption 
(Vanke & Tartakovskaya, 2016). In the context of widespread poverty, these ideals are incredibly hard to 
achieve, and Russian masculinity is, thus, perpetually haunted by narratives of failure. In mainstream 
discourses, narratives of this masculinity crisis have transformed into moral panics, ultimately fueling the 
demonization of feminism and homosexuality. 
Quite paradoxically, the essentialist interpretation of gender roles and contemporary narratives of 
crisis happened at the same time as the rapid liberalization and increasing visibility of sexuality. 
Discourses on sex have multiplied and sex is now starting to be recognized as important to many areas of 
life—from advertising and political campaigns to self-fulfillment. This explosion of discourses was a 
momentous change, since the Soviet communist regime previously monopolized the production of 
discourses on sex, sexuality, and the body. The liberalization of discourses on sexuality in the nineties and 
the development of a culture in which intimacy is more valued, as well as more attainable, produced a 
“rational sexual discourse” (Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2007, p. 226) that acknowledges, even if quite 
often contemptuously, the existence of non-marital sex and sexual pleasure, as well as non-
heteronormativity, sex work, and sexually transmitted infections—i.e., the “degeneracies” that were 
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previously excluded from public discourse and existed only in the rare, specialized literature of 
sexopathology. 
During the early post-Soviet transitional period of liberalization, Russian society was beset with 
contradictions. As Adele Marie Barker (1999), a scholar of Russian popular culture, adeptly puts it, “like 
Russia itself, [the] new popular culture [found] itself torn between its own heritage and that of the West, 
between its revulsion with the past and its nostalgic desire to re-create the markers of it, between the lure 
of the lowbrow and the pressures to return to the elitist prerevolutionary past” (p. 5). Eliot Borenstein 
(2007) uses the term “overkill” to describe the dominance of images of crisis, bleakness, and grimness, 
such as joyless sex, violent crime, poverty, and domestic conflict, in the popular culture of the nineties. 
He further explains how the sexualization and brutalization of public spaces and visual cultures—e.g., 
advertisements, mass media, popular films, television series, and pornography—provided “the symbolic 
vocabulary for the expression of fundamental anxieties about national pride, cultural collapse, and the 
frightening new moral landscape of Yeltsin’s Russia” (Borenstein, 2007, p. 23). Thus, sex became a way 
to express the political, economic, and psychological states in which Russia found itself after 
democratization—a state characterized by a crisis of masculinity, the instability of national identity, and 
widespread geopolitical confusion (Borenstein, 2007). 
The visual culture of sexualized despair and violence remains, but over the last two decades, it 
has been complicated by sexual and gendered discourses that focus on family, intimacy, and 
consumerism, as well as by more optimistic and satirical engagements with sexuality. The sexualization 
of everyday life has been increasingly used as a tool for the political legitimization of power. There’s no 
clearer example of this than the political campaigns of President Vladimir Putin, which often include 
sexualized images of young women. As I discuss in Chapter 2, Putin himself has demonstrated his macho 
strength and fit body on numerous occasions (e.g., shirtless horse-riding, swimming with dolphins, 
tranquilizing a Siberian tiger). Sperling’s (2015) exploration of political discourses during Putin’s 
presidency shows that an adherence to gender norms in contemporary Russia is a highly meaningful 
aspect of cultural identity. Sperling (2015) further contends that “the availability of a sexist and 
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misogynist cultural idiom and the absence of a sizeable Russian feminist movement make the use of 
gender norms and the sexualization of politics possible in a way that it would not be in a community 
where overt sexism was no longer seen as acceptable in the political realm” (p. 4). Yet, on the other hand, 
in her analysis of youth politics in Putin’s Russia, Julie Hemment (2015) calls for caution when using a 
feminist lens to critique the sexualization of the public sphere in Russia. She urges us to keep in mind that 
Russian responses to sex in public culture rest on an understanding of sex, gender, satire, and politics that 
is quite different from that of Western feminist approaches. Further, she cautions, Russian uses of public 
sex and feminist critiques are enmeshed in global systems of power and political economy that redefine 
our relationship and understanding of authoritarianism, liberalism, and capitalism (Hemment, 2005). 
Writing on “arousing” patriotism in today’s Russia, Hemment instead suggests looking at the 
sexualization of Putin and patriotic pronatalism as “geopolitical performances” (2005, p. 180). The author 
argues that by participating in these processes, Putin’s supporters use sex as a display of Russian power as 
well as a critique of liberalism and globalization, which they argue devalues Russian national identity. 
However, Putin and his allies are not the only ones utilizing sex; the political opposition also widely 
harnesses narratives of sex and gender. Some examples include queer activists popularizing images of 
“drag Putin” to confront homophobic legislation (Paulauskas, 2015), Ukrainian nationalist youth 
challenging Putin’s masculinity in chants during protest marches (Golovetskiy, 2014), and countercultural 
artists such as Voina (“war”), Pussy Riot, and Piotr Pavelsnky using sexualized expressions of political 
protest in their art, which I discuss in Chapter 2.  
Alongside Russia’s patriarchal renaissance and the resurgence of hypersexualization, homophobia 
has also been a defining feature of Russian culture in global media. This is particularly true of the “gay 
propaganda” law enacted in 2013 and its attendant legitimation of anti-gay violence. Homophobia in 
Russia and restrictions on homosexuality have been at the forefront of contemporary research on Russian 
sexualities by both Russian and non-Russian scholars. Kon writes that homophobia in Russia, on the one 
hand, constitutes a part of the country’s general sexophobia, and, on the other hand, is closely related to a 
form of xenophobia that constructs complex racial-sexual figurations of otherness through a combination 
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of anti-Semitism, Russian supremacy, machismo, and homophobia (Kon, 2008). Adi Kuntsman (2008) 
argues that contemporary forms of Russian homophobia are closely related to the culture of Soviet 
prisons. Analyzing modern homophobic discourse, Kuntsman finds that perpetrators of anti-gay violence 
use language that is similar to the language of the hierarchical systems and practices of sexual punishment 
and domination that governed the Soviet Gulag. This history complicates modern understandings of 
homophobia in Russia, as it demonstrates that it is not only based on individual prejudice but is also the 
legacy of a culture of punishment, repression, and criminality. Thus, contemporary homophobia 
associates homosexuality with criminality and monstrosity.  
Laurie Essig (2014) notes that the increase of homophobia in contemporary Russia is a result of 
two phenomena: the first is the concerted efforts of Putin’s political campaigns, which have used 
homophobia as a political platform, and the second is the growing influence of the Russian Orthodox 
Church and its postulates of gender normativity and sexual abstinence. Dan Healey (2014) further claims 
that homophobic rhetoric is nothing new in Russian politics, but rather, it has been recently refined in two 
ways: First, the rhetoric has been strengthened by the addition of religious arguments to official legal and 
medical discourses that pathologize homosexuality. As a result, homophobic discourse has been 
popularized among Orthodox believers. Second, the discourse has been simplified through the 
categorization of sexualities into “traditional” and “non-traditional,” which strengthens the idea of 
queerness having non-Russian origins. In this way, homophobic discourse connects heteronormativity to 
national belonging. According to research by Soboleva and Bakhmetjev (2015), Russian LGBTQ citizens 
themselves recognize how homophobic campaigns instrumentalize LGBTQ issues for other purposes, 
such as developing a dichotomy in which a “traditional” Russia is placed in opposition to a liberal and 
sexually permissive West. 
However, the regulation of non-heteronormative desire occurs beyond the sanctioning of 
violence. Alexander Kondakov (2013) argues that even though homosexuality is not criminalized as such, 
the unintelligibility of non-heteronormative relationships creates an aura of illegality and censorship. He 
points out that the legal discourse limiting gay visibility uses the terms “propaganda” and 
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“homosexualism,” and therefore, it characterizes homosexuality as an ideology rather than a sexual 
orientation. In doing so, it likens favourable discourse on homosexuality to claims of social, racial, 
national, and religious supremacy, which are prohibited under the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
This law, as Kondakov (2013) notes, breaks the regulatory silence in the legal sphere and attempts to 
directly restrict LGBTQ activism while defining the contours of Russian sexual citizenship. 
However, not every scholar of Russian sexuality views the situation as being as dire as the ones 
cited above. For example, Francesca Stella (2015) cautions against using Western theorizations of sexual 
citizenship, such as the one developed by Jeffrey Weeks (1998), in which sexual subjectivity has a certain 
constitutive function in the development and maintenance of sexual identities and sexual activism that 
demands inclusion in legal, social, and political institutions. As Stella argues, Russian forms of sexual 
citizenship do not afford the same kind of significance to sexual subjectivity; according to the Russian 
queer citizens Stella interviewed for her ethnographic project, their sexuality is not part of meaningful 
political action and they do not support activism that is based on LGBTQ visibility, association, and 
political representation. Admittedly, this is partly because of the stigmatization of sexuality during the 
decades of Soviet censorship, but it is also due to the visibility of sexuality being positioned as dangerous. 
The inclusion of queer people in the liberal marketplace and commercial consumption is only starting to 
emerge in Russia. As a result, attempts to redefine LGBTQ people as consumer-citizens, and thus as 
subjects written into normativity, are ineffective. 
The contemporary Russian public sphere can be characterized by both the coexistence and 
confrontation of nationalist ideologies that promote heteropatriarchy—which are supported by the 
Russian Orthodox Church—and a liberal secular ideology that pushes for gender equality (Vorontsov, 
2014). The ideology of gender equality and the hypersexualization of public space directly undermine the 
traditional gender regime, and thus the state and the church continuously frame it as anti-reproductive and 
anti-Russian. This has set the stage for numerous “national crises” in relation to what the church and state 
see as failing morals regarding sexuality and gender norms. These crises reflect changes in gendered, 
sexual, and national identities in post-Soviet society, and as such, they are both real and imaginary. In 
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reality, the crises describe economic stresses, mental and physical health problems, and the instability of 
individual and collective identities. Yet they are simultaneously imaginary in that they are highly 
exaggerated in political discourse, framed within moral panic rhetoric, and used to justify restrictive 
nationalist ideologies. Ultimately, the new political and religious sexual doctrine pathologizes any 
utterance on the topic of sex, justifies homophobic violence, and demonizes feminism and women’s 
reproductive, sexual, and civil rights. In this political climate, the gendered and sexual “other” becomes a 
scapegoat, an easy target—and the restriction, exclusion, and eradication of it becomes a solution. It is 
within this context that such conservative policies of banning “homosexual propaganda,” sanctioning 
domestic violence, and thwarting the work of research centres and non-governmental organizations in 
Russia have developed. However, due to increasing international attention regarding homophobia in 
Russia—including the international support campaigns during the public trial and incarceration of 
feminist punk band Pussy Riot (discussed in Chapter 2) and transnational actions to help Chechen gay 
people to flee from persecution (discussed in Chapter 4)—voices of LGBTQ activists in Russia have 
found a public platform. Although these voices are not unified, and although the contours of Russian 
queer politics are murkier than ever before, Russian sexual dissidents’ opinions on sex and politics 
became more visible than before. Furthermore, in this context, queerness signifies resistance not only to 
gender normativity but also to a whole array of political problems. 
Gender and sexuality studies as forms of resistance 
In the contemporary Russian climate, many academics are simultaneously activists, organizers, 
and artists; it is often hard to distinguish these roles. For example, Temkina and Zdravomyslova (2014), 
in describing their career paths and the peculiarities of being feminist academics in Russia, write that 
being gender studies scholars today means not only researching and teaching, but also providing expertise 
and support to human rights groups as well as participating in often-hostile talk shows. The development 
of gender and sexuality studies, the discipline’s positioning as anti-Russian, and the recent applications of 
queer and anti-colonial critical approaches demonstrate that Russian scholarship in these areas should be 
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understood as political resistance to both Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism and the Western gaze. In 
this section, I trace the connections between scholarship and activism, including recent engagements of 
scholars with the decentralization of Russian whiteness. 
In Russia, writing about homosexuality was almost impossible until the nineties. Yet, even with 
the explosion of sex-expertise at that time there were very few Russian scholars studying this topic 
seriously. According to Igor Kon (2010), public discussion regarding homosexuality from scientific and 
humanitarian points of view began in 1987-1990, and the emergence of activism on behalf of sexual 
minorities themselves started in 1991-1993. The newly founded activist organizations, such as 
Association of Sexual Minorities in Moscow, have drawn on discourses of human rights and financial and 
political support of American LGBTQ organizations (Kon, 2010, p. 293). As a result of educational 
publications and direct action on the streets LGBTQ issues in Russia were transformed from medical 
concerns into political battles. Additionally, the opening of borders and increased access to archives in the 
nineties sparked interest in new ethnographic possibilities for studying Russia. Over the past two decades, 
LGBTQ desires, identities, and behaviours in Russia have been major topics of interest for Western-based 
researchers. A lot of this research, however, has continued to look at Russia through a lens of difference, 
thus continuing the tradition of “inventing Eastern Europe” (Wolff, 1994), moreover the studies 
privileged Russian metropolitan centers over peripheries and thus the intersections of sex and gender with 
marginalizations based on race/ethnicity and remote geographical location remained unstudied.  
The first significant ethnographic research on Russian queers was conducted by American 
anthropologist Laurie Essig (1999) over the course of a ten-year stay in St Petersburg that began in the 
late eighties. Although Essig’s was not the first immersive study of queer cultures in Russia,7 it opened 
new terrains for exploring questions about Russian same-sex desire from modern Western understandings 
of queer identity and subjectivity. The main argument proposed by Essig is that Russian homosexuality 
 
7 British novelist Duncan Fallowell (1994) and American journalist David Tuller (1996) provided accounts of 
Russian homosexual life during their travels there in the early nineties. See James Baer (2002) for a critique of 
Fallowell’s and Tuller’s conceptualization of Russian sexuality as erotically liberating. For a historical analysis of 
travel writing on Russia and exotification of Russian sexuality, see Larrie Wolff (1994). 
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does not crystallize into gay and lesbian identities in the same way as it does in the West because of the 
fluid nature of Russian sexuality. She found this fluidity in people’s reluctance to adopt sexuality as an 
important part of their identity and in their unwillingness to mobilize around sexual rights. Essig has also 
described the fluidity of gender identity in Russian queer circles, an observation that was based on Essig’s 
participation in cruising and cross-dressing in St Petersburg. This fluidity results in what Essig (1999) 
calls “politics without identity,”—i.e., politics based on subjectivity rather than identity (p. 81). This kind 
of politics brings people without consistent sexual identities together for temporary and occasional 
common projects—cruising practices, festivals and celebrations, small political protests, and more. For 
example, an individual could be in a heterosexual marriage and still be a part of a monthly lesbian poetry 
gathering. These kinds of imagined communities of “our people” exist outside the strict limitations of 
binary and inflexible identities of heterosexuality and homosexuality (Essig, 2014). 
Brian J. Baer (2002), an American historian of Russian literature, describes two prominent 
cultural figures that are significant for understanding queer identities in the context of Russian modernity. 
The first, the “spiritual homosexual,” embodies Russian national identity through the centrality of ideas of 
“soul” and “suffering.” The second, contrasting, figure is the “lesbian,” who is very intimately attuned to 
the body, sexuality, and everything carnal (Baer, 2002, 2009). By analyzing the presence of these figures 
in Russian literature and film, Baer demonstrates that the question of homosexuality for Russians is 
“often inseparable from the burning question of Russia’s place in the new world order and of Russia’s 
relationship to modernity itself” (Baer, 2009, p. 36). According to Baer, in Russian post-Soviet literature, 
homosexuality belongs to a series of images that illustrate the disturbing loss of difference and resulting 
identity crises that characterize post-Soviet life. Additionally, he claims that “the Russian homosexual, 
constructed as a ‘suffering soul,’ in contrast to his hedonistic cousin, the ‘global gay,’ earns himself a 
central place within the national community not through a discourse of civil rights but rather through the 
deeply spiritual discourse of soul” (Baer, 2009, p. 15). Baer demonstrates that homosexuality in Russian 
literature is often evoked as an aesthetic expression of longing, soul-searching and suffering and this, 
paradoxically, makes homosexuality visible in Russian culture.  
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This is in contrast to what sociologists describe as the censorship and silencing practices 
surrounding homosexuality in contemporary Russia; queer characters, including gay, lesbian, and gender-
nonconforming people, are highly visible in Russian cultural milieus, including in the popular music 
scene and among filmmakers and other types of public personas.8 Despite this presence, their sexuality is 
never directly discussed, associated with LGBTQ movements, or criticized. Baer’s proposal that 
homosexuality is an aesthetic representation seems particularly fitting for these characters, who are 
viewed as possessing not a different sexuality but rather a different sensitivity, which then, in the public 
sphere, translated into music, poetry, talent, and/or fashion. I find that such view on homosexuality as 
sensitivity is also perpetuated in Russian portrayals of racialized/ethnic homosexuality—I return to this 
point in the Chapter 4 where I discuss the construction of the Chechen gay man in oppositional media 
discourses. 
Although there are very few studies of race, racism, and racialization in the field of Russian 
studies, there has been an increase in recent years. One of the most important multidisciplinary 
contributions is a theoretical, sociological, and ethnographic work by Nikolay Zakharov (2015), in which 
the author develops race and racialization as analytical concepts for the Russian context. Zakharov 
investigates forms of racial thinking and racial exclusion in tsarist, Soviet, and contemporary Russia 
through a multi-sited analysis. His study includes a historical examination of the construction of race 
through Russian ethnology and physical anthropology and the critique of a contemporary racist 
ideological framework through the issue of migrant manual labour in Russia. This ideological framework 
constructs labour migrants from North Caucasus and Central Asia as a security problem, identifies 
manual labour as “black,” and enables identification of non-manual work and Russianness as “white.” 
However, Zakharov’s otherwise ground-breaking study misses an opportunity to analyze the gender 
 
8 Examples include female rock singers Zemfira Ramazanova, Diana Arbenina, Svetlana Surganova; male pop 
singers Boris Moiseev, Sergei Zverev; and film director and actress Renata Litvinova. These people, although 
famously known for their nonheteronormativity, never publicly speak about their sexuality and do not identify 
themselves as lesbian, gay or queer. They constitute that kind of paradoxical double-life, where they are inside the 
system and at the same time outside it (Yurchak, 2005). 
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dimension of race, racism, and racialization in Russia, because it focuses on racialized male migrant 
labourers and the racist discourse and physical violence directed specifically at racialized migrant 
masculinity. The important questions left out of Zakharov’s study include: are there any links between 
Soviet scientific racism and the medicalization and pathologization of sexuality, which were also 
developed in early Soviet period; how does the discourse of patriarchy and gendered violence, including 
controversial topics of “cultural” violence such as body covering, forced marriage, or “honour killings,” 
play into articulations of racial and/or ethnic difference and constructions of non-violent Russian 
whiteness; and how does racialization play out among female migrant workers, including those involved 
in reproductive labour and sex work? This missed opportunity to enrich the analysis of race through 
further considerations of its intersections with gender and sexuality is a common omission in Russian 
racial and ethnic studies.9 
British researcher Francesca Stella (2015) also challenges Eurocentric approaches to Russian 
same-sex sexualities by complicating the homogeneity of Russian sexual identities, even though she as 
well focuses on the sexuality of ethnic Russians. Stella notes that Russian sexual subjectivities were more 
fluid and diverse than in the West not because Russians were somehow inherently queer, as Essig’s book 
suggests, but because homonormativity did not coalesce in Soviet Russia. Her ethnographic project treats 
Russia not as a unified homogenous space, but rather as a multiplicity of geographic and temporal sites 
where the experiences of Russian lesbians differ across space and generation. Stella looks at the lives of 
several generations of women in Moscow and in the provincial city of Ulyanovsk. Her findings show that 
processes of coming out, self-identification, and political mobilization are pragmatic decisions made by 
Russian lesbians who choose between being “in the closet” and disclosing their sexuality strategically, 
taking into account their varying circumstances. Therefore, the processes that are often seen in the West 
as signs of forming self-consciousness and sexual identity are not necessarily central to the experiences of 
 
9 Besides Zakharov (2015), another important study of racialization in the Russian context is the research on Soviet 
racialization of the Roma people by Ian Law (2012), however it also exemplifies a disconnect between analytical 
categories of race/ethnicity and those of gender and sexuality.  
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lesbians in Russia. Similarly, ethnographers of Russian queer diasporas Adi Kuntsman (2009) and Diana 
Fisher (2003) have demonstrated the strategic pragmatism of navigating disclosure when in the presence 
of Russian friends and family and when participating in local queer cultures. This, however, does not 
mean that Russians are incapable of holding intersectional identities simultaneously. Rather, as a 
significant amount of research has shown, many queer Russians simply do not prioritize the disclosure of 
their sexual identity at the expense of maintaining good family relationships or in order to participate in 
identity-based LGBTQ politics.  
Several Russian scholars have criticized Western researchers for objectifying and exotifying 
Russian sexuality, pointing out that the social circumstances and economic conditions of Soviet and post-
Soviet life have created an environment in which stable sexual identities are unnecessary and undesired. 
Nadya Nartova (2004), for example, argues that the reality for Russian lesbians is defined not by a 
floating subjectivity, but by a specific form of social space organization—a management of behaviour and 
identity-presentation that varies across place. This includes clear divisions among three spaces: one where 
women can present themselves as lesbians, another where they lead visibly heterosexual lives, and a final, 
borderline, space where their lesbianism is visible but not discussed nor necessarily identified. Finally, 
Galina Zelenina (2006) claims that lesbian identification in Russia is not related by belonging to a 
community or by adopting queer citizenship based on human rights claims, nor is it really a cultural 
identification. Instead, Zelenina’s quantitative research of online spaces for queer women shows that 60 
percent of respondents avoid using the word “lesbian” due to this term’s historical associations with 
criminality and psychosis in Soviet Union.10 Zelenina concludes that because of the stigma and secrecy 
surrounding lesbianism, identifying as a lesbian is a matter of private behaviour rather than social 
belonging. As one of her respondents said, “sexual orientation … does not, and should not, impact the 
way people look, who they socialize with, their political views, or their cultural tastes” (Zelenina, 2006, 
 
10 According to Essig (1999), Soviet psychiatry classified lesbianism as mild schizophrenia. Currently, women 
having sex with women often identify themselves using the English term “dyke” and the vague term tema, which 
literally means “theme” or “topic.” The term tema is also used by gay men. 
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n.p.). These arguments made by Russian sexuality studies scholars provide a nuanced analysis of LGBTQ 
communities in Russia that emphasizes that Russian sexualities cannot be gauged by linear ideas of 
gaining political consciousness, but must rather take into account the social and economic circumstances 
of living, representing, and politicizing sexualities. Such views are also supported by a small but visible 
community of Russian transfeminist activists and scholars. Overviewing the emergence of trans* 
communities and organizations and the politicization of trans* issues, Yana Kirey-Sitnikova (2016) 
demonstrates that although the visible trans* community in Russia is very small, it is incredibly diverse. 
This diversity includes vast differences in gender expressions, definitions of trans* identity, and 
approaches to trans* politics and visibility. According to the author, some trans* people seek to challenge 
cisnormativity and gender essentialism through confrontational activism, while others attempt to 
compromise with the state by lobbying against transphobic laws using a “born this way” paradigm. In a 
difficult and perhaps counterintuitive move, there is also a highly vocal group of trans* people who 
condemn non-binary gender expressions, oppose activism altogether, and support cissexist state practices 
that pathologize, medicalize, and impose compulsory surgeries on trans* people. This diversity in the 
conceptualization of trans* experiences and identities, as well as in political approaches to trans* activism 
and political visibility, is heavily influenced by class and educational privileges as well as by theoretical 
and political ideas that are imported from the West (including trans-exclusive feminist approaches). In 
light of this socio-political complexity, Sitnikova (2014) calls for caution when collaborating with 
Western feminists and LGBTQ academics and activists. In particular, she cites the West’s frequent lack 
of understanding of Russian political contexts, their often patronizing “progress-oriented” approaches, 
and the vast power imbalances between Russian and Western academics and activists as added 
considerations. 
In his article on teaching queer theory in Russia, sociologist Alexander Kondakov (2016b) 
reflects on the isolating situation of being a queer scholar in that country. In the context of the 
governmental sanctioning of, animosity towards, and violence against LGBTQ people, as well as the 
clampdown on freedoms of association and speech through legislative and bureaucratic means, the queer 
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scholar’s position, according to Kondakov, is one of loneliness and isolation. University courses in queer 
theory are almost non-existent across the country, Russian scholars working within the queer paradigm 
are very few, and institutions and organizations engaging in critical research on queer theory are under 
constant scrutiny and attack. However, at the same time, the political oppression of homosexuality has 
created momentum for increased interest, visibility, and politicization of queer scholarship, and, 
according to Kondakov (2016b), a feeling of hope.  
Today, engagement with queer theory and politics in Russia is full of inconsistencies, 
ambiguities, and contradictions. On the one hand, the term “queer,” and its phonetic Russian translation to 
“kvir,” is currently ubiquitous in Russian academic and activist circles. The terms are often employed to 
signify a sexual-cultural identity, a social and political paradigm of thought, and a disciplinary 
orientation. Russian realities expand the notion of queerness to such an extent that some scholars even 
claim that under patriarchy all women are queer (Kharitonova, 2010b). In this sense, queer politics is an 
extension of feminism, as its main task is undoing patriarchy and gendered oppression. Russian queer 
theory, scholarship, and politics have emerged within this context, where the space of marginalization is a 
common political consideration for leftists, feminists, and LGBTQ people. According to philosopher Alla 
Mitrofanova (2014), each of these marginalized people “become[s] a new historical subject, who has to 
take on the political decision regarding rationalization of a new historical community. This historical 
subject is exactly queer-subjectivity in the political sphere” (p. 346). On the other hand, the use of the 
term “queer” often doesn’t mean anything more complex than sexual fluidity and is frequently used as an 
umbrella term for LGBTQ people. For example, the annual weeklong QueerFest held in St Petersburg 
since 2009 uses the term “queer” as a catch-all term for LGBTQ sexual identities. Organizers themselves 
said that the festival was a human rights event modeled after Western Pride Parades and its purpose is to 
“create places for dialogue between various parts of society to promote tolerance of invisible and 
stigmatized groups” (QueerFest, n.d.). This festival does not use queerness as a point of reference for the 
deconstruction or critique of gendered and sexual categorization systems; instead, it emphasizes the 
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homonormative formulations of human rights, tolerance, and celebration of sexual diversity directly 
borrowed from the West. 
Some Russian scholars (Vorontsov, 2014; Nartova, 2007; Kharitonova, 2014) also claim that 
Russian gender and queer studies all too often fail to use the theoretical and methodological advances of 
gender and queer theories. Instead, Russian scholarship produces behavioural descriptions of LGBTQ 
lives without adopting the reflective, deconstructing, paradigm-changing function of researching the 
norms of social behaviour and social structures. Some research presenting itself as queer studies 
chaotically compiles psychological theories of sexual orientation and makes political claims for the 
recognition of certain rights while accidentally slipping into a heterosexual binary by framing their studies 
in “active” and “passive” classifications of sexual behaviour (e.g., Baranov & Zolotareva, 2012). This 
situation, however, reflects the state of Russian academia in general, which, as a result of Soviet 
censorship and ideological pressure, promoted the intellectual isolation of sexuality studies scholars 
(Oushakine, 2002; Vorontsov, 2014), or what Madina Tlostanova (2015) calls “the coloniality of 
knowledge.”  
Tlostanova (2015) criticizes the global configuration of knowledge where research on post-Soviet 
politics and cultures depends on Euro-Atlantic theoretical and methodological constructions of 
knowledge. She also raises issue with the fact that post-Soviet researchers are seen as being incapable of 
producing theory and methodology beyond replicating Western models. As Tlostanova discusses, this 
coloniality of knowledge is present in most social science research produced both in the West and in post-
Soviet spaces. There are both external and internal reasons for the Eurocentric epistemology. Externally, 
Eurocentrism in knowledge production is perpetuated by the constant reproduction of post-Soviet and 
post-socialist difference and epistemic racism that treats non-European people as native informants rather 
than theory producers. Internal reasons include the stagnation of Russian academia, constant censorship 
and intervention from the government, as well as what Tlostanova calls the “tendency to idealize the 
West” (p. 48) and projection of objectifying and exotifying perspectives onto Russian peripheries. In this 
context, decolonizing knowledge would mean destabilizing the established subject-object relationship by 
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moving away from post-Soviet subjects and instead producing studies that focus on the dynamic 
changeability, mobility, flexibility, and complexity of interaction between post-Soviet spaces and the 
West, as well as Russian center and its (post)colonial peripheries. 
One example of such complexity is the research of Olga Reznikova, a Russian scholar at 
München University in Germany. In her M.A. research project, Reznikova (2014) discusses the 
applicability of race as an analytical concept and its usability alongside terminology of gender and 
feminism in the Russian context. Reznikova analyzes anti-Chechen racism in Russian political discourses 
and ethnographic materials collected during her fieldwork in Grozny, Chechnya. Specifically, she 
examines the ways in which Russian nationalist discourse is used by a liberal protest leader and Putin’s 
presidential opponent Alexei Navalny. Navalny employs images of violence against Chechen women 
perpetrated by Chechen men to call for the exclusion of Chechens from Russian citizenship and the 
imaginary community of the Russian nation. Reznikova claims that this racist discourse attempts to create 
an image of “humanist nationalism” (p. 26), or, nationalism that appeals to feelings of care for Russian 
women and strengthens the symbolic barriers between the “nourishing and protective” self and the 
patriarchal Other. Using language of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Gayatri Spivak, Reznikova 
connects such processes of discursive racialization to the biopolitics of Chechnya as a militarized zone 
and the ways in which Chechen lives become ungrievable. Interpreting this politics from the perspective 
of the Chechen women that she interviewed, Reznikova argues that male violence in Grozny should be 
conceptualized not solely as a feminist issue and gendered violence but primarily through the lens of 
colonial and racist violence against Chechen people. Reznikova’s research and theorization is a rare 
example of an explicit use of intersectional feminist theory in Russian studies. However, Reznikova 
avoids a direct transposition of the language of critical race theory and (post)colonial theory onto Russian 
realities but underscores the specificities of the Russian geographical, cultural, and historical context that 
requires alteration of these theories and their key terminology. 
The criticism of Eurocentric approaches to feminism and LGBTQ politics is also an important 
conversation in activist circles. Vanya Solovey’s (2017) research shows the ways in which Russian 
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feminist activists and organizers perceive Western theory and the “lag discourse” (i.e., the position that 
maintains that Russian feminist movement is following in Western footsteps towards progress). For 
example, as Solovey discusses not without irony, in Russian activist circles such “lag discourse” takes 
form of discussion whether Russian society is ready for the third wave of feminism or whether feminists 
should work to establish the principles of the second wave a bit better first. Solovey’s ethnographic 
research of multiple locations in Russia demonstrates that while some despise such lag discourse it also 
provides a feeling of hope for many activists, because it creates the expectation that Russia is not stuck in 
patriarchy but will move towards the more open future. On the other hand, his data also suggests that 
most activists are more focused on small local community organizing and see the concern with 
Eurocentrism as a less relevant issue. 
Nevertheless, there have been several conversations among queer studies scholars that help make 
sense of the situation. The first formal event was a one-day seminar in September 2010 in St Petersburg 
entitled “Is Queer in Russian Possible?” This event, and the resulting publication (Sozaev, 2010), 
considered the possibilities of applying queer theory and its methodology to diverse disciplines, such as 
the social sciences, psychology, legal studies, and literary studies. In the years following, two 
interdisciplinary international conferences brought together queer scholars from post-Soviet countries and 
those studying Russia from Western academia. The conference “Queer Sexuality: Politics and Practices” 
was held in Minsk in October 2012 and was organized by the feminist project “Gender Route” and the 
advocacy project “GayBelarus” (Solomatina & Shurko, 2014). The conference “On the Crossroads: 
Methodology, Theory and Practice of LGBT and Queer Studies” was held in St Petersburg in October 
2013 and was organized by the Centre of Independent Sociological Studies (Kondakov, 2014a). In 
interdisciplinary and multi-methodological fashion, the published conference papers from these two 
conferences include theoretical discussions, empirical research, photographs, drawings, a screenplay, 
protest posters, and autobiographical essays. Finally, another transnational event, titled “Gender, 
Sexuality, and Power: Queering Normativity,” was scheduled to take place in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in March 
2014, but it was cancelled due to the commencement of military actions in the country. Although the 
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event was cancelled, its organizers published short papers from the presenters they had invited (GSP, 
2014). Collectively, these four events have produced a rich diversity of texts and created a continuous 
conversation, since many of the scholars involved in each of these events were present at some or all 
others as well. 
Among the recent gender and sexuality conferences focusing on the post-Soviet region, I would 
like to discuss one example, which I see as a particularly successful case of interdisciplinary 
collaborations between academics and non-academics. This conference provides an example of an 
initiative which decentralized the Western gaze, worked from decolonial perspectives, and sought to 
deprioritize white Russianness in studies of gender and sexuality of the post-Soviet region.  This is the 
conference titled “Fucking Solidarity: Queering Concepts On/From a Post-Soviet Perspective,” which 
was organized by post-Soviet queer diaspora in Western and Central Europe and was held at the 
University of Vienna on September 20-23, 2017. The event was one example of organizing from a 
feminist and queer diasporic perspective that challenged the Western academic and activist gaze as much 
as it criticized Russian imperialist repressions. The conference was also an example of overcoming 
different kinds of borders, physical and symbolic ones; it was a collaborative project between queer and 
feminist academics, activists, and artists from multiple locations, including central cities in Russia 
(Moscow and St Petersburg), Russian and post-Soviet peripheries (smaller cities in Russia, Chechnya, 
countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, and conflict zones in Ukraine), Russian-speaking diaspora in 
Europe and North America, and non-Russian-speaking scholars of Russian and post-Soviet sexualities. 
These various collaborations are important. In the Western world, gender studies scholars, due to their 
access to university networks, knowledge of funding, and recognition of their expertise, are able to 
provide financial, institutional, and networking resources. However, the knowledge of academics is 
privileged over those doing the important work of assessing, explaining, disseminating, and addressing 
social problems without educational credentials, such as artists and activists. The latter are not often 
recognized as experts and, as a result, generally have less access to resources. Within Russian and some 
other post-Soviet academia, gender studies scholars are severely marginalized and are suspected by the 
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government of being “foreign agents,” which means facing censorship, deprivation of funds, and 
sometimes persecution that pressures people to either collaborate with the government or to leave the 
country (such as Evgeny Shtorn’s example mentioned above). Academia is also an important way for 
people fleeing persecution or dangerous situations in Russia, as acceptance to university programs is a 
way to access exit and entry visas and, sometimes, necessary funds. These opportunities, however, are 
also severely limited by language barriers and access to information on application processes, which 
means the process is heavily dependent on a Russian-speaking diaspora in the West. This situation 
underscores the importance for academics (mostly graduate students and junior scholars) to collaborate 
with the scholars and non-scholars working from within Russia and other post-Soviet countries to 
challenge restrictive systems. 
The conference organizers of “Fucking Solidarity: Queering Concepts On/From a Post-Soviet 
Perspective,” sought to address these power imbalances and, in the conference set-up, actively prioritized 
activists and artists over academics, Russian-speakers over English speakers, and people from the post-
Soviet periphery versus people from the West and Russian urban centers. The official call for papers and 
pre-conference information bulletins emphasized the need for presenters to use language that would be 
accessible to people outside of academia. This formal requirement created an atmosphere in which it was 
appropriate to request clarifications on complex theoretical concepts or challenge the presenters for not 
following the rules of the conference on the spot. The moderators of the discussions also prioritized 
people outside of academia asking questions and offering comments during Q&A sessions. The 
presentations of the conference were either in Russian or in English with translations provided, including 
whisper translations on smaller panels. The rules and ethical principles of the conference created an 
important reversal in power and an atmosphere in which those who are normally seen as experts on 
Russia and/or post-Soviet region and have the most recognition and power were under scrutiny and sat 
face to face with those who are usually the subjects of their academic work. 
This conference also truly demonstrated that worlds of academia, activism, and art are closely 
intertwined. Previously unfamiliar with one another, people found out that they were all dealing with the 
57 
 
same simultaneous processes of marginalization and oppression caused by the Russian government, and 
homonationalist exclusions in countries of Western Europe and North America. For example, a common 
topic in scholarship and activism discussed at the conference was the persecution of queer people in 
Chechnya, as many of the conference attendees worked to help refugees relocate, apply for asylum, 
network, find housing, and translate in the countries of their residence. They were drawn to the 
conference because of its commitment to decentralizing white Russians from the conversation on 
homophobia and to shift the language of tolerance, liberalism, and human rights towards more 
intersectional and anti-oppressive perspectives. Moreover, the conference centralized academics, activists, 
and artists from Russia’s (post)colonial spaces. I will provide two examples of this through the work by 
the Creolex Centre and Ukrainian queer feminist activists.  
Creolex Centre is an artistic and academic collaboration led by queer and trans* feminists Maria 
Vilkovisky and Ruthia Jenrbekova from Kazakhstan. This project is an example of the work from the 
racial/ethnic margins of post-Soviet space, as the artists’ perspectives are rooted in identity, politics, and 
aesthetics of post-Soviet Central Asia. The artistic and scholarly projects of the Creolex centre employ 
theories of creolization and feminist border-crossing, such as works by Gloria Anzaldua (1999 [1987]), in 
order to create bridges between post-colonial spaces of the Caribbean, the post-Soviet spaces of Central 
Asia—where Soviet rule had artificially imposed divisions along ethnic lines in forms of “nationalities” 
(Tlostanova, 2008),—and post-Soviet non-Russian diasporas. In their theoretical texts, performance 
works, and poetry, Vilkovisky and Jenrbekova use trans* modalities of gender, queer sexualities, and 
deconstruction of Central Asian ethnic and national categories to imagine futures with no borders or 
boundaries (Kreolex.Center, n.d.). 
Another example of challenging the Western gaze, homonationalist perspectives, and critiques of 
local repressive politics, was the presentation by feminist activists from Ukraine—Ira Tantsiura, nadiya 
chushak, and Yulia Serdyukova. Titled “Gaycation Ukraine: Honest Trailer,” this presentation offered a 
creative critique of the episode on Ukraine of the American documentary series Gaycation. The series 
follows Canadian actress Ellen Page and her friend Ian Daniel as they explore local LGBTQ cultures 
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around the globe and highlight human rights abuses. The series presents a contemporary form of colonial 
travelogues. However, unlike the travel accounts of post-Soviet Russia provided by Fallowell (1994) and 
Tuller (1996)—and criticized by Baer (2002)—Gaycation focuses not as much on the discourse of 
Ukrainian queers’ difference from Western queers but rather on their sameness, and seeks to establish 
empathy for the Ukrainian LGBTQ people by exposing and criticizing Ukrainian homophobia. To 
critique the Western perspective presented by the show, the Ukrainian activists provided a detailed 
analysis of the episode, as well as a video project in a form of an “honest trailer.” The honest trailer 
provided a frame-by-frame commentary of the episode that featured voices of those Ukrainian queers who 
were excluded, underrepresented, or misrepresented by the show. This commentary criticized the 
documentary as an example of an objectifying and exotifying gaze and thrilling “risk tourism,” which 
privileged Western homonormative forms of queerness in its narrative, imposed homonationalist 
expectations of LGBTQ citizenship on Ukraine, and exploited locals and their labour in the creation of 
the episode. These critiques were portrayed through witty commentary of the misrepresented Ukrainian 
queer community. The commentary also allowed the conference audience to recognize and take pleasure 
in moments where locals were “trolling” the creators of the show by playing on the Western gaze. For 
example, Ukrainian drag performer Misha, offended by the way show creators attempted to represent 
him, invited Ellen and Ian to a dilapidated village and asked them to drink raw eggs and eat pig’s ears 
right from the roasted pig’s head lying on the table in an attempt to satirize Western expectations of 
Ukraine as “the Other.” The result of producing the honest trailer was forming community through a 
shared experience of misrepresentation and taking pleasure in gazing back at the creators of the show. 
Watching this trailer also provided an important moment of bonding for the attendees of the conference 
and an important call for the white North/Western academics, activists, and artists to check themselves 
and their assumptions. 
Such initiatives as the “Fucking Solidarity” conference underline the importance of Russian and 
post-Soviet diaspora in scholarship and activism as well as non-institutionalized forms of scholarship and 
activism. The critical language that is currently developing through such diasporic collaborative projects 
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as this conference offers an alternative to what has been earlier discussed as the Western gaze, including 
the politics of “gender mainstreaming,” the limiting and orientalizing agendas imposed on Russian and 
other post-Soviet spaces by international institutions, homonationalist adoptions of LGBTQ rights 
discourses and, to use Tlostanova’s (2010) term, “colonial epistemologies.” However, this diasporic and 
collaborative critical gaze also offers an opportunity to develop strategies to address problems within 
Russia—the crackdown on institutionalized centres of critical gender and sexualities scholarship, the 
silencing of LGBTQ voices, and the state’s employment of gender and sexuality in maintaining the 
physical and symbolic boundaries of the nation and Russian whiteness, as I discuss in the following 
chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I provided an overview of the development of gender and sexuality studies in 
Russia and the main challenges of the field. The current state of gender and sexuality studies has been 
affected by Soviet censorship and control over social sciences, dominance of medicalized views on 
gender and sexuality, and biological and evolutionary views on racial/ethnic difference. In the nineties, 
the field was majorly influenced by Western funding, agenda, and perspectives – this resulted in the 
institutionalization of gender study centers, emergence of large-scale sociological, ethnographic, and 
policy analysis projects, and adoption of the Western language of feminism, gender, and sexuality studies. 
This scholarship was subsequently stalled with the withdrawal of international organizations from Russia 
in 2000’s, positioning of the discipline as driven by non-Russian interests, and the crackdown on critical 
scholarship and activism under Putin’s presidency. However, as I argued in my analysis of more recent 
scholarly and activist initiatives, the most significant work currently happens outside of the institution of 
academia or research centers. This is the scholarship that emerges from collaborative projects between 
emerging scholars and activists from the post-Soviet regions and diaspora. 
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Chapter 2 
Patriotic Sexualities: Cultural Representations of Sex and Gender in The 
Normalization and Contestation of Russian Nationalism 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the role of sex and gender in popular culture for processes of nation-making 
in Putin-era Russia (2000–present). Russian popular culture is known for its heavy use of 
heteropatriarchal codes of representation in nationalist rhetoric, such as “macho” hypermasculinity and 
subservient and hypersexualized femininity. The fascination of Western media with President Vladimir 
Putin’s macho public image is the most obvious example of how these codes are reproduced 
transnationally. Since the beginning of Putin’s presidency in 2000, most independent mass media became 
controlled by the state, and codes of gender and sexuality were actively recruited for boosting public 
support for Putin’s policies (Gessen, 2012; Sperling, 2015). So, for example, Russian representations that 
celebrate Putin’s masculinity, such as photoshoots of his many adventures in the Russian wilderness, are 
seen through Western framings as representing quirks of character, expressions of his masculine 
egomania. In this fashion, the Guardian review of the BBC documentary “Putin: The New Tsar” 
discusses Russian President’s public image and describes him as “a lonely, lying narcissist” (Wollaston, 
2018). Such psychological explanations provide a backdrop for further assessments of the overall 
character of the Russian people and their readiness to shed the inherent sexism and homophobia, such as 
in the Economist’s article “From Russia with Youth: Meet the Puteens” (Sneider & Monteleone, 2018, 
March 15) included in the Introduction of this dissertation. 
At the same time as heteropatriarchal codes remain dominant in Russia, sexualized and gendered 
discourses have gained more optimistic, playful, and satirical forms. In Western readings of these forms, 
however, some cultural and political elements were lost in translation, as satire and play have been 
interpreted simplistically as tactics of countercultural movements that are set in opposition to hegemonic 
heteropatriarchal representations. One example of this celebrated opposition is Euro-American white 
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feminist attention on the Russian punk band Pussy Riot. Pussy Riot became famous after their 
carnivalesque anti-Putin performance in Moscow in 2012 and subsequent incarceration of two members 
of the band. After their release in 2014, Pussy Riot members were invited to participate in Western 
culture—such as leading the Toronto Pride parade in 2015 and filming music videos criticizing Donald 
Trump’s sexism. The excitement and self-identification with Pussy Riot among Western feminists and 
queers—for example, through the #WeAreAllPussyRiot Twitter hashtag—capitalized on linear 
constructions of sexual modernity, wherein Russia is discursively fixed as a place of inherent sexism and 
homophobia that is being slowly transformed by politics of visibility, identity, and the fight for human 
rights. In the case of Pussy Riot and other feminist actions, this narrative is expanded through the 
conceptualization of Russian feminism as being in the process of “catching up” with the progressive and 
already-feminist West (Groeneveld, 2015).  
While I do not maintain that analyses of Putin’s character are wrong, nor that Pussy Riot’s actions 
fail to be countercultural or subversive, I suggest that the emphasis on the psychological portrait of a 
leader, and by extension the people of his nation, overlooks the ways in which Russian pop cultural 
representations that make use of sexual and gendered codes are moments of establishing or contesting 
power. Specifically, I argue that when the codes of gender and sexuality are embedded in representations 
of “Russianness,” they should not be seen as expressing Russian nationalism, but rather as constituting, 
accruing, or contesting it. Thus, in this chapter, I look at several examples of popular cultural 
representations of sex and gender in nationalist contexts and examine the mechanisms of nation-making 
that are expressed in those moments of representation. Moreover, the cases analyzed in this chapter 
further illustrate what I have identified in Chapter 1 as the constructed “foreignness” of non-normative 
representations of gender and sexuality. 
My arguments here follow Stuart Hall’s (2012 [1997]) theory of representation, which maintains 
that a representation is not a copy of reality, a stand-in for something that exists, but rather is a process of 
meaning-making through visual language. Subverting the popular understanding that images simply stand 
in for something that exists in reality, Hall argues that meaning is given to things at the moment of their 
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depiction instead of existing prior to representation. This production of visual language and meaning does 
not happen in isolation, but rather draws on already existing communication codes and “conceptual maps 
of meaning” within the wider socio-cultural and political structure (Hall, 2012, p. 18). In Putin’s Russia, 
profound sexualization of visual culture has served to normalize certain representations of the gendered 
body, sex, and desire into “near-universal codes” (Hall, 2012, p. 95)—i.e., codes with universally 
understood and seemingly natural meaning. The production of these codes, as this chapter suggests, 
happens through dialogue between hegemonic visual culture and resistant images. 
Following Hall’s definition of representation, codes of sex and gender are not merely using 
sexualized and gendered language in service of nation-making through representation, but rather create 
nationalism as sexuality or, to use Parker, Russo, Sommer, and Yaeger’s (1991) term, an “eroticized 
nationalism” (p. 1). This argument also builds on Michael Billig’s (1995) conceptualization of “banal 
nationalism” as indicating “the collection of ideological habits (including habits of practice and belief) 
which reproduce established nations as nations” (p. 6). I suggest that when national symbols of pride or 
patriotism are expressed through codes of gender and sexuality in popular culture, they (re)create the 
ideological habits of nationalism, while countercultural or resistant representations attempt to disrupt this 
(re)creation of habits.  
To support this claim, I offer a discussion of several cultural flashpoints of Russian popular culture 
in this chapter: the hyperheteronormative public image of President Putin; the non-heteronormative, and 
therefore controversial, ballet Nureyev, film Matilda, and viral video from students of the Ulyanovsk pilot 
academy; and several art-activist actions from Voina, Pussy Riot, and Piotr Pavlensky. Each of these are 
cases in which representations of gender and sexuality were taken up as matters of national concern. 
Sensationalized and amplified by the media, they focused the public eye on the body, inviting scrutiny 
and discussion. These representations linger in Russian visual space, reappearing periodically in news 
media, on talk shows, and on social media, which emphasizes their enduring cultural capital.  
The discourses surrounding these representations fixate on questions of national belonging and 
patriotism, and therefore reveal the complex intersections of gender, sexuality, body, and nationalism. 
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Through an interpretation of these cases, I explain the mechanisms that constitute eroticized nationalism, 
normalize heteropatriarchal codes of nationalism, and also contest them. First, I examine hegemonic 
heteropatriarchal representations of sex and gender as they intersect with notions of the nation and 
patriotism––i.e., the practice of demonstrating respect and commitment to national ideals and symbols. To 
examine this, I utilize anthropologist Julie Hemment’s (2105) term “erotic patriotism” to analyze the 
demonstrations of love and desire for national symbols and securing images of white Russian virility 
through the example of President Putin as an iconic representation of the nation-state. Second, I examine 
the hegemonic maintenance of erotic patriotism through practices of censoring and expressing public 
contempt for feminist and non-heteronormative representations. Analyzing these public responses, I 
highlight how these practices are related to the popular understanding of what is patriotic and what is not, 
using three examples: the scandal around homoerotic representations in the ballet Nureyev, the protests 
against the portrayal of Tsar Nikolay II in the film Matilda, and the public discussions about the viral 
satirical homoerotic video by the students of Ulyanovsk pilot academy. Finally, I discuss three examples 
of how the link between heteropatriarchal representations and nationalism has been challenged by 
countercultural art-activists and discuss the successes and limitations of their strategies. In this last 
section, my cases consist of performances by the countercultural movements Voina and Pussy Riot and 
by the art-activist Piotr Pavlensky. The selection of cases for this study should not be seen as being 
representative of or describing contemporary Russian visual culture in full; however, my choices were 
motivated by the great attention each received in Russian media (as well as beyond). All of these events 
became moments of sexual and national scandal, and therefore, I see them as being particularly useful for 
my examination of eroticized nationalism.  
The theoretical framework of this chapter starts with the function of heteropatriarchy in Russian 
popular culture. Building on Adrienne Rich’s theory of compulsory heterosexuality, Francisco Valdes 
(1996) proposes the term “compulsory heteropatriarchy,” which rests on four elements: 
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the bifurcation of personhood into ‘male’ and ‘female’ components under the 
active/passive paradigm; the polarization of these male/female sex/gender ideals into 
mutually exclusive, or even opposing, identity composites; the penalization of gender 
atypicality or transitivity; and the devaluation of persons who are feminized. (p. 170) 
As I show in this chapter, all four of these components are present in Russian hegemonic representations, 
which are organized through heteropatriarchy: male patriotism is asserted through active 
hypermasculinity, while female patriotism is expressed through a desire for hypermasculine national 
symbols and a rejection of effeminized masculinity. Furthermore, representations of gender atypicality 
and femininity are devalued through official, state-sponsored campaigns, such as Putin’s campaign to 
limit the visibility of LGBT people started in 2010 (Healey, 2018).  
In this chapter, I discuss strategies of censorship and the expression of public contempt as 
processes of devaluing gender and sexual transgressions that are seen to be non-patriotic. My analysis of 
heteropatriarchy in cultural representations in contemporary Russia starts with analysis of erotic 
patriotism as a hegemonic form of expressing love for the motherland. The concept of “erotic patriotism” 
is used by Julie Hemment (2015) in her anthropological study of youth cultures in Putin’s Russia to 
describe the practice of sexualizing national symbols and expressions of national belonging through 
sexualized rituals. Specifically, Hemment analyzes the sexualization of women in Putin’s election 
campaigns and an ethnography of camps for young Putin supporters, in which the participants were 
encouraged to marry a person who they just met at the camp in an act of demonstrating and enacting their 
love for the motherland. In my case studies for this chapter, I analyze cultural representations that use the 
similar tactic of erotic patriotism, and I consider a series of countercultural representations that attempt to 
interrupt the hegemony of erotic patriotism.  
The theoretical framework of this chapter also builds on works that analyze humour, satire, and the 
grotesque in Russian culture. Protest cultures in Russia have historically relied on carnivalesque humour 
and a representational device termed stiob, a kind of satire that became popular in the late-Soviet era and 
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reemerged again after the 2000s. Stiob is similar to the Bakhtinian notion of the carnival, a humorous 
transgression of bodily, social, and political taboos that relies on displays of excess, grotesque, and 
ambivalence. For Bakthin (1984), the carnival created an alternative space in which social and political 
norms were challenged. Stiob differs from the carnival because, in addition to satirizing regimes of power, 
its critical position is in itself ambivalent; stiob exposes the authority and constructedness of social norms 
but invites the participant or audience to take part in the regimes of authority, to identify with them 
despite this exposure, perhaps even with pleasure. This is how the scholar of Soviet culture Alexei 
Yurchak (2005) describes this representational and discursive tactic: 
Stiob was a peculiar form of irony that differed from sarcasm, cynicism, derision, or any 
of the more familiar genres of absurd humor. It required such a degree of 
overidentification with the object, person, or idea at which this stiob was directed that it 
was often impossible to tell whether it was a form of sincere support, subtle ridicule, or a 
peculiar mixture of the two. The practitioners of stiob themselves refused to draw a line 
between these sentiments, producing an incredible combination of seriousness and irony, 
with no suggestive signs of whether it should be interpreted as the former or the latter, 
refusing the very dichotomy between the two. (p. 250) 
Specifically, Yurchak provides a study of the aesthetic movement of necrorealism in late-Soviet period 
(late 1970s–early 1980s). Necrorealists overidentified with the form of the authoritative discourse––by 
performing party speeches and slogans, recreating the excessive communist bureaucracy, celebrating 
party leaders, or performing other rituals of ordinary Soviet life––but emptied this discourse of its 
content.  
The process Yurchak calls “overidentification” differs slightly from José Esteban Muñoz’ (1999) 
term “disidentification,” which refers to a rhetorical practice in which minority groups repurpose 
hegemonic representations. As Muñoz (1999) explains, “disidentification scrambles and reconstructs the 
encoded message of a cultural text in a fashion that both exposes the encoded message’s universalizing 
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and exclusionary machinations and recircuits its workings to account for, include, and empower minority 
identities and identifications” (p. 31). This term has been widely applied to the ways in which queer 
people of colour engage with hegemonic culture as raw material to carve out new cultural spaces for 
themselves. The practice of overidentification is similar to this process in that it also displaces dominant 
symbols and uses them to create spaces in between seriousness and irony and in between submitting to 
the dominant symbolic order and criticizing it. However, those who have used the process of 
overidentification to engage in stiob humour do not necessarily belong to minority cultures. On the 
contrary, as Yurchak (2005) notes, towards the end of the Soviet era, when the distrust towards the 
Communist Party and deep irritation with the excessive state apparatus became widespread, the culture of 
stiob and the ironic use of authoritative forms of discourse and representation became omnipresent in 
mass culture. As Yurchak (2005) explains, stiob became literally an everyday aesthetic of living. In my 
analysis, I demonstrate how stiob, as a form of irony, is used not only by resistant Russian cultural 
producers who are well-known outside of Russia, such as Pussy Riot, but also how it plays a significant 
role in upholding heteropatriarchal forms of nationalism. 
My approach to visual analysis is influenced by the field of visual anthropology, which not only 
looks at process of representation––i.e. the process of constructing meaning through language (Hall, 
2007)––but also holds that images “rather than re-present reality and therefore be largely descriptive, are 
more accurately categorized as actions” (Bakewell, 1998, p. 22). In other words, images do not only 
reflect the reality or the intentions of their creator, and their function does not stop at their representation. 
In this way, they are similar to speech-acts, the term that points to the ability of words and utterances to 
function as promises, accusations, threats, orders, offences, or acts of violence (Austin, 1962).  
In her analysis of hate speech, Judith Butler (1996) shows that injurious speech wounds not only by 
the words of hate but even more so by the mode of address itself, which interpellates and constitutes a 
subject. As Butler argues, injury by words does not originate in the intention of the speaker, and it is not 
created anew with every utterance; instead, it comes to being through its social and linguistic contexts and 
by iteration of previous utterances. Through the process of hurtful speech being brought into legal 
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contexts, the hate speech and its injury is enacted again. In examining the images of the Russian visual 
space, images that “offend,” create panicked responses, and urge to be covered up or censored, I find a 
striking resemblance to the power of speech as analyzed by Butler. The images I take up are claimed to 
offend the feelings of “the people,” to hurt through their representation of gender and sexuality, and this 
offence is recreated repeatedly through lingering of images in the news media, in court, and in public 
spaces such as talk shows. Therefore, in this chapter, I contend that it is particularly useful to see images 
as image-acts that create action not only due to their content but also due to the mode of their 
representation. 
President Putin’s body: Erotic patriotism and icon of Russian popular culture 
Though the laws against “gay propaganda” and recent bans on profanity in news and social media 
would suggest strict prohibition, sex, desire, and pleasure are highly visible in contemporary Russian 
politics and culture. Russian visual culture engages in the necessarily intertwined processes of exclusion 
and the production of sexual power. Narratives of sexual pleasure present in Russian politics are 
expressed through politicized stories that imagine sexual desire, what it means, how it relates to the 
present moment and the future, and how it relates to the nation. This portrayal of sexual pleasure is a tool 
that shows Russian citizens how and who to desire, how desire is connected to politics, and whose desire 
matters the most. President Putin’s image is the most visible example of this instructional rhetoric, as it 
creates a specific nationalist iconography.  
Putin’s public demonstrations of his physical prowess and “fit body” are numerous: fishing, 
hunting, hiking, horse-riding shirtless in the Siberian wilderness, teaching martial arts on DVD, practicing 
the difficult butterfly stroke, swimming with dolphins, diving to recover ancient urns in the Black Sea, 
tranquilizing a tiger, and taking an outdoor ice plunge in winter are but some examples (Figures 1-6). This 
ongoing series of presidential images has been the object of jokes and inquiry internationally, both in the 
popular media as well as in academic writing. One of the most recent instances of these broadcasted 
accomplishments is official footage from Putin’s vacation in summer 2017, which was released by the 
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Kremlin to the press (Kremlin.ru, 2017, August 7; NTV.ru, 2017, August 5). In the video, the President is 
shown driving a motor boat and fishing pike underwater in the remote Siberian wilderness, his healthy 
lifestyle underscored by his casual refusal of alcohol offered to him during the fishing trip. 
  
Figure 1. Putin takes an ice plunge. Photo credit: 
Alexei Druzhinin/RIA News (RIA News, 2018, 
January 19) 
 
Figure 2. Putin on vacation on the Cayo-Blanco island. 
Photo credit: RIA News (Kremlin.ru, 2000, December 
17) 
  
Figure 3. Putin hunting. Photo credit: Kremlin. 
(Kremlin.ru, 2017, August 13). 
Figure 4. Putin swimming. Photo credit: Alexei 
Druzhinin/RIA News (Kommersant.ru, 2017, March 3)  
 
  
Figure 5. Putin fishing. Photo credit: Alexei 
Nikolsky/TASS. (Kremlin.ru, 2017, August 7) 
Figure 6. Putin riding a horse. Photo credit: Kremlin. 
(Kremlin.ru, 2017, August 13). 
 
69 
 
While many world leaders, including Barack Obama (The Huffington Post, 2017, June 12), Tony 
Blair (Culliford, 2016, August 13), and Justin Trudeau (CTV News, n.d.), have been photographed and 
filmed while engaging in physical activities, sometimes also shirtless, the appearances of the Russian 
President’s capable body overshadows all others by the frequency of broadcasting and intensity of 
physical activities he engages in. While other leaders’ engagement in sports seems more accidental, or at 
least incidental, the Russian media regularly reports on Putin’s exercise routines, vacations full of 
recreational activities such as fishing, hunting, hiking, and horseback riding, and exotic experiences, such 
as swimming with dolphins and archaeological endeavours. Moreover, such activities like underwater 
fishing, competing in martial arts tournaments, and ice plunging require an exceptionally fit body. The 
omnipresence of the image of Putin’s hairless tight torso, as well as the scale of audience’s engagement in 
consuming and reproducing this image, which I discuss further in this chapter, suggests that it is firmly 
placed within contemporary Russian iconography and becomes a symbol of national pride. 
Valerie Sperling (2014) argues that the accessibility and resonance of gender norms and sexist 
stereotypes with Russian cultural identity have enabled them to be used as means for political legitimation 
and sustaining political power. Elizabeth Wood (2011) sees Putin’s public persona as a carefully crafted 
image that has served to transform the insipid technocrat into an ultramasculine hero. Wood claims that 
Putin’s image of a “tough guy” serves two purposes: firstly, it signals superiority to the world outside of 
Russia, and secondly, it portrays Putin as a man-of-the-streets for Russian citizens––one who is not afraid 
to be direct and ruthless with the enemy. Sociologists Tatiana Riabova and Oleg Riabov (2010) examine 
forms of hegemonic masculinity in contemporary Russian politics by conducting an extensive survey of 
Russian citizens on the meaning of the concept “real man” as it pertains to Russian politicians. The 
authors find that the image of the “real man” relies on processes of militarization, eroticization, and 
nationalization of masculinity. Firstly, a “real man” is a warrior, who does not show weakness in times of 
crisis, is capable of making hard decisions, is tough on the enemy, and is competent in commanding the 
military. Secondly, a “real man” is desired by women. Thirdly, he is simultaneously down-to-earth, a 
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tough leader who expresses his anger and frustration in a direct manner, and is an opposite of the Western 
liberal man, who is seen to be too tolerant of homosexuality and too scared of being accused of sexism.  
The visual representation of President Putin fits these characteristics quite well. The militarization 
of his masculinity is achieved through multiple images of him operating military machinery, such as 
flying a fighter jet or testing firearms. Putin’s consistently confident posture and calm focused facial 
expressions project professionalism. His image of strength and superiority is underscored by publicizing 
his engagement in combative sports, such as martial arts, and outdoor activities requiring endurance, such 
as hunting, fishing, swimming, and horseback riding. The images of Putin engaging in outdoor activities 
come from his vacations, a time of leisure in remote Russian wilderness. Since these are the times when 
Putin is understood to be engaging in acts of self-care and pleasure, recordings of these activities seem 
intimate, inviting audiences to witness the President being his “authentic self” without the presidential 
suit. Finally, the equation of Putin with the Russian nation is demonstrated through his closeness to nature 
and mastery of it, and especially through the use of such symbols of Russian natural resources as the 
remoteness of the Siberian wilderness of Tuva, Siberian tigers, pike, the Black sea, and activities of 
fishing and hunting. 
Another point of desire for Putin is the performed devotion of the racial/ethnic Other. This can be 
illustrated by representations of Putin with the Head of the Chechen 
Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov is well-known for his 
expressions of loyalty and devotion to Putin. Although he is not the 
only one among state officials expressing such devotion, 
representations of Kadyrov are often markedly different. For 
example, the body language within the representations is particularly 
expressive. If Putin’s bodily interactions with other state officials 
take form of a handshake or a brotherly pat on the shoulder, images 
with Kadyrov express much more intimacy. One of the famous 
representations of such kind is the image, which Kadyrov posted on 
 
Figure 7. Putin and Kadyrov. The 
image was posted on now defunct 
Instagram account of Kadyrov when 
he congratulated Putin on his decision 
to run for the fourth presidential term. 
Source: Komsomolskaya Pravda 
(2017, June 12).  
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his Instagram account after Putin’s announcement of running in presidential elections for his fourth term 
in 2018 (Figure 7). In this photograph, smiling Kadyrov is holding Putin’s forearm instead of his hand, 
their suits are ruffled up by their strange leaning into each other, and their torsos and faces are touching so 
that their interaction resembles a cuddle rather than a formal embrace. This embrace seems heartfelt to the 
point of awkwardness expressed on Putin’s face. 
Such imagery of Putin and Kadyrov circulates frequently in Russian media. Posing with Kadyrov 
in a performatively intimate fashion strengthens Putin’s claims to hypermasculinity by creating a 
mythology of his ability to turn a “barbaric” violent Chechen into a cuddly devotee. This dynamic is 
particularly symbolic after the end of the Second Chechen War (1999-2009). During Putin’s first two 
presidential terms, his discourse on Chechens was characterized by violent rhetoric of anti-terrorist 
politics, the frequent use of crude emotional language and references to Chechen bodies, sexuality, and  
bodily functions, as well as symbolic threats of castration (I discuss this discourse in more detail in 
Chapter 4). By contrast, the imagery that circulated after the war, and after Kadyrov came to power, is 
that of Chechen devotion to Putin and the celebration of his power. Images of Kadyrov wearing T-shirts 
with Putin’s portrait are another common form of expression of loyalty and devotion (Figure 8). These 
representations can be interpreted as supporting Putin’s white Russian masculinity by taming the 
racial/ethnic Other. Kadyrov, with his typical Chechen physique and facial features, is a particularly good 
object for the creation of such a symbol. 
According to Helena Goscilo (2013), “Putin’s masculinity is 
grounded in the body and what the body can withstand—a material 
guarantor that, as Putin learned, reassures the public” (p. 184). 
Putin’s calm and almost blank stare in photographs of him in action 
suggests an aura of self-restraint and complete mastery of the body, 
the natural environment, and the racialized/ethnic Other. Contrary 
to other scholars, Alexandra Novitskaya (2017) reads Putin’s 
performance of masculinity not as a strategy of legitimacy but 
 
Figure 8. Kadyrov wearing a T-shirt 
with a picture of Putin in Judo attire. 
The letters on the T-shirt say 
“Victory”. Image credit: EchoMSK 
(2015, May 12) 
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rather as a form of “male hysteria,” a panicked reaction to the fragility of the image of the indestructible 
patriarchal heteronormative nation. Interpreting texts of Putin’s public addresses, Novitskaya notes the 
way in which Putin attaches “bad feelings” (Ahmed, 2005) to non-heterosexual Russians by linking non-
heterosexuality and feminism with the moral degradation of the West. In this context, Novitskaya sees 
Putin’s machismo as a reactionary political overcompensation that results from vulnerability rather than 
from a coherent political strategy. In my research, however, I am less interested in the motivation and 
strategy behind these images and more concerned with the place they play in visual culture and the ways 
they may enable discourse on sexuality, white Russianness, and political power.  
In addressing such discursive impacts, Cassiday and Johnson (2010) analyze the cult of personality 
of Putin, in particular the constant reproduction of Putin’s image by regular citizens creating fan art, such 
as comic books, music, paintings, poetry, or internet memes (Figures 9-10), as well as in a wide variety of 
everyday consumer goods, from T-Shirts to iPhone cases to chocolate (for a list of products with Putin’s 
image on them, see “Putin na prodazhu,” n.d.). Comparing the canonization of Putin to earlier cults of 
personality, such as Stalin’s, Cassiday and Johnson (2010) argue that proliferation of Putin’s imagery 
does not exist because of official forms of coercion, where one’s participation in the glorification of a 
leader is a prerogative for access to resources and public institutions. On the contrary, because of such an 
omnipresence, accessibility, and ease of reproduction of Putin’s image, this image becomes a part of 
neoliberal interactive individualized consumer culture and thus is sustained through the masses. In all 
  
Figure 9. Putin riding a bear. Photo-collage (creator unknown). 
(Vesti.ru, 2018, March 10). 
Figure 10. Putin riding a crane. Photo-collage 
(creator unknown). (sta-sta.ru, 2012, 
September 6) 
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cultural and consumer products, the meaning of Putin’s image remains elusive: Is the anonymous creator 
of a collage, in which shirtless Putin is riding a bear, glorifying the President or laughing at him? Is 
Putin’s portrayal as a superhero in comic books poking fun at his tough-guy image or playing along with 
it? As Cassiday and Johnson argue, the polysemic nature of Putin’s image enables the consumption and  
proliferation of these images, as well as recreating/changing their meanings through memes, photo- 
collages, and other social media material.  
Putting the President’s body on display constructs Putin as an archetype of virility, white 
Russianness, and as an object of sexual desire. Sexual desire for a brutal heterosexual virility has been 
also expressed in such video clips like “I want someone like Putin,” a song by the female pop-band 
Singing Together (Poyushie Vmeste), released in 2002, and the more recent song “Baby boy” (“Malysh”) 
by the Russian pop singer Alisa Vox, released in 2017. A comparison between these two songs 
demonstrates the way in which sexual desire for hegemonic masculinity also expresses social regulations 
and an attempt to discourage protest by associating it with failed masculinity and feminization.  
The catchy disco-pop song “I want someone like Putin” (MsRussianMusic, 2012, November 11) 
paints a picture of a protective man who is full of strength, one who doesn’t “get in trouble,” unlike the 
song protagonist’s boyfriend. The video shows two men dressed in suits, one of them presumably the 
President, watching the video of three women singing about their love for Putin (Figure 11). These men 
are watching the videos with serious facial expressions, sometimes they quietly talk to each other, which 
suggests that they are perhaps evaluating the women’s performance. The camera lingers either on these 
men from below—so that they are imposing on the picture, filling the frame—or from behind, so that the 
viewer sees the backs of men’s heads watching the video on a TV. This positioning poignantly illustrates 
the difference between the female subject on the screen, which exists to be looked at, and the male 
subject, who exists to watch the women (Berger, 1972; Mulvey, 1999). Close-ups of the women are 
filmed from above, diminishing them and adding to the ways their role can be read as submissive. 
Throughout the video, excerpts from Putin’s presidential inauguration, speeches, and footage of him 
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body-slamming opponents in a judo 
competition act as interstitials, underscoring 
Putin’s desirability and illustrating the positive 
qualities that singers attribute to him. 
It is important to mention that this song is 
not a stand-alone piece but rather is just one of 
many examples of cultural productions that 
build on the expression of female desire for the 
President. If during the nineteen-nineties, as 
Borenstein (2007) demonstrates, popular 
culture was characterized by overkill with 
repeating images of grim hopelessness and 
joyless sex, popular culture of the Putin period 
overkills with sexual desire for the President: 
from humorous songs about a whole village of 
people unable to achieve orgasm until Putin 
visits them (“Neschastnyi sluchai,” 2014, April 
27); to a photo competition for an iPad, in 
which women were asked to make videos “ripping (their clothes off) for Putin” (ArmiaPutina, 2011, July 
13); to a calendar with young women in lingerie proclaiming “Vladimir Vladimirovich, you are the best” 
and “How about a third time?” (the latter suggests an invitation to run for the third presidential term, 
while playing on sexual innuendo) (Figure 12). According to Mosse’s (1985) comparison of the use of 
masculinity and femininity in national symbols, the masculine represents depth and seriousness of 
patriotism, while the feminine is portrayed as shallow, frivolous, and driven by desire. This dynamic is 
 
11 Translation my own. 
 
Figure 11. Screenshot from the music video for “I want 
someone like Putin” by Singing Together. 
(MsRussianMusic, 2012, November 11) 
 
Lyrics: 
 
My boyfriend is in trouble once again 
Got in a fight, got drunk on something nasty 
I got fed up, I kicked him out,  
And now I want someone like Putin 
 
Someone like Putin, full of strength 
Someone like Putin, who wouldn’t drink 
Someone like Putin, who wouldn’t hurt me 
Someone like Putin, who wouldn’t run away! 
 
I saw him on the news last night 
He was telling us that the world has come to crossroads 
With one like him, it’s easy to be home and out 
And now I want a man like Putin.  
 
[Refrain]11 
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visible in popcultural representations of 
Russian women desiring president Putin. 
The seriousness of Putin’s macho image 
could be safely accompanied by feminine 
passion for him, which is expressed as 
excessive, hysterical, and frivolous. 
Additionally, these expressions of female 
desire for Putin serve the function of 
saving Putin’s sexualized image from 
being read as homoerotic. Since 
nationalism relies on clear and unambiguous signals of masculinity, any signs of homoeroticism must be 
exorcised from masculine beauty (Mosse, 1985), and the omnipresent performances of female desire do 
just that. 
Providing a contrast to the image of macho Putin, Alisa Vox’s music video titled “Baby boy,” 
produced in 2017, infantilizes a male protester against Putin’s regime and portrays him as effeminate, 
weak, controlled by his mother, and irrational. The video contains quite an eclectic set of images: a sexy 
blonde woman posing as a high school teacher and scolding a male student (Figure 13), a young man 
waving an unspecified protest flag, grimacing monkeys (perhaps suggesting stupidity), and pink liquid 
being poured on a brain, a quite literal depiction of brainwashing. For those who are familiar with protest 
cultures in Putin’s Russia, “Baby boy” alludes to the protests started by an anti-corruption activist and 
Putin’s presidential opponent Alexei Navalny in 2017. Navalny and his team at the Anti-Corruption 
Foundation investigated and published information about embezzlement schemes through property and 
luxurious possessions, which they exposed using drone-camera footage of a number of government 
employees. In skilfully using social media, the short films about corruption, his charisma, and his quirky 
sense of humour, Navalny succeeded in mobilizing many people to protest all over Russia. He especially 
sought to appeal to young populations, people who have not experienced any other regime in their adult  
 
Figure 12. Erotic calendar for 2011. The text says “Vladimir 
Vladimirovich, you get better with age” (left) and “Vladimir 
Vladimirovich, what about a third time?” (right). Photo credit: 
Maksim Perlin and Vladimir Tabak (yuga.ru, 2010, October 7) 
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lives than that of Putin. As a result, many of 
Navalny’s followers and protest participants 
were indeed young professionals, college 
and even high school students. The 
government attempted to spin this against 
Navalny, suggesting that he is brainwashing 
youth and that his followers are too young 
to understand politics. Alisa Vox’ video 
emerged in this context. 
The lyrics of the song provide a 
coherence to otherwise quite disjointed 
imagery of the video (Figure 13). The 
references to misspelled words on the poster 
and failing an exam in history are meant to 
infantilize the protester as a silly school kid 
who is failing at Russianness. Perfection of 
the Russian language and a deep knowledge 
of history are regarded as fundamental 
values of Russian ethnic identity and are 
highly praised in Russian culture. 
Therefore, this mentioning of insufficient 
knowledge of Russian grammar and history 
is a stab at the protester’s inability to know 
his own country and culture. Furthermore, 
 
12 Translation my own. 
 
Figure 13. Screenshot from the music video for “Baby boy” by 
Alisa Vox. (Stepan G-nko, 2017, May 16). 
 
Lyrics: 
 
On a nice sunny day, he heads out to a protest. 
His weak hands grip the poster. 
There are errors on the poster, four in just two words. 
But his heart is pounding thunderously. 
And there is rage in his eyes. 
  
It’s not too late to learn from your mistakes. 
If your heart wants changes, start changing yourself. 
It’s not too late to learn from your mistakes. 
Do you want changes, baby boy? Start from yourself. 
  
He failed his history exam, 
But someone promised him tons of gold and euros. 
He is just a puppet, he lost out in this life. 
His mommy chases after him and tells him to keep warm. 
  
[Refrain] 
  
Mistake after mistake will teach you eventually, 
But do you really need to make the same mistakes again? 
There’s determination in his eyes to fight and to change 
But tomorrow is an early rise again for school. 
  
[Refrain] 
  
Freedom, money, girls—you’ll get it all, even power. 
Stay out of politics, baby boy, go prepare for your math test.12 
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the lyrics are dehumanizing the protester through the image of the monkey and the brain immersed in 
pink liquid. The promise of “gold and euros” refers to the government’s attempt to claim that those 
coming to Navalny’s protests were paid and that Navalny was sponsored by the West (Kornya, 2018, May 
31). The neoliberal message about starting from fixing one’s own mistakes as a first step in making 
change also fits well within Russian contemporary culture, which values self-growth (Salmenniemi & 
Adamson, 2014) and shames political activism (Henderson, 2011). Finally, the song is using a negative 
image of femininity—that of an aggressive sexual woman—to infantilize and emasculate the protester, 
simultaneously instilling a controlling image (Collins, 2008) of the protester who is supposed to keep a 
lower rank in the Russian hierarchy. 
Both videos use tropes and stereotypical images that employ highly heterosexualized 
representations of women to express sexual desire and, as I would argue, sexual submission and sexual 
dominance in relation to men—the nation’s leader in the first case and the protester in the second. These 
songs are examples of erotic patriotism exercised through gendered representational practices. The two 
videos both support Berger’s (1972) claim that men most often take the position of the surveyor and 
women, the position of the surveyed or the object to be looked at. What is interesting, however, is that the 
scopophilic pleasure (Mulvey, 1999) here is mobilized for the political message, which positions the pro-
government subject as the one for whom this pleasure is accessible, and the oppositional subject as the 
one for whom this pleasure is dangerous or castrating.  
Should we consider these videos, as well as other cultural elements that can be seen as glorifying 
Putin, as serious or as ironic? It is easy to dismiss such cultural producers as Singing Together and Alisa 
Vox as being blatantly anti-feminist and sexist. While I do not deny that the performers are firmly situated 
within heteropatriarchal representational codes, I claim that there is a certain irony in them that 
destabilizes such a straightforward reading. The exaggeration and performativity in these representations 
can be interpreted through the terminology of camp and the rhetorical tactic of stiob, specifically because 
the songs and videos are so excessive in their expressions of erotic patriotism. 
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The videos share something with practices of camp. Specifically, they involve artifice and 
exaggeration, two of the qualities that Susan Sontag (1964) highlights in “Notes on Camp.” According to 
Sontag (1964), camp is a mode of seduction that relies on the double interpretation and ambiguity of 
things represented, an artifice. In these two songs, the campy aesthetics of devotion to the masculine 
strong leader and disdain towards the effeminized childish protester point to the performativity of 
heterosexuality. Sontag writes that when “camp” is used as a noun, it means that “behind the ‘straight’ 
public sense in which something can be taken, one has found a private zany experience of the thing” (n. 
17). While “Baby boy” and “A man like Putin” reinforce heteropatriarchal scripts, in analyzing these 
songs, there is, however, a small chance left that this is, in the end, a mockery of this patriotic devotion 
through exaggeration, artifice, and a private zany experience of a viewer. The artificial element of these 
videos and the exaggeration of desire are the same elements that allow it to not be immediately dismissed 
by the viewer, who is likely to continue viewing, even if in disbelief. These heightened aesthetics, 
similarly to camp, can be seen as either bad art or kitsch (Sontag, 1964). Sontag writes that “camp is art 
that proposes itself seriously but cannot be taken altogether seriously because it is ‘too much’” (n. 26). 
Perhaps it is this notion of too-much-ness in the videos, alongside the cult of Putin, that hides the political 
message behind a kitschy extravagant aesthetics of performative heterosexuality. This is the point where 
tactics of stiob—namely, artifice, performativity, and exaggeration—that are often employed by Russian 
art-activists (discussed further below), can also be coopted by mainstream political powers. Specifically, 
because these representations overidentify with the authoritative discourse of heteropatriarchy and the 
gender roles exaggerated to the point of grotesque, they retain a possibility of irony. This stiob irony  
allows the Russian audience to recognize these representations as excessive and performative but still 
leaves an invitation to partake in their performative pleasures.  
In a patronizing verse, Alisa Vox sings, “Freedom, money, girls—you’ll get it all, even power. / 
Stay out of politics, baby, go prepare for your math test.” This advice suggests that the young protester’s 
objects of desire, which he is attempting to access through an inadequate participation in protest politics, 
will come to him in due time if only he would remain compliant. This same messaging is suggested by 
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the image of Putin appearing on 
consumer goods, where Putin’s face 
creates an object that is meant to 
evoke a smile—for example, a 
chocolate bar with the face of Putin 
kissing a puppy is called “Kind 
chocolate” and the one with him 
shedding a tear is called “Bitter 
chocolate” (Figure 14). Would one take this object of propaganda seriously? Perhaps not, but one will 
mostly likely smile or at least roll their eyes, or perhaps buy this chocolate as a joke, thus perpetuating the 
circulation of Putin’s image as a symbol of the Russian nation and reinforcing banal nationalism (Billig, 
1995). 
In her anthropological book “Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia,” Hemment (2015) demonstrates the 
way in which Russian nationalist performances of heterosexuality and the rituals in which young 
supporters of Putin engage are responses to geotemporal interpretations of Russia as being stuck in 
“backward” times of sexism and homophobia, unable to reach the contemporary liberation of sexual 
openness. Young pro-Putinist activists, who Hemment had interviewed, engaged in sexualized rituals of 
devotion to the President (women ripping their shirts on camera, for example, proclaiming “I will rip for 
Putin”) and heteronormativity for the sake of politics (such as marrying someone they met through 
political youth camp for Putin supporters right at the camp itself). However, in her interviews, Hemment 
found that these youth not only knew about feminism and feminist critiques of such heteronormative 
sexualized behaviour, but they also engaged in this behaviour despite such knowledge, laughing at it, 
marveling at the feeling that Western feminist researchers would not really be able to comprehend the true 
meaning of their acts. Specifically, the image of a liberal Westerner includes the presumption that liberals 
support certain social causes, the ridiculousness of which is common-sense for Russians. These social 
causes include an acceptance of transsexuality, gender and sexual inclusion, support for women’s sexual 
 
Figure 14. Promotional photos. Left: Dobryi [Kind]. Image of Putin 
with a puppy. Right: Gor’kyi [Bitter]. Image of Putin with a tear in his 
eye. Photo credit: Shokobox (n.d.). 
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autonomy and anti-harassment campaigns, gender and sexual diversity, anti-racist and pro-immigration 
politics, and political correctness.  
The liberal in Russian mainstream popular culture is seen to be “silly” in her claims for inclusion of 
unnatural things and “hysterical” in her suspicion of harassment and oppression at every turn. Thus, the 
performative heterosexuality seen in actions such as “I will rip for Putin” are also acts of enjoyment taken 
in expressing something that is, presumably, an impossibility for politically correct and feminist liberals, 
and in confusing the Western gaze. As Hemment writes, young Putin supporters’ “use of young women’s 
bodies was a provocation that deliberately sought to flout liberal norms as they are currently construed in 
much Russian popular discourse, in a context were ‘liberalism’ and ‘liberals’ are widely disparaged” (p. 
193). Hemment contends that “Putin-era sexualized patriotic performances talk back not only to the 
decade of the 1990s and the humiliations and unwelcome international interventions it entailed, but to the 
disciplining reach of global liberal norms and global governance that continued in the 2000s as well” (p. 
194). Hemment suggests that we can see Putin-era sexualized patriotic performances as propelled in part 
by the desire to confound the Western gaze, or “judging western eye” (Greenberg, 2010, p. 44). These 
campaigns direct themselves not only to foreign liberals, but to domestic critics of Putin’s regime as well 
– the liberal-oriented urban professionals, or “creative classes,” who in recent years have expressed 
opposition to the Putin administration (Gapova, 2011). These kinds of sexual political play use sex, 
excess, and satire as a challenge to Western conceptualizations of what sexual freedom and sexual 
modernity means. Thus, Hemment very poignantly suggests seeing these campaigns as geopolitical 
performances. Interestingly, this ironic tactic is similar to the strategies of camp, which relies on a flashy 
but flat character (i.e, a woman securely attached to her object of desire, an omnipotent and beloved 
nation’s leader) and theatricalizes the experience through exaggerated performances of gender that are 
simulteneously serious and ironic. Both theatrical patriotic devotion and camp share a strong relationship 
to artifice and exaggeration. 
As Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner (1998) argue, “national heterosexuality is the mechanism 
by which a core national culture can be imagined as a sanitized space of sentimental feeling and 
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immaculate behavior, a space of pure citizenship” (p. 549). The iconography of the strong and virile 
leader that was meticulously constructed during the years of Putin’s rule firmly established an archetype 
of national heteronormative masculinity in Russian visual culture. The visual tropes associated with Putin 
include mastery over one’s body and environment, taming and owning nature and national culture, and 
commodifying the masculine body as a popular object of female desire. Female desire is also used to 
emasculate Putin’s opposition. In these popular representations of the national ideal masculinity and 
femininity the place of non-ethnic Russian bodies is extremely marginal: in fact, it is only present in a 
form of a prop for president’s mastery over the environment. Through such symbolic annihilation of non-
ethnic Russians from popular representations, the hegemony of Russian whiteness in nationalist imagery 
is reinscribed. 
Prohibited representations: The limits of patriotic sexualities 
The hegemony of heteropatriarchal representations of national Russianness is secured not only by 
dominance of idealized white Russian masculinity in popular culture, but also by censorship and 
expressions of public contempt toward those images that challenge the ideal. According to Andrei 
Erofeev, who curated the exhibition Forbidden Art in 2007, there are four categories of censored works in 
Russia: those that include swear words; those that take religious elements out of their usual context; those 
that use corporeality and play with various erotic representations; and those that employ irony to 
comment on political issues (Zaitceva, 2009, August 20). The Forbidden Art exhibition happened in 
March 2007 at the Sakharov Centre, a cultural hub in Moscow that hosts projects related to the history of 
Soviet repressions as well as more current issues of human rights and political freedoms in Russia. The 
exhibition brought together paintings, collage-works, and installations by 12 individual artists and two 
art-collectives. These works were previously censored by Moscow museums and galleries in 2006. The 
exhibition showed the works behind a faux wall; the visitors were only able to see the artworks by 
standing on a stool and looking through a small peep hole. Some of the works used religious objects to 
criticize post-Soviet consumerism, such as an icon frame filled with black caviar by Aleksandr 
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Kosolapov. After several Orthodox organizations’ protests against the exhibition and a two-year long 
trial, the director of the Sakharov Centre, Yury Samodurov, and the show’s curator, Andrey Erofeev, were 
found guilty of offending the religious feelings of Orthodox believers (see Jonson, 2015).  
At the same time, there were repressions of representations of sexual pleasure that, allegedly, worked to 
corrupt heterosexuality and Russianness of the nation. Such was the case of a series of protests in 2017 
launched against the feature film Matilda, directed by Aleksey Uchitel, which narrates a love affair 
between Nikolay Romanov, the crown prince of the Russian Empire (Tsar Nikolay II), and a Polish 
ballerina named Matilda Kshesinskaya (Figure 15). Though Nikolay II’s interest in Kshesinskaya has 
been historically and factually confirmed, the specific historical details of their relationship are unknown 
and the film fictionalizes their encounters. The film portrays the Emperor being overtaken by his passion 
for Kshesinskaya. It includes several sex scenes and a short reveal of a bare breast, but it is no more 
sexually explicit than, for example, The Barber of Siberia, a well-beloved Russian historical fiction 
romance film of comparable budget created in 1998 by avid Putin supporter Nikita Mikhalkov. 
This high-budget production, filmed in imperial palaces and cathedrals in St. Petersburg and 
Moscow, was originally scheduled for release in 2017. However, protests held the process up. The 
instigator of the protests was Member of Parliament Natalya Poklonskaya, who claimed that a number of 
concerned citizens had complained to her about the 
film and asked the prosecutor general to investigate it 
on the basis of insulting religious feelings. 
Additionally, several movie theaters across the country 
reported that they had received letters urging them to 
not show the film. After an inspection by the 
prosecutor’s office found no violations, the situation 
escalated. The building of Uchitel’s film studio was 
vandalized, one of the movie theaters that showed the film was hit by a van, and two cars were set on fire 
in front of Uchitel’s lawyer’s office windows. Notes were left on these burnt cars, stating, “Burn for 
 
Figure 15. Still from the film “Matilda” picturing 
Polish ballerina Matilda Kshesinskaya (Michalina 
Olszanska) and Russian Tsar Nikolay II (Lars 
Eidinger). (regnum.ru, 2017, November 3)  
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Matilda.” Due to threats they had received from anonymous sources, several movie theaters decided not 
to show the film. There was also an anonymous protest video, in which a portrait of Nikolay II was 
sprinkled with blood, claiming that the blood was menstrual (“Feministki okropili,” 2017, August 29). 
Part of the reason for such intense backlash was the fact that the image of Romanov is an important 
symbol of nationalism. The crown prince Nikolay Romanov became the Emperor of the Russian Empire 
in 1894. Nikolay II was killed by the Bolsheviks in 1918, and in 1981, he was canonized by the Russian 
Orthodox Church as a saint.13 The icons portraying Nikolay were juxtaposed with the controversy 
surrounding actor Lars Eidinger, who played Nicholay II. In public interviews, Natalya Poklonksaya 
repeatedly invoked photographs of Eidinger in violent and erotic scenes, also wrongly naming the actor a 
pornography performer. And so Nicholay II became contrasted with Eidinger: saint vs. “pornographer.” 
The representation of the tsar being overtaken by passion is so deeply uncomfortable for Russians not 
only because of its adulterous consequences and the challenge to respectability, but also specifically 
because of Kshesinskaya’s position as a foreigner.  The foreignness of Kshesinskaya threatened the ethnic 
homogeneity of Russian nationalism. 
Another case of sexual repression can be seen in the currently ongoing charges of money-
laundering against theatre director Kirill Serebrennikov. This case exemplifies a form of sexual repression 
that can be seen across the arts. It is no coincidence that Serebrennikov was arrested in August 2017 as he 
was in the middle of preparing Nureyev: an incisive new ballet for the Bolshoi theatre. The ballet tells the 
story of Rudolf Nureyev, an accomplished Soviet ballet dancer, who defected from the Soviet Union 
while on tour in Paris in 1961 by requesting political asylum. Living and working in the West, Nureyev 
openly dated a Danish male dancer, Erik Bruhn, and eventually died of AIDS-related illness in 1993. The 
ballet reflects Nureyev’s hotheaded temperament and non-conventional lifestyle through homoeroticism 
 
13 Nikolay’s recognition as a saint is controversial: while some branches of the Russian Orthodox Church canonized 
him in 1981 as a martyr saint, regarding him as a man of exceptional piety and moral leadership, other branches 
condemned him for weakness and incompetency that brought the country to revolution and argued against his 
canonization. 
84 
 
in both the choreography and flashing video 
projections, taken by Richard Avedon, 
featuring a nude Nureyev (Figure 16). 
Was Serebrennikov’s arrest related to 
the artistic choices he made as director of this 
explosive ballet? The answer to this can be 
only speculative, as Serebrennikov was 
charged with embezzlement of public funds 
unrelated to this specific ballet production. Notably, however, there is a total absence of evidence, and a 
large number of his colleagues—well-known people working in theatre, ballet, and film—see these 
charges as ungrounded and completely absurd (“My potryaseny,” 2017). It would rather make sense to 
see his arrest not as a direct punishment for the representation of sexually explicit content, but rather as an 
act of disciplining meant to reinforce self-censorship among artists and the repressive use of culture. 
These unexpected and unjust accusations brought against Serebrennikov, as well as the pressure on 
Aleksey Uchitel, the director of Matilda, make it easy to see these events as expressions of anxiety about 
the corruption of Russian national pride—specifically, corruption by desire that is too passionate, too 
conflicting with the needs of the nation, and too perverse. These repressions, however, have happened at 
the same time as the sexual desire for the “right” object is becoming increasingly present in popular 
national culture and when the object that is not “right” is constructed not only as challenging 
heteropatriarchy but also whiteness of the Russian nation. For example, this connection is present in 
expressions of public contempt for challenging representations. Such contempt was represented by Nikita 
Mikhalkov. Mikhalkov, director of The Barber of Siberia (mentioned above), is a successful film director 
known for his high-budget films that glorify Russian nationalism and Russian character—loyalty, 
patriotism, self-sacrifice, openness, and uninhibited strong emotions. In Russia, he is regarded as an 
important cultural influencer. On his YouTube channel, which is devoted to discussing cultural life in the 
country, Mikhalkov addressed the scandal around the Nureyev ballet and expressed his contempt for 
 
Figure 16. Rudolf Nureyev. Photographs by Richard 
Avedon intended as projected decorations for the ballet. 
Photo credit: The Richard Avedon Foundation. (artwise.live, 
2016, November 4)  
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representations of homosexuality in Russia (Mikhalkov, 2017, August 21). The tone, structure, and 
discursive codes used in his commentary are telling in terms of establishing the link between 
representations of sexuality and a sense of cultural belonging. The narrative of the commentary is 
roundabout, not clearly structured, doesn’t have a clear addressee (only a broad “you”), and highly 
emotional. This is the tone of a father scolding his child, just barely suppressing his anger, accentuating 
each word with elliptic pauses. 
First, the commentary accuses the creators of the ballet of lying. Specifically, he claims, the 
creators were lying when they said they did not expect the backlash against the performance, since 
everyone knows that the imposition of homosexuality on Russian people causes a negative reaction. 
Further, Mikhalkov explains that just as Russians would not be able to understand the traditions of 
various racialized and indigenous peoples, they would also not be able to accept homosexuality, as it is 
foreign to Russian culture. Illustrated by images of a variety of non-specified non-white people in 
traditional or ceremonial attires, Mikhalkov narrates:  
Young women of certain tribes in India marry for just three days, after that they can have 
as many lovers as they want. Australian aboriginals, for instance, within the same kin can 
share wives. Indigenous peoples of South America greet each other by spitting at each 
other. 
These words are supposed to educate the audience about the impossibility of bridging cultural gaps with 
those who are so foreign to Russian culture and create a parallel between such impossibly distant 
traditions and homosexuality. After that, Mikhalkov scolds the creators again for thinking that the image 
of Nureyev’s naked body in the Bolshoi theatre would not provoke “aversion in a huge number of 
people.” Finally, he reads the “harsh but heartfelt” public statement from a famous actress who expresses 
her disdain towards “sexual filth” and the word “tolerance.” This segment emphasizes that the Russian 
cultural elite is rightfully and whole-heartedly angry at sexual perversion being imposed on Russian 
people. This logic of rationalizing the feelings as something “of the nature” brings up the way 
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racial/ethnic boundaries are constructed in Russian nationalism as etnos. As discussed in Chapter 1, etnos  
refers to biological and evolutionary explanation of racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, and perceives 
the world through the prism of survival of the fittest etnos. By evoking cultural difference through the 
image of racialized cultures and by portraying them as abject, this public expression of contempt for 
homosexuality rationalizes both heteropatriarchy and whiteness of Russian culture. 
This seven-minute-long monologue has a faint soundtrack. The music comes from the long final 
scene of Mikhalkov’s film The Barber of Siberia (1998). In this scene, the main protagonist, a Russian 
soldier in exile in Siberia, watches from afar as the love of his life, an American bourgeois woman, rides 
away across the vast Siberian landscape. This highly emotional scene portrays the soldier choosing his 
country, and the extremely rough life in the wilderness, over passionate romantic love for a foreigner. The 
background music accentuates the emotional purity and authenticity of Mikhalkov’s anger, because it 
legitimates this anger as a natural expression of the feeling of patriotism and his concern for the nation. It 
produces his anger at homosexuals as a national feeling of contempt. This music also is a subtle link—
perhaps only visible to those intimately familiar with Russian cultural production and emotional codes—
between sexual representation, cultural belonging, and the inescapability of Russian etnos. 
Policing representations of sexuality is an ongoing process of regulation. However, besides 
regulating sexuality, it also functions to thwart the expression of other forms of political resistance. This 
silencing mechanism, silencing alternative sexualities, is just as important as regulating possibilities for 
people to create art and culture that offer alternative readings of history, challenge norms of 
respectability, and deter critical action. Heteronormativity and gender conformity here play as modes of 
social cohesion. Mainstream discourse makes it seem as if Serebrennikov is punished for appropriating 
public funds rather than for his non-traditional beliefs and for representing the non-representable—i.e., 
the dominant social discourse is obscured by an economic one. 
If in case of Nureyev the creator of offending cultural production was censored by accusing him of 
corruption, the grassroots cultural productions are more directly regulated through discourses on morality 
and patriotism. In December 2017, students of the Ulyanovsk Institute of Civil Aviation filmed a video to 
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the 2002 electro house hit “Satisfaction” by 
the Italian DJ Benny Benassi (Figure 17; 
Ulnfox info, 2018). In the video that 
eventually made its way to YouTube, 
approximately 15 male students dance 
dressed in underwear, boots, and academy 
pilot caps, along with playful accessories 
such as neckties, leather harnesses, and 
suspenders. The video is set in the bleak 
environment of a student dormitory. The 
dance includes hip thrusting while doing 
household chores such as cleaning and ironing, grinding on brooms and doorframes, and doing pushups. 
The culmination of the video is a group scene of nearly naked college boys shaking their butts together. 
The video mocked the original “Satisfaction” music video, which shows women in bikinis using power 
tools. The idea of this parody was not new; the Ulyanovsk student creation was nearly identical to one 
filmed by British military personnel in 2013 (xSynapse, 2013). 
Originally, it seemed like there was no deeper meaning to the video beyond being a frivolous 
college student joke (as the students themselves said, “we were just joking” (Berg, 2018, January 17)); 
however, there was a tremendous reaction to this video from a variety of organizations, including 
educational and government authorities, student groups, staff of different workplaces, and media outlets. 
Clearly, the pilots would have been aware of the semiotics of the leather harnesses, but this 
homoeroticism was glossed over and not talked about by the students themselves. The media used 
exaggerated terms to describe the short clip, such as “sex-video,” “erotic performance,” and “BDSM-
video.” The Dean of the Ulyanovsk Institute pronounced that the video insulted something sacred, 
pointing towards the patriotic symbolism of Russian aviation. He also compared the students’ act to 
performances by Pussy Riot and threatened to expel the students from the Institute (Berg, 2018, January 
 
Figure 17. Screenshots from the video “Satisfaction” by the 
students of the Ulyanovsk Institute for Civil Aviation. (Ulnfox 
info, 2018, January 16). 
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17). The federal authority of aviation started an investigation into this event, which it called “outrageous,” 
“amoral,” “repulsive,” and “desecrating,” and ordered an evaluation of the students’ mental health 
(Rosaviaciya, 2018). Several popular TV shows of the largest national broadcasters joined in on the 
criticism. The audience repeatedly watched and dissected the video, discussed whether it should be taken 
seriously, whether it should be considered homosexual propaganda, and how the students should be 
punished (Novosti, 2018; Politics Russia, 2018). In response to this incredibly heated discussion, many 
student groups across the country, as well as various organizations and random groups of citizens, filmed 
their own versions of the “Satisfaction” video. Perhaps the avalanche of tributes to the Ulyanovsk 
students was effective in creating a moving target and also demonstrating the absurdity of the discussion, 
as the investigation by the federal aviation authority eventually came to a conclusion that there was no 
violation of conduct, and the students faced nothing more than reprimands. 
As Eliot Borenstein (2018, February 27) argued, the viral campaign in support of the Ulyanovsk 
students fights not for gay rights, but rather for the right to frivolity, the right to not be taken too 
seriously. Moreover, in my reading, there is also pleasure to be had in engaging the comedic sexuality. 
This video might also be similar to camp through its heightened erotic patriotism. However, again, as 
Borenstein argues, this campaign rests on heterosexual privilege and the invisibility of gayness: it is 
precisely because the Ulyanovsk boys’ heterosexuality is not seriously undermined that they can enjoy 
this public support. Because they are performing this dance as a sort of “gay drag,” wearing leather 
harnesses and parodying the sexual body on display, their heterosexuality is emphasized. The entry into 
visual space is denied to certain representations of sexuality through laws on homosexual propaganda and 
the prohibition of lewd language. However, through the cases of public scandal and incitement to 
discourse, the repetition of these images, and the fetishization of these images, the public learns about the 
boundaries of the patriotic body and patriotic sexuality. In all of these cases, the dominant discourse is not 
actually about sexuality but rather about patriotism. 
The analysis of the three cases of censorship and expressions of public contempt towards 
representations of “non-patriotic” sexuality demonstrates that the production of the Other occurs through 
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a constant pushing of things into the realm of the “private.” Only patriotic eroticization of public space is 
allowed, while protest eroticization is punished by discarding it as insanity, as depravity, as non-Russian, 
and/or as sexual perversion. Through the scrutiny of “offending” images, the limits of patriotism are set 
through representations of specific stereotypical figures: the overly sexual homosexual; the youth with a 
dangerous untamed sexuality; hysterical oversexed young women and crazy feminists; and sexually 
fixated cultural producers. These figures serve as controlling images (Collins, 2008)—i.e., images that 
maintain the hierarchy through stereotypical representations of marginalized subjects. 
Sex, body, and satire as resistance to heteropatriarchy in Russian art-activism 
The links between heteronormative expressions of gender, heterosexuality, and patriotic notions of 
Russianness are well understood by the countercultural movements and are at the center of critical artistic 
engagements with Russian nationalism. Late at night on April 14, 2007, during the wave of Russia-wide 
anti-government protests known as the March of the Dissenters, an old dusty Zhiguli car drove around 
Moscow while a heterosexual couple had sex on a mattress that was affixed to the roof (see video: 
Nikolaev, 2008). The car moved slowly through busy streets, while surprised but enthusiastic onlookers 
yelled bawdy jokes at them. The couple did not react to the yells, nor did they pause their activity when 
the seemingly indifferent driver of their car stopped to get some gas and cigarettes. The “Auto Ride of the 
Dissenters” was staged by the art-group Bombily, which formed in 2004 and was run by two young visual 
artists, Anton Nikolaev and Aleksandr Rossikhin.14 As Nikolaev later explained, the action referred to the 
demonstration of sexual freedom as the only possible protest that cannot be appropriated by the political 
games of Putin’s regime (Nikolaev, 2008, September 17). While I think that Nikolaev was too optimistic 
about his creation and, as the previous discussion in this chapter shows sex and satire has been, and 
continues to be, appropriated by the hegemonic culture in Russia quite successfully, satirizing 
heteronormative nationalism is a potent tactic of Russian countercultural representations. 
 
14 Unfortunately, I wasn’t able to find the name of the woman participating in this action. All sources only credit 
Nikolaev and Rossikhin. 
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According to the arts scholar Alek Epstein (Epstein & Langenburg, 2012), contemporary Russian 
art-actionism, such as Bombily, traces its roots to the Russian avant-garde movement, which started with 
the suprematism, futurism, and cubism of the 1910s. Moscow conceptualism, developed in the 1960s and 
1980s, became a first wave of performance art in the Soviet Union. It was represented by such well-
known artists as Andrei Monastyrsky, Dmitri Prigov, Lev Rubenstein and others. Their performances 
explored the nature of art itself, in particular the notions of spectatorship, audience, event, and artwork. 
They often blurred the boundaries between artist and spectator by involving the audience in their 
performances. Sometimes, they took their performances out of institutionalized contexts by not 
announcing them and staging them in difficult-to-access spaces. They also questioned the limits of the 
artwork by refusing fixed meaning or creating the meaning only after the performance had happened. 
These forms of Russian avant-garde challenged the conventions of art, perhaps even commenting on the 
politics of art in the context of repressive Soviet ideology and the explosion of neoliberal consumerism in 
the 1990s. These principles of the avant-garde artistic form were carried into art-activism of the Putin era, 
criticizing the institutionalization of art while also articulating wider political criticism. 
Putin’s cultural politics involved the growing censorship of the visual field and the exclusion of 
political art from the institutionalized spaces of museums, galleries, and cultural centres (Jonson, 2018), 
as well as the appropriation of contemporary art for political purposes (Chukhrov, 2011). Perhaps as a 
result of this, performance art, which was squeezed out of institutionalized spaces, became more actively 
involved with political commentary and provocation. The most recent wave of art-actionism emerged in 
the context of protest culture against Putin’s regime. This protest culture has experimented with 
carnivalesque humour and the representational device of stiob, as discussed above. One example of stiob 
in Putin’s era that employed sex and body as conduits for a political message was the performance action 
by the art-group Voina (“war”) titled “Fuck for the heir Little Bear!” This performance employed 
overidentification with patriotic rhetoric and eroticizing the pro-natalist politics of Putin’s administration. 
On February 29, 2008, two days before the election of Putin’s chosen candidate Dmitry Medvedev, five  
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heterosexual couples undressed and had sex in 
public at the State Museum of Biology in the hall 
of “Metabolism, energy, nutrition, digestion” 
(Figure 18).  
While they were having sex, Voina’s chief 
media artist, Alexei Plutser-Sarno, wearing a 
tuxedo and a top-hat, held a black banner reading 
“Fuck for the Heir Little Bear!” According to 
Plutser-Sarno’s account of the action on his blog, the couples were also shouting “We have to support the 
Little Bear! We will pass down the energy of our bodies to him! We must fuck for him!” The joke played 
on the soon-to-be president’s name; “medved” is a Russian word for “bear.” The bear was also an 
emblem of the Putin and Medvedev party “United Russia” and one of the symbols of Russian 
nationalism. This sarcastically celebratory action mocked the farcical elections in the country, which 
passed down the presidency to Putin’s puppet and left Putin in control as Prime Minister. At the same 
time, the performance grotesquely parodied Putin’s heteropatriarchal pro-natalist politics, which sought to 
increase the birthrate of the country and financially rewarded women giving birth to a second or third 
child (Avdeyeva, 2011). One of the women taking part in this action, future member of Pussy Riot, 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, was noticeably pregnant. In a classic stiob move, the artists used the tactic of 
overidentification, reproducing the authoritative form: the pro-natalist slogans, the gestures of voting in 
favour of the current leader, and the nationalist symbols (see Yurchak, 2005).  
It is unclear whether this performance had any audience in real time; however, the photos and a 
detailed description was published on Plutser-Sarno’s blog, which, at the time, served as an archive of 
Voina’s work and generated more than two thousand comments. The images resurfaced again years after 
the performance: In 2012, during the trial of Pussy Riot members, these photographs were put under 
scrutiny on numerous talk shows, in internet discussions, and in the courtroom. The image became iconic,  
 
Figure 18. Voina action “Fuck for the Heir Little Bear!” 
The State Museum of Biology, Moscow, 2008 (Plutser-
Sarno, n.d.). 
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as it was often used in discussions on Pussy Riot in which the speaker sought to dismiss any claims to 
seriousness on the part of Pussy Riot members by invoking the image in order to show the lack of morals 
of Tolokonnikova, discrediting her as insane, immature, and sexually depraved (e.g., the talk show “Let 
Them Speak” (Pust Govoryat, 2012, March 15)). 
Later actions by Voina continued similar commentary: “A cop in a priest’s robe” saw Oleg 
Vorotnikov dressed in a priest’s robe worn over a police uniform, walking past the cash register at a 
supermarket without paying for a shopping cart full of items; “In memory of the Dekabrists” staged a 
hanging of three migrant workers and two queer people at a grocery store and referenced the failed revolt 
of 1825 against the authoritarian regime of tsarist Russia15; “The storm of the White House” projected a 
giant image of a skull and crossbones onto a government building; and “A dick held hostage by the FSB,” 
where members of the art group drew a seven-meter long phallus on the drawbridge seconds before the 
bridge was raised, erecting the phallus in front of the Federal Security Service building. This last action 
brought a prestigious Innovatsiya prize to Voina in 2011. Each of the performances was filmed, 
photographed, and narrated online. In this way, even though the performances had no direct audience, 
they became widely distributed and well-known in online communities. Voina performances used 
playfully grotesque actions in order to draw attention to and criticize the seemingly limitless power of the 
church, police, secret service, and corrupt justice systems. Their performances can also be understood as a 
form of “culture jamming.” Coined by Naomi Klein (2010), culture jamming refers to a resistant cultural 
practice of parodying public messages created by corporations and state institutions, such as 
advertisement billboards, in order to create a new radical meaning, deconstruct oppressive discourse, and 
voice political concerns. As Klein (2010) argues, the most successful culture jams “hack into a 
corporation’s own method of communication to send a message starkly at odds with the one that was 
intended” (p. 281). The object of Voina’s culture jam is the authoritative form itself as they hijack 
political discourse, the disciplinary power of the secret service and police, and the privacy of the sexual 
 
15 Footage from this action was used in the documentary film, Grey Violet – Odd one out, (Juntunen & Aalto, 2017) 
narrated from the point of view of gender-queer participant and member of Voina Grey Violet. 
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act. The eroticism here is not a direct criticism of the power, but rather, as Jonathan Platt (2018) points 
out, is a staged enjoyment of bare life, “an erotic enjoyment that is obscene, even traumatic, and which 
troubles the desiring, disciplined subject” (p. 145). 
Pussy Riot continued these practices of 
stiob, culture jamming, and erotic enjoyment. 
On February 21, 2012, several women dressed 
in bright-colored dresses, tights, and balaclavas 
and stormed the nearly empty Cathedral of 
Christ the Saviour in Moscow. They proceeded 
to sing a “Punk prayer,” accompanying their 
song with grotesque dancing and jumping (Figure 19). The performance took place on the ambo, an area 
of the church reserved for clergy, the pulpit, and the altar, and women’s access to it is strictly regulated. 
The lyrics of the song read:  
Black robe, golden epaulettes 
All parishioners crawl to bow 
The phantom of liberty is in heaven 
Gay pride sent to Siberia in chains 
The head of the KGB, their chief saint, 
Leads protesters to prison under escort 
In order not to offend His Holiness 
Women must give birth and love 
Shit, shit, the Lord’s shit! 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God 
Put Putin away! 
Virgin Mary, turn into a feminist! 
Become a feminist! Become a feminist! 
 
The performance was interrupted by security personnel in mere minutes; the participants barely managed 
to unpack a plastic guitar and start jumping and shouting as they were dragged off the ambo. Still, the 
action gained international attention as the next day, the video clip appeared online and went viral. The 
video clip used footage filmed at the Cathedral the day before as well as materials from previous actions. 
Pussy Riot’s “Punk prayer” was not the first performance of this kind. The group formed in 2011, 
when, according to historian Masha Gessen (2014), Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and a friend were preparing 
 
Figure 19. Pussy Riot action “Punk Prayer.” The Cathedral 
of Christ the Saviour, Moscow, 2012. (Pussy Riot, n.d.) 
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a public lecture on the third wave of feminism and the riot grrrl movement when they decided to form 
their own riot grrrl group. However, if Pussy Riot’s aggressive punk aesthetics and feminist commitments 
were similar to those of North America’s Bikini Kill and alike, the actions of the Russian version of riot 
grrrl differed significantly. Pussy Riot staged their actions in unexpected public places: on top of a bus, in 
a crowded subway station, on the monument wall of the Red Square, and on top of the glass enclosure of 
a luxury car in the posh shopping district. Their texts were feminist and pro-LGBTQ, aggressive, mocked 
Putin’s government, the police, and the institution of the Orthodox Church, and full of direct references to 
corporeality, such as pissing, shitting, and fucking. They criticized the Orthodox Church for promoting 
the “religion of a hard penis,” claimed that “feminist whip is healthy for Russia,” and called for “the end 
to sexist fucked-up Putinists.” All of their performances, with detailed explanations of the actions and the 
lyrics, were posted on the Pussy Riot blog (Pussy Riot, n.d.). The blog also provided the explanation for 
the band’s actions and cited artists and philosophers—including Slavoj Žižek, Judith Butler and Rosi 
Braidotti—as inspirations. 
When the video footage of young women in bright clothing and balaclavas performing the “Punk 
prayer” erupted in the world news in 2012, the Pussy Riot art collective was quickly celebrated in Europe 
and North America as a symbol of feminist courage and strength in the face of authoritarian patriarchy. 
Their aesthetics of carnival, satire, and punk female aggression sought to provoke and challenge the 
power of the state that was backed by the Russian Orthodox Church, while their music condemned 
Putin’s regime, systemic sexism, and oppression of LGBTQ people. The world closely followed the trial 
that would result in a two-year long sentence for two leading members, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and 
Maria Alyokhina, on the grounds of hooliganism committed for reasons of religious hatred. After their 
release from incarceration in December 2013, these two activists became even more popular in the West, 
and the image of bright balaclavas circulated widely in North American and European media as iconic 
markers of feminist struggle. Romanticized as symbols of white feminist return (Groeneveld, 2015), 
Tolokonnikova and Alyokhina were invited to take part in Western visual culture. They published 
memoir books in English (Alyokhina, 2017; Tolokonnikova, 2018), appeared in Vanity Fair (Gessen, 
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2014, July), Rolling Stone (Kelley, 2015, August 19), and the Netflix show House of Cards, and they 
participated in public conversations with famous artists and philosophers, such as Marina Abramovic 
(TimesTalks, 2018, May 14), Slavoj Žižek (Tolokonnikova & Žižek, 2014), and Judith Butler and Rosi 
Braidotti (The First Supper Symposium, 2014, May 21). They also went on music tours across North 
America, expanding their political focus. Their new music video, “I can’t breathe” (wearepussyriot, 2015, 
February 18) criticized police brutality in the U.S., while “Make America Great Again” (wearepussyriot, 
2016, October 27) mocked Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. The DIY punk aesthetics and 
carnivalesque humour of the pre-trial Pussy Riot got lost; their bright balaclavas were exchanged for 
multicolored hair and stylish glasses, their videos are now professionally filmed, and their performances 
moved from hard-to-access and politically charged spaces to regular music halls. 
Pussy Riot’s performances also exemplify the typical Russian silence on issues of racism in Russia. 
The broad agenda of Pussy Riot expressed through their performances and the lyrics of their songs 
tackled such varied issues as sexism, infringement on reproductive rights, LGBTQ issues, capitalist 
exploitation, corruption of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian politicians, and the ties between 
clergy and political leaders. Yet, the problems of racism were absent from the band’s agenda until the 
continuation of their artistic endeavours in the West. For instance, their video “I can’t breathe” addresses 
the murder of Eric Garner by New York police in 2014, illustrating issues of anti-Black racism. Their art 
has never addressed the massive violent anti-migrant protests in Russia in 2010 and 2013, however, 
which were backed by the state and resulted in mass detentions and deportations of immigrants from 
Central Asia (see Zakharov, 2015). This omission of racism within Russia is a common tendency in 
Russian mainstream and countercultural discourses, as race is seen as something extraneous to the 
country and as a problem of the West. 
It is not surprising that feminists in Europe and North America celebrated Pussy Riot, since the 
collective used language and imagery familiar to Western audiences—that of third-wave punk feminism, 
social media-based activism, and identity politics (Gapova, 2015). As media scholars Kathie Wiedlack 
and Maria Neufeld (2014) argue, there was quite a bit of misinterpretation involved in Western readings 
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of Pussy Riot: their actions were often misunderstood as anti-religious, while their appropriation of the 
riot grrrl movement’s representational techniques was interpreted as a sign that Russia is following in the 
footsteps of white Western feminism. In Russia, the support for the collective was far less celebratory and 
was primarily situated within a discursive framework that criticized the state’s excessive punishment for 
minor offences rather than the framework of feminism (Gapova, 2015). Many Russian feminists felt 
Pussy Riot did not express a clear feminist message, that their methods were too violent, and that they 
failed to consider that their rhetoric and aesthetics would be inaccessible to most of the Russian 
population who were not versed in third-wave feminism (Sperling, 2014). However, I maintain that the 
role of Pussy Riot in Russian popular culture was both misunderstood by Western and Russian feminists. 
Despite the murkiness of their message and the questionable success of their achievements in Russia, the 
imagery produced by Pussy Riot effectively highlighted the ways in which gender and sexuality is 
recruited in maintaining nationalist ideals, values, and symbols. The practice of sexualizing national 
symbols and expressions of national belonging—Hemment’s (2015) “erotic patriotism”—is a hegemonic 
practice of representation in Russian popular culture in Putin’s years of governing. Pussy Riot’s 
performances demonstrated that sex and gender work both to legitimize nationalist heteropatriarchy and 
resist nationalism and oppressive state practices. Pussy Riot continued the work of earlier countercultural 
anarchist art collectives, such as Voina, which sought to interrupt the nation-making and body-policing 
processes of the state while focusing on female interpretations of these processes. 
The final example of art-
actionism I will discuss in this 
chapter is the work of Piotr 
Pavlensky. Pavlensky’s first well-
known action in July 2012, titled 
“Stitch,” happened just before the 
judge made the decision to sentence 
Pussy Riot members Tolokonnikova 
 
Figure 20. Screenshot from the video of Piotr Pavlensky’s  action 
“Stitch” in front of the Kazan Cathedral, St. Petersburg. 
(xpitercorex2012, 2012, July 24). 
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and Alyokhina to two years of imprisonment (Figure 20). Pavlensky appeared in front of the Kazan 
Cathedral in St Petersburg with his mouth stitched shut,16 holding a banner stating, “The performance of 
Pussy Riot was a repetition of the action of Jesus Christ.” The artist was silent, calm, and passive, as he 
stood there watching the crowd of passers-by react. One of the onlookers came up to him and crossed him 
while reciting a prayer. Another attempted to take the banner away. Finally, police officers and an 
ambulance arrived, taking Pavlensky to a psychiatric hospital, where he was promptly released 
(xpitercorex2012, 2012, July 24). In his next action, in May 2013, “Carcass,” Pavlensky wrapped himself 
in a cocoon of barbed wire in front of the Legislative Assembly building in St Petersburg (Figure 21). 
He lay naked and silent inside the cocoon until 
police officers cut the wire open and released him. In 
November 2013, in an action titled “Fixation,” 
Pavlensky nailed his scrotum to the pavement in the 
Red Square and, again, sat there naked and silent 
while puzzled police officers walked around trying 
to figure out what to do (Figure 22). Since the artist 
was harming no one except himself during the 
actions, he managed to avoid being arrested and charged. However, after each of these actions, Pavlensky 
was requested by the authorities to undergo psychiatric evaluation—a common response of Russian 
authorities to both sexual and political transgressions (remember the required psychological evaluations 
of the students who filmed the “Satisfaction” video discussed in the previous section)17. The evaluations 
found the artist sane and in good health. In October 2014, an action titled “Separation” addressed the 
topic of abuse of psychiatric diagnosis for political means: sitting naked atop a high concrete fence of the 
 
16 The symbolism of the mouth shut has been used in multiple activist and artist works around the world, from the 
ACT UP activist David Wojnarowicz’ work in in Rosa von Praunheim’s 1990 AIDS documentary, Silence = Death, 
refugee protests against detention and the process of asylum seeking (Goldsmith, 2002, January 19). 
17 For history of political abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet countries, see van Vooren (2009) 
and, specifically on psychiatric treatments for sexual “perversions” see Essig (1999).  
 
Figure 21. Screenshot from the video of Piotr 
Pavlensky’s action “Carcass” in front of the 
Legislative Assembly, St Petersburg (Sergeev, 2013, 
May 27). 
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institute for forensic psychiatry, 
Pavlensky sliced off his earlobe with 
a big kitchen knife and silently 
waited for police and firefighters to 
intervene and take him off the fence. 
Each of Pavlensky’s art-
actions involved not just his body as 
a means to convey his message, but also the reactions of the governing and policing systems. In each 
action, Pavlensky’s body was naked and extremely vulnerable as it was stitched shut, entrapped by the 
barbed wire, nailed to the ground, suspended and bleeding on the high fence. In each case, the system 
responded to his voluntary vulnerability with puzzlement: the video of “Fixation” (Grani.ru, 2013, 
November 10) shows a police officer coming up to the naked artist and, in a tone that conveys irritation 
and expectation of immediate obedience, addresses the artist “Dear, we get up now!” The gloomy 
November day and wet grey pavement amplifies the contrast between the bare, pale skin of the artist and 
the puffy uniforms of the police officers gathered around. The extreme vulnerability of the artist’s body 
on display makes him difficult to remove, to police, and to govern. Pavlensky’s naked torso provides 
stark contrast with hegemonic images of masculinity that circulate in Russian popular culture, particularly 
those of President Putin. The irrational, vulnerable, and self-harming image of Pavlensky contrasts with 
Putin’s self-restraint and mastery over his own body and its surroundings.  
Hlebowitz (2015) maintains that there is a similarity between these forms of art-action and the 
Russian tradition of holy foolery (iurodstvo), which also treats the body as a conduit of the message of 
engagement with the state’s power. He states, “both phenomena employ nudity, dramatic gestures, silence 
and mortification of the flesh. Even if holy foolery and Pavlensky’s art are based on different premises, 
the fact remains that they share a close aesthetic affinity” (p. 66). Pavlensky’s actionist art, which is 
gendered and sexualized, is a political protest that is juxtaposed with the consuming and healthy body of 
the President, with its heteronormative happy sexuality. His art clearly also engages with sadomasochistic 
 
Figure 22. Screenshot from the video of Piotr Pavlensky’s action 
“Fixation,” the Red Square, Moscow (Grani.ru, 2013, November 10). 
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exhibitionism placed in the context of the national body—e.g., the Kremlin wall, the Red Square—
playing with the image of the sexual body in pain in public, and perhaps taking the proposition of Berlant 
and Warner (1998) for the politics of the public sex to the point of grotesque. All of these actions 
employed rebellious bodies and sexuality in an attempt to shed disciplining power. These representations 
are in stark contrast with the images of sexualized bodies that are proliferated by mainstream culture.  
The representations that I have discussed in this chapter are of exclusively white Russian bodies. 
Even Nureyev, whose ethnicity is Tatar, was never really represented as a non-white person. Perhaps 
especially since his life was rooted in the Soviet era, which sought to make ethnicity obsolete, his 
ethnicity was never a point of public discussion. This exclusivity of whiteness in Russian popular culture 
that focuses on representations of the body is a crucial component of my analysis—it constructs a 
particular ethnic/racial imaginary (Rankine, 2015) wherein hegemonic representations of masculinity and 
femininity, as well as homoerotic and aggressive types of femininity, are represented as being the 
exclusive domains of white Russianness. In this context, non-Russian and non-heteronormative subjects 
are seen as outsiders and are written out beyond the ethnic/racial imaginary (see  
Chapters 3 and 4). White Russian bodies in Russian counterculture are seen to be inherently more 
subversive than others. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the notion of erotic patriotism and the uses of heteropatriarchal 
codes of sexuality and gender for maintaining national ideals. Specifically, I discussed representations of 
President Putin as symbolizing the face of the country through virile and self-restraining masculinity, and 
I highlighted how support for this national symbol appears through representations of female sexual 
desire for the President and representation of racial/ethnic Other loyal to the President. I have also 
provided examples from popular culture where aggressive and dominant femininity is employed in 
representations that attempt to humiliate and devalue male anti-Putin protesters. As I argued, the 
representations of erotic patriotism are enforced through the use of rhetorical tactics that are historically 
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familiar to Russian popular audiences: humour, irony, and heteropatriarchal codes of gender and 
sexuality. Furthermore, the producers of hegemonic culture appropriate such resistant forms of 
representation as stiob, sexual pleasure, and grotesque in reproducing heteropatriarchal hegemonic 
culture. The employment of playful discursive and representational tactics ensures that erotic patriotism is 
produced not only by authorities, but also by larger national publics who willingly participate in the 
recreation of national symbols, such as Putin’s image, and circulates it in public spaces. 
Next, I confirmed that the protection of heteronormativity and patriotic sexuality of Russian 
national cultural symbols manifests through the censorship of non-heteronormativity initiated by 
government agencies and the demonstration of public contempt for sexualities that are deemed to be 
“non-patriotic.” To illustrate this, I discussed three cultural flashpoints where representations of sexuality 
became the focus of scandal, not only because they transgressed heteropatriarchal values but also because 
they violated the rules of erotic patriotism. These examples included the feature film Matilda, which told 
a story of a love affair between the Russian Tsar Nikolay II and a Polish ballerina; the ballet Nureyev, 
which follows the story of a gay HIV-positive ballet dancer in the Soviet Union; and a viral homoerotic 
video filmed by students of the Ulyanovsk Institute of Civil Aviation. Finally, I provided examples of 
countercultural performances that challenge the link between national symbols and hegemonic 
representations of gender and sexuality, including representations of erotic patriotism—namely, 
performances by Voina, Pussy Riot, and Piotr Pavlensky. Although these resistant representational 
practices are often celebrated as challenging Russian heteropatriarchy, they often stay within 
heteropatriarchal logics. What I see as their main contribution to Russian public cultures is the way they 
interrupt the hegemony of erotic patriotism, where heteropatriarchal representations serve to uphold 
nationalist symbols and to silence “non-patriotic” representations of gender and sexuality. The 
countercultural sexualized representations are powerful precisely because they interrupt patriotic 
eroticism and take over public spaces that are reserved for patriotic sexuality. Occupying the same niches 
as patriotically erotic bodies, these images of sex in public, citizens taking ownership over their body and 
the space they occupy, and gender non-conformity create a collection of resistant iconography. They 
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intervene in the expectation of erotic patriotism and moralization through culture jamming and taking 
over public spaces. 
Representations of gender, sexuality, and the body establish power and control, and the use of 
sexual and gendered hierarchies is a conduit for making claims about that power and control. The 
language of the nation, feelings of patriotism, and authority of the state are all ways to legitimate the 
control of how bodies are represented. Each of the examples that I have discussed in this chapter is an 
example of representing white Russianness which symbolically annihilates the racialized/ethnic Other and 
writes racial/ethnic difference out of the body of the nation. In the following chapters, I turn to the 
function of gender and sexuality in discursive and representational practices that maintain the boundaries 
of Russianness through sexualized images of the racial/ethnic Other. 
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Chapter 3 
Othering one of us: Codes of Gender, Sexuality and Race/Ethnicity in Political 
Cartoons on the Russia-Ukraine conflict 
 
Introduction 
In the last decade, online communities in Russia have seen an increase in sexist, homophobic, and 
racist language, particularly in relation to military conflicts. Through this language, the enemy is often 
described as lustful, sexually perverse, and/or gender-non-conforming. I suggest that this language should 
not just be seen as a result of Russian heteropatriarchy and homophobia but rather as a response to the 
ways in which gender and sexuality play out on a global scale, and, specifically, in Russia’s relations with 
Western Europe and North America. The use of codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity offers an 
insight into the geopolitics of zones of conflict. This is especially visible in the context of the Russia-
Ukraine conflict that led to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the war in Eastern Ukraine 
in 2014.  Focusing on the employment of sexist, transphobic, homophobic, and racist language in political 
cartoons, this chapter analyzes the intertwined and sometimes contradictory discourses on Ukrainian–
Russian relations. At the centre of my analysis are the following questions: How do representations in 
political cartoons shape reality; what are the geopolitical meanings of transphobia, homophobia, sexism, 
and racism in these cartoons; and, how can we understand it in relation to Western neoliberal discourses 
on women’s and LGBTQ rights? 
Though Ukraine and Russia have had a long history of both closeness and tension, recent years 
have seen an increase in conflict. The latest political tensions between Russia and Ukraine were sparked 
by a protest known as the Euromaidan––an action that took place on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square) in Kiev in November 2013. The protesters opposed Ukrainian President Victor 
Yanukovych’s decision to stop preparations to join the European Union (EU), a pursuit of the previous 
twelve years, and instead continue to develop economic partnerships with Russia. Similar protests quickly 
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spread around the country, escalating into violence and leading to more than 50 deaths of protesters and 
police officers (Gatehouse, 2015, February 12). In February 2014, President Yanukovych was removed 
from office and an interim government was established. In the spring of 2014, in response to events in 
Ukraine, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula using undercover Russian troops. At first, Russian 
President Putin denied the involvement of Russian military forces in Crimea and claimed that the region, 
which has a large Russian-speaking population, voluntarily joined the Russian Federation (Collett-White 
& Popeski, 2014, March 16). Later, however, he addmitted that the Russian military was present there to 
ensure peace during the referendum on Crimea’s separation from Ukraine (RT.com, 2014, April 17). That 
same year, protests in the region of Donbass, Eastern Ukraine, evolved into an armed conflict between 
supporters of the newly established Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatists who were 
aided by Russian support. The conflict is ongoing at the time of this writing. 
The conflict in Ukraine has created strong divisions in Russian society. According to data from 
the independent pollster Levada Centre (2014, November 11), in October 2014, 86% of Russian citizens 
supported Crimea’s unification with Russia; the main reason respondents gave for their support was the 
belief that Crimea was “Russian land” that needed to be protected. The annexation of Crimea also 
positively affected the popularity of Putin and entrenched imperialistic beliefs in Russia’s military and 
symbolic might globally (Rogov, 2017). The popular slogan “Crimea is ours!” (ru. Krym nash!) became 
not only an expression of one’s position on annexation but also a marker of wide and passionate support 
for the Russian government (and, sometimes, a subject of ridicule by political opposition––see Edenborg, 
2017) Popular figures publicly opposing Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, including public speakers, 
actors, and musicians, found themselves facing a variety of problems, from violent threats to sudden 
performance cancellations. At the same time, the government started large-scale, rapid economic and 
infrastructural development of Crimea and sought to attract Russian tourists into the region through a 
carefully crafted advertising campaign.  
The political discourse at the beginning of the conflict relied heavily on ideas of commonality 
between Russian and Ukrainian peoples. In the popular imagination of the last two centuries, Russian and 
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Ukrainian peoples have been conceptualized through narratives of brotherhood, close ethnic bonds, 
aligned values, and shared pasts. The idea that East Slavs were inherently Russian became hegemonic in 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Snyder, 2003). This idea has been further entrenched in travel 
writing, fiction literature, history textbooks, and popular culture, while centuries of Ukrainian traditions 
of resistance against Russian imperialism have been omitted (Shkandrij, 2001; Kappeler, 2014). This 
imagined commonality has also been sustained in times of the current Russia–Ukraine conflict. For 
example, in 2015, at the International Economic Forum in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin commented:  
Speaking about cooperation, we always said and will always say that—and there is nothing 
new to it—even in the face of today’s challenges, as I have always thought and still do 
think, that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, one etnos with their own, of course, 
peculiarities, their own cultural traits, but common history, common culture, common 
spiritual roots. Whatever happens, in the end Russia and Ukraine are in one way or another 
meant to have a common future. (qtd. in Stenogramma, 2015) 
The term “etnos” used by Putin in this speech is telling. As I discussed in Chapter 1, etnos stems from the 
absence of categories of race and ethnicity under Soviet ideology and refers to the biological and 
evolutionary explanations of physical, social, and cultural differences among ethnic groups (Oushakine, 
2009; Zakharov, 2015). Putin used this term in his speech to emphasize the inescapable commonality 
among Russian and Ukrainian peoples deriving from nature. How is it possible then that while official 
discourse rests on the idea of such inescapable “natural” commonality, Ukrainians are simultaneously 
marked as the Other of Russians and the occupation of Ukrainian territories is justified? As I show in my 
analysis in this chapter, despite Putin’s symbolic imagining of Russians and Ukrainians as “one people,” 
cultural representations of the Russia–Ukraine conflict position Ukrainians as losing their whiteness and 
thus distancing themselves from Russianness. This, as I claim, is done with the help of codes of gender, 
sex, and race/ethnicity.  
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During the protests and subsequent violence in Ukraine, popular images of Ukrainians changed 
drastically within Russian contexts. Symbols of brotherhood and aligned values were replaced with 
discourses and derogatory images of Ukrainians as lazy, lost, deranged, and primitive. A non-
representative survey of passersby in Moscow conducted by Radio Svoboda in the fall of 2016 showed 
that ordinary people described Ukrainians as less educated than Russians, confused, brainwashed, and 
mentally unstable (Rykovceva, 2016, October 18). One important conduit of this stereotyping was the 
discourse on gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity. Specifically, the reconstitution of Ukraine as a 
European nation was commonly positioned in Russian hegemonic discourse as a departure from 
heteronormativity and whiteness and an embrace of sexual perversion. These representational moves echo 
those in other zones of conflict; even though the content of gendered and sexualized discourses varies, in 
words of Lindsey Feitz and Joanne Nagel (2008), “the gendered, sexual nature of war is not simply a 
historical artifact of warfare or the military, but is an ongoing, evolving feature of military organization 
and operations.” (p. 202) 
In this chapter, I argue that––following processes of sustaining of white Russian heteropatriarchal 
nationalism through popular culture, explored in Chapter 2––stereotypes that maintain sexualized ethnic 
boundaries in the context of the Russia–Ukraine crisis function to establish the geotemporal placement of 
Russia as a space of alternative (sexual) modernity and maintain the symbolic border between two 
nations. Specifically, I claim that the figure of Ukrainian man in political cartoons is represented as the 
Other through its portrayal as a khokhol (a Ukrainian peasant), through metaphors of gender confusion, 
and through racialization of this figure through its proximity to Blackness and Muslim femininity. Such 
representations, as I suggest, support spiritual justifications of Russian occupation of Ukrainian territories.  
Having set the scene for the Russia–Ukraine conflict, I will now present my methodology for the analysis 
of the representations in political cartoons before discussing my findings. 
Both Stuart Hall (2012 [1997]) and Roland Barthes (1977) maintain that the visual image does not 
represent reality but rather constructs it through the creation of meaning. In “Rhetoric of the Image,” 
Barthes (1977) argues that the reproduction of an image encodes “natural” reality by encrypting signs and 
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symbols with cultural meaning, which are then read through the viewer’s cultural knowledge of these 
signs and symbols. Political cartoons are especially fruitful for analyzing the creation of reality—or, in 
this research, the geopolitical meanings—through representations because, by the nature of their ironic 
genre, they heavily rely on the viewer’s ability to read the culturally available codes, hyperbolization, and 
simplification of abstract concepts, as well as the layering and slippage of meanings that enables their 
humour. Media scholar Josh Greenberg (2002) provides a useful explanation of the meaning-making 
potential of political cartoons as a genre:  
Political cartoons provide metalanguage for discourse about the social order by constructing 
idealizations of the world, positioning readers within a discursive context of “meaning 
making” and offering readers a tool for deliberating on present conditions. Cartoons “frame” 
phenomena by situating the “problem” in question within the context of everyday life and, in 
this way, exploit “universal values’’ as a means of persuading readers to identify with an 
image and its intended message. (p. 182) 
In order to examine the metalanguage of political cartoons in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, I use a Cultural 
Studies Approach (Lister & Wells, 2004) to analyze the images and, specifically, the terminology and 
methods of semiotics (Jewitt & Oyama, 2004; Van Leewen, 2004). My interrogation of images includes 
the identification and interpretation of thematic patterns in the cartoons, visual and textual codes, 
rhetorical processes (Greenberg, 2002), metaphors (Bounegru & Forceville, 2011; El Refaie, 2003), 
narrative structures (Jewitt & Oyama, 2004), and mechanisms of producing humour (Mazid, 2008). 
One of the central concepts for my analysis is “code.” In semiotic analysis, a code refers to a set of 
signs that operate like a language to convey meanings (Lister & Wells, 2004). In this chapter, I pay 
attention to specific codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity. For example, one of the central codes 
that I discuss is a depiction of a Ukrainian man through physical characteristics of hypermasculinity, 
peasant attire, and the “lowly” pleasures of food and sex. Another rhetorical tool that is pervasive in 
political cartoons is that of metaphor, a representation of a complex concept through something more 
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familiar and easily imaginable (El Rafaie, 2003). Building on the theory of conceptual metaphor, 
Bounegru and Forceville (2011) show that pictorial metaphors are manifestations of underlying 
conceptual ones. They quote Lakoff and Johnson (1980), writing that “metaphor is primarily a matter of 
thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language” (as cited in Bounegru & Forceville, 2011, 
p. 209), and they add that abstract ideas are often conceptualized in terms of experiences that pertain 
directly to the body. By focusing on the use of metaphors, I illuminate how codes of gender, sexuality, 
and race/ethnicity are put to work in pictorial representations that are employed for explaining the 
Russia–Ukraine conflict, and I identify the abstract concepts that hide behind them. 
In this chapter, I interpret cartoons and put them into the context of Russia–Ukraine relationships 
while considering the creation, circulation, and discussion of these cartoons online as a representational 
praxis. The set of cartoons analyzed in this chapter consists of drawings created from a pro-Russian 
perspective and published in Russian-speaking online spaces between 2013 and 2018 (although I include 
one older image to provide further context). The cartoons were gathered using the keyword “Ukraine” 
through the search function on the websites caricatura.ru, anekdot.ru and pikabu.ru––all of which are 
devoted to archiving and sharing cartoons, jokes, gifs, and memes. I have further selected twelve cartoons 
that stand out for their explicit use of sexualized and gendered codes. Some of these images were used in 
online news or opinion articles, some of them were exchanged on chat forums, and some were 
untraceable to their original creators. Because of their diverse textual contexts, I focus specifically on the 
images themselves and their captions, rather than on the articles, discussions, and other major textual 
content surrounding their appearances. Since the selected corpus of images is small and has been gathered 
through only a few databases, this collection of cartoons should not be seen as a representative sample. 
Nevertheless, I believe it provides valuable insights about the availability of codes of gender and 
sexuality, and their intersections with race/ethnicity and nationalism, for Russia’s geopolitical positioning 
and its border control. 
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The figure of khokhol and the metaphor of gender confusion 
The political cartoons focusing on Ukraine derive their humour from a range of stereotypes, 
symbolizing Ukrainians in three primary ways: (1) through the traditional image of Cossack or Ukrainian 
peasant (khokhol), (2) as an emasculated man, or (3) as a woman in 
distress. The images are accentuated by depictions of vulgarity and 
sexual perversity, through exaggeration of simple emotions (such as 
lust, anger, or fear), and by ethnic markers of dress and facial 
features. The most wide-spread symbol for Ukraine during the 
conflict has been the image of a stocky man, coded through a 
distinctive Cossack look: a shaven head with a scalp lock, a long 
horseshoe mustache, and an embroidered shirt, wide pants, and high-
knee boots. An example of such an image can be seen in Figure 23. 
A short historical overview is needed to explain this figure. In the fifteenth century, Cossacks 
were an indigenous population of what is currently the territory of Ukraine, known for their socio-
political organization as they formed small self-governing martial communities (see Kappeler, 2003; 
Kohut, 2011). With the growing control over the territory by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the Russian Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
some of Cossack groups were enserfed and became peasants. The Cossacks often initiated mass 
rebellions, escaped serfdom, and formed militarized nomadic groups. Some groups managed to preserve 
their administrative autonomy in exchange for military service and loyalty to the Russian Emperor. 
Cossack traditions were neglected during the Soviet era; however, recently, Vladimir Putin sought to 
revive the relationship between Cossacks and Russian governance (Herpen, 2014). Cossack groups loyal 
to Putin reinstated their paramilitary organization, albeit in a form that resembles a cultural institution or a 
club rather than a politically autonomous community. Today, they are sometimes involved in Russia’s 
military operations and aiding the police forces. Modern Cossack organizations are known not only for 
their military tradition, but also for their loyalty to authority, Orthodoxy, macho masculinity, rustic 
 
Figure 23. “Me, a Khokhol?!” 
(Original caption) No image 
credits. Posted by Awful 
Avalanche (2016, July 16). 
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culture, and traditional gender roles, as well as their strict and harshly enforced moral code. In 2014, 
Cossacks made international news when they captured and publicly whipped Pussy Riot band members 
during their protest performance at the Sochi Winter Olympic Games (Walker, 2014, February 14). In the 
contemporary Russian and Eastern European public imaginary, the figure of the Cossack collapses both 
the image of a militarized patriarchal ethnic minority of Russia and that of a Ukrainian peasant, a 
primitive rural man serving nobility.  
Modern Ukrainian national identity is complex, historically influenced by often-changing 
relationships between many ethnic and socio-political groups, of which Cossacks are just one. Therefore, 
the choice to symbolize Ukrainianness through this particular figure is significant. The traditional scalp 
lock not only marks Ukrainianness but also signifies a derogatory Russian word for Ukrainians, khokhol 
(literally, “lock of hair,” pl. khokhly). As scholar of Ukrainian nationalism Myroslav Shkandrij (2001) 
contends, the figure of the khokhol first appeared in narratives of imperial frontiers established in the 
early-nineteenth century by Russian writers (p. xxi). These narratives described the Ukrainian frontier 
(similarly to Caucasus, Poland, or Siberia) in feminizing terms, associating it with the rural, the violent, 
and the primitive. Besides its ethnic meaning, khokhol also has a distinctive class meaning. As historian 
Andreas Kappeler (2003) explains, the wide mass of people in nineteenth century-Ukraine was comprised 
of peasants who were dependent on the elites––either Russians, or Poles––or a small number of Ukrainian 
nobility who were loyal to the Russian Emperor. Because of this, categories of ethnicity became closely 
associated with differences in class and socio-economic status. In the eyes of Russian people, this 
dependent mass of the Ukrainian people became khokhly––the stereotype of uncivilized peasants. 
Khokhly were seen as incapable of rebellion, unlike the freedom-loving Cossacks, and thus were not 
considered a threat; as a result, they were generally derided as barbaric but harmless. By comparison with 
Russia, Ukrainian peasant culture was seen as uncultivated and inferior. In derogatory images of 
Ukrainians, such as Figure 23, this primitive nature is often accentuated by including depictions of pigs, 
lard, and vodka, as well as of the fat body. 
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The connection of this collapsed figure of 
Cossack and khokhol to the codes of gender and sexuality 
further entrenches the ideas of inferiority and lowly 
pleasures as characteristics of Ukrainian people. An 
example can be seen in Figure 24. Preceding the 
development of the Russia–Ukraine armed conflict, this 
image depicts the presidential elections of 2010, an 
earlier period of tension between the two states over 
political loyalties. The cartoon shows a Ukrainian man 
voting in favour (of what is unspecified), while excitedly marching towards four smiling naked women 
and ignoring the ballot boxes held by two opposition leaders, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor 
Yanukovych, who both supported political distance from Russia. The cameraman in the image is also 
ignoring the candidates, instead directing his camera at the women. The caption for the cartoon reads 
“Ukraine is tired of elections. Bosoms of teenagers holding posters ‘Stop raping Ukraine’ overshadowed 
the qualities of the candidates.” 
The image of naked women refers to the Ukrainian women’s activist group Femen. Members of 
Femen are known for their public stripping, which they call “sextremism” (FEMEN, n.d.) in protests 
against sex trafficking, corruption in Ukraine, anti-abortion legislation, religious events, and many other 
issues.18 In the media reporting on Femen, the content of their political messaging is often lost behind 
sensational commentary regarding their acts of stripping and interrupting of political meetings and events. 
Contrary to the title of this cartoon, the protesting women here are not even holding posters. Instead, they 
are merely represented as objects of lust. The misrepresentation of Femen here is significant, given that 
feminist groups were active and visible during the Euromaidan protests in attempts to connect the struggle 
for political independence from Russia with the struggle for women’s rights (Bociurkiw, 2014, June 20; 
 
18 Femen has also been criticized for anti-Islamic and neocolonial forms of feminism (see Eileraas, 2014, p. 42). 
 
Figure 24. “Ukraine is tired of elections. 
Bosoms of teenagers holding posters ‘Stop 
raping Ukraine’ overshadowed the qualities of 
the candidates.” (Original caption) Image 
credit: Evgeny Kran (2010, February 12). 
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Plakhotnik, 2017). As a result of this sexualization, this image not only misrepresents women’s 
participation in political protest but it also portrays Ukrainian women as promiscuous—a classic tactic of 
dehumanizing and Othering the enemy in militarized contexts (Feitz & Nagel, 2008). 
The voting man in Figure 24, the collapsed figure of a Cossack and a khokhol, symbolizes the 
duped mass of Ukrainian people as seen through the eyes of the artist. The exaggerated lust and grotesque 
stupidity of the man alludes to the primitive mind unable to comprehend the democratic ritual of voting 
for the candidate with the best political program. It is interesting that political leaders, such as 
Timoshenko and Yanukovich in this image, are not marked by the scalp lock, which puts them in stark 
contrast with the “ordinary man.” This difference in coding points to the fact that khokhol is a metonym 
for the Ukrainian nation and “the people,” while the formal dress of the Ukrainian politicians marks their 
supposed distance from “the people.” 
The following two images (Figures 25 and 26) offer an interpretation of geopolitical dilemmas 
that Ukraine faced in 2013 and use a structure of a dualistic world. The image titled “Ukraine at the 
crossroads” (Figure 25) portrays a Ukrainian man, represented as khokhol, choosing between two worlds–
–the world of the devil, naked and unashamed of its uncovered genitals, and the world of the angel, 
modestly dressed in traditional peasant attire and pointing his finger to the skies. The devil’s world 
includes the EU flag and the rainbow flag; Adolf Hitler addressing a crowd; kissing men and a person in a 
flashy pink costume holding a rubber chicken (drawn from a specific photograph of the Kiev Gay Pride 
widely circulated in the media); a roll of money; and recreational drugs symbolized by a syringe. By 
contrast, the world of the angel offers the three knights on horses, who are immediately recognizable from 
Slavic folk tales and symbolize traditions, might, and spirit; the Orthodox Church; the Soviet space 
pioneer Yuri Gagarin and a space station; a fighter jet; a peasant family with six children; and a 
monument celebrating the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II. All symbols of the angel’s world refer 
to the past, whether imaginary (the knights) or real (WWII, Gagarin, and peasants), while the devil’s 
world represents the evils of the contemporary world. I would argue that even the depiction of Hitler, 
although drawing on a real historical figure, does not necessarily refer to a specific event; rather, in my 
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reading, it represents fascism as an abstraction. This suggests that the juxtaposition here is not just 
cultural but also temporal: the world of Good is represented as a space of continued history, while the 
world of Evil is coded as being void of historically significant content.  
The untitled image in Figure 26 is similar to “Ukraine at the crossroads” in its binary narrative 
structure, featuring a Ukrainian man with a pig on a leash. The man faces two choices depicted as two 
roads. The first road, indicated by the marker “European Union,” leads to characters associated with 
moral depravity: a large woman in fishnets and lingerie holding a whip; a devil with a sack of money; and 
a pair of kissing men in fascinators. The kissing men refer to a stockpile image of gay pride, which is 
frequently used for shock value by the Russian media in articles opposing LGBT issues and is a well-
known signifier of Gay Pride for Russian audience. The second road is indicated by the marker “Eurasian 
Customs Union,” which refers to the economic union between Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. This road leads to a series of characters whose ethnicity and cultural belonging is clearly 
signified by the clothes they wear and the rituals they preform: a Russian woman, offering bread to her 
guest (a traditional ritual of hospitality); a Belarussian man welcoming his guest with open arms; a 
Kyrgyz elder offering a cup of tea; and an Armenian, who is stereotypically running late. This image 
  
Figure 25. “Ukraine at the crossroads.” (Original 
caption). No credits. Image illustrates an article by 
Margarita Knyazeva (2017, December 25). 
Figure 26. Untitled. No credits. Posted by Yagiza (2014, 
April 9). 
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suggests that the Ukrainian people have to make a choice between the supposed consumerism and sexual 
perversion of Europe and hospitality of the member-countries of the Eurasian Customs Union. 
The images in Figures 25 and 26 suggest the duality of the world. The rhetorical device used in 
these drawings is what Theo Van Dijk calls an “ideological square” (cited in Mazid, 2008, p. 436). The 
ideological square refers to an extreme exaggeration of “our good things” and a misrepresentation of 
“their bad things.” The function of the ideological square is to polarize while concealing differences 
within the group. So, in Figures 25 and 26, the Evil is marked by consumerism, perverse sex, and excess. 
The excess is underscored by such metonyms as the nakedness and the flamboyant posture of the devil, 
the fatness of the woman, the size of the money sack, and the extravagance of kissing queers. On the 
Good side of both images, each character’s appearance, action, and pose refer to ethnic and cultural 
belonging. The absence of ethnic markers on the Evil side is stark and suggests that the binary in this 
world is not between two sets of cultures. Rather, it rests between the clear demarcation of ethnicity on 
the Eurasian side and the “unnatural” absence of ethnic demarcation and cultural belonging, which is 
substituted by consumerist and sexual excess, on the European side. 
These images of the binary world are hardly unique to the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. 
A cultural historian Andreas Önnerfors (2018) collected popular images across Eastern and Central 
Europe and traced similar representations of a Good/Evil binary to Augustine of Hippo’s “the City of God 
Against the Pagans” (426AD). As Önnerfors points out, this genre of dualistic political cosmology 
requires the central character, “the people,” to choose between “us”/Self and “them”/Other. “Us” is 
imagined as a space of historical and cultural symbols, nuclear family, harmony, and nature; while “them” 
is marked by signifiers of death (fire and war), capitalist symbols, refugee crisis, and non-heterosexuality. 
The one commonality between these images, overlooked by Önnerfors, is that they contrast the world of 
clear gender and sexual boundaries with the world where these boundaries are confused. In Augustine’s 
original depiction of the Evil, the City of Pagans, this confusion is represented by half-female half-animal 
creatures, while modern variations on this theme copy the most sensational photographs from recent Gay 
Pride celebrations portraying transgressions of sexual and gender binaries. Therefore, this confusion is a 
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code marking the clarity of boundaries on the side of the Self and underscoring the blurring of boundaries 
on the side of the Other.  
The Othering of Ukrainians is further 
enacted through representations equating Europe 
with homosexuality. In Figure 27, a Ukrainian 
couple is depicted watching Eurovision Song 
Contest on a TV that features a close-up shot of 
hairy male buttocks. The man exclaims in 
distorted Ukrainian, “Look, Galya! Ukraine is 
indeed Europe!” The room is decorated in 
yellow and blue, the colours of the Ukrainian revolution. The walls are adorned with several telling 
images: a rainbow flag with a derogatory word for homosexuals; a banner with the slogan “Ukraine 
Above Everything”; an American flag; and the red and black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 
overlaid with a made-up word that could be translated as “right-wing-sexuals,” alluding to the collapsed 
meaning of Ukrainian nationalism, anarchy, and sexual perversion. The artist also posted an additional 
satirical explanation of the image, which could be approximately translated as follows: “Eurovision-2017 
hosted by the Glorious This-Is-Europe [Ukraine] ended with the triumphant performance consisting of 
demonstration of an ass by the famous prankster and the hero of Ukraine, Vitaly Sediuk.” In this cartoon, 
the speech bubble, the slogans, and the surrounding text all use a distorted Ukrainian language; this 
distortion combines Russian and Ukrainian orthographies, uses Anglicisms, and employs phrases 
associated with Euromaidan slogans (such as “This Is Europe!”) to create a sarcastic tone that presents 
Ukrainians as stupid and culturally confused. 
The show the couple is watching––Eurovision––is a popular music contest organized and 
televised by the European Broadcasting Union. Each season of the competition has singers performing 
songs that are selected by national audiences and meant to represent the diversity of European cultures, 
including some countries beyond the EU (such as Russia), while simultaneously engaging with questions 
 
Figure 27. “Eurovision!” (Original caption). Image 
credit: Oleg Zhornik (2017, May 25). 
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of European identity. The winner of the contest is chosen by a combination of jury members and a 
popular vote from each country (see Montoya, 2017). Most often, instead of assessing the quality of the 
song, voting reflects political loyalties and public sentiments in regard to a vague notion of “brotherhood” 
between European nations. With an audience of more than 200 million people (Eurovision.tv, n.d.) and its 
campy extravagant aesthetics, Eurovision is a mega-event of significant influence on hegemonic 
representations across Europe. Because of its influence and reach, it is a heavily politicized event that 
infuses cultural representations with political meanings in relation to national identity. Given this cultural 
and political dynamic of the show, it is not surprising that Ukraine won the contest in 2016, when most 
countries in Europe were demonstrating their support for Ukraine in its struggle against Russia’s 
aggression. That year, Ukraine was represented by the singer Jamala, who is of Crimean Tatar origin, an 
ethnic group of indigenous Muslim people of the Crimean Peninsula. Her song, which she sang in a 
combination of English and Tatar, critically alluded to the annexation of Crimea. When Ukraine hosted 
Eurovision in 2017, Jamala’s performance was interrupted by a controversial Ukrainian TV persona, 
Vitaly Sediuk, as he burst onto the stage and exposed his buttocks.19 It is this event that the cartoon in 
Figure 27 references.  
In my reading, the narrative of this cartoon involves sexuality not only because it includes 
symbols of homosexuality but also because of its reference to Eurovision. Gay culture plays a significant 
part in the articulation of European identity at this event. Embracing Eurovision’s campy aesthetics 
functions as a way to claim political and cultural belonging to Europe (Szulc, 2014; Tobin, 2017). This is 
especially important for the countries whose European belonging can be contested, such as countries in 
Eastern Europe, or Israel, with its desire to distance itself from other nations of the Middle East by 
claiming exceptional modernity. Russia’s participation in the contest is notable as it also meant 
engagement with Eurovision’s sexual cultures: In 2003, Russia was represented by a faux-lesbian pop 
 
19 Sediuk is well-known for pranks of a similar crude style and has been previously charged with hooliganism and 
sexual harassment. The information that I was able to access suggests that his actions don’t have a political (or any 
other) message, and I am therefore not analysing this element in more detail. 
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group, t.A.T.u., and in 2006 and 2008 by Dima Bilan, with performances that effectively blurred the lines 
between heterosexual romance and homoeroticism (Cassiday, 2014). As scholar of post-Soviet media 
Galina Miazhevich (2010) convincingly argues, Russia’s participation in Eurovision has always been 
employed as a way to engage in dialogue with European identity, though frequently in an ironic way. 
Russian performers have repeatedly used references to camp aesthetics, faux-homosexuality, and stiob 
(see Chapter 2) in order to position itself as at once engaging with the West and creating distance from it. 
Miazhevich explains:  
[Russia’s contestants] ironise the global media’s obsession with gay culture using a 
manufactured “western” homoeroticism in order to flatter (Western) European viewers, and 
at the same time knowingly to disparage the West’s cultural imperialism for the benefit of 
domestic audiences. (p. 260) 
In Figure 27 the artist distances Russia from the Eurovision sexual discourse through an extensive use of 
the symbolism of homosexuality, as if Russia has not engaged in this discourse previously. At the same 
time, markers of homosexuality work to condense complexly related events—Ukraine’s representation at 
Eurovision, Sediuk’s prank, and aspirations for proximity with Europe—to a singular frame of khokhol 
inferiority. 
The next two cartoons (Figures 28 and 29) further condense the symbols of (homo)sexuality, 
gender confusion, and Ukrainian aspirations for belonging to Europe. Figure 28 shows two Ukrainian 
men, both portrayed as khokhly. One of them is asking, “Where are you going, Petro?” The other answers, 
“To the EU.” The one going to the EU has fashioned his scalp lock into “girly” pigtails. A similar cartoon 
(Figure 29) portrays two Ukrainian men, again coded as khokhly, looking at the viewer with excited 
expressions. One of them is cross-dressed as a woman. The couple is holding a poster that says, 
“Ukrainians are for European values!” Both cartoons play on the ideological juxtaposition of traditional 
values, such as heteronormative family, and “perverse” European values, such as homosexuality and 
gender fluidity. The corruption of masculinity in these simple images exemplifies feminization of the 
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enemies as symbolic domination (Goldstein, 2001). The juxtaposition is further emphasized by the 
traditional macho look of an uncultured Ukrainian peasant, for whom posing as a woman is meant to 
seem especially ridiculous since his rustic masculinity––with a long black mustache, hairy chest, and 
scalp lock—is impossible to erase. 
Considering what, exactly, makes these images humorous might offer perspective on the 
intersection between gender confusion and national belonging. The Incongruity Theory of Humour 
(Mazid, 2008) suggests that what creates a joke is the use of incompatible elements in such a way that this 
incongruity disguises any aggression and is perceived as humorous. The mechanism of humour in Figures 
28 and 29 is precisely the incongruity between Ukrainian’s hypermasculinity and the perceived essence of 
Europe––i.e., its tolerance of homosexuality. This mechanism can also be explained through the rhetorical 
device of transference. According to Greenberg (2002), “transference normally operates in an implicit 
way that absolves the cartoon’s actors of their absurd actions or commentary by displacing blame to 
another, normally non-visible, actor” (p. 187). In this cartoon, the absurdity of Ukraine’s geopolitical 
belonging to Europe is transferred to the absurdity of gender confusion. 
Theorizing nationalism’s symbolic investments in the family trope, Anne McClintock (1993) 
argues that portraying nations through the iconography of familial and domestic space creates a 
naturalized hierarchy that is based on the subordination of women to men and children to adults, and 
 
 
 
Figure 28. “New cartoon on Euromaidan.” 
(Original caption). No credits. Posted by rubanok 
(2013, December 7). 
 Figure 29. “Ukrainians are for European values!” 
(Original caption). Image credit: Evgeny 
Samoylov. Image illustrates a blog post by Kerb 
(2015, June 4). 
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which supports a supposed unity of interests independently of one’s status in this hierarchy. The nation 
symbolized as a family justifies the subordination of ethnic, racial, and/or cultural subjects who are 
imagined as women and children for the sake of imagined common interests, such as “progress” or 
“security.” Referring to important work by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989), McClintock 
(1993) also notes that women typically become the symbolic bearers of the nation through their role in 
reproduction, biological and cultural, as well as maintaining boundaries of national groups through 
restrictions on sexual or marital relations (pp. 62-63). Therefore, McClintock claims, nationalism is 
necessarily constituted as a gendered discourse and relies on gender difference between women and men 
to symbolically define the limits of national difference and power between men. Given the centrality of 
gender difference in symbolizing boundaries of the nation, portraying Ukraine––especially within the 
context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict––through the trope of gender confusion becomes a code for the 
symbolic loss of the nation. Moreover, through the use of cross-dressing as a metaphor, an abstract notion 
of national belonging is conceptualized through specific forms of embodiment. This metaphor helps 
viewers experience something distant and conceptually complex, such as political conflict, through the 
more simple and familiar codes of physical bodies (Bounegru & Forceville, 2011). The next set of 
political cartoons will further explain this logic through the analysis of employment of tropes of family 
and race/ethnicity in representations of Ukraine’s cultural belonging. 
Tropes of family and race/ethnicity in the geopolitics of Ukraine 
One of the common tropes in political cartoons interpreting the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that of 
family relationships and the threat posed to masculinity by non-heteropatriarchal sexuality. Emasculation 
works as a narrative device in the series of cartoons that directly refer to annexation of Crimea. In Figure 
30, a man with “Crimea” written on his shirt peaks under the blanket at an orgy. The blue and yellow 
blanket symbolizes the colours of the Ukrainian revolution, while the colourful socks indicate that the 
participants of the orgy include the European Union, the United States, Poland, the United Kingdom, and 
Ukrainian insurgents. Frustrated with the debauchery going on, the man addresses his wife, who is hiding 
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under the blanket: “Think whatever you want, my 
dear, but I’m leaving you for my ex.” The ex is 
peaking from the corner, represented as a stern-
looking woman in a traditional Russian headdress who 
is holding a rifle. In contrast to the images 
emphasizing the hypermasculinity of khokhol, the 
hunched and misshapen figure of the Crimea-man 
portrays him as an emasculated softie who is 
submitting to a dominant, rifle-bearing woman.  
Unlike the image of khokhol, who stands in for “the people” of Ukraine, the Crimea-man 
symbolizes the people of the Crimean Peninsula who, from the Russian point of view, are ethnically 
Russian. This cartoon suggests that Crimea joined the Russian Federation in reaction to the decisions of 
Ukrainian leadership in order to strengthen ties with the West. Further, as the sexual content suggests, it 
implies that these political ties are primarily driven by consumerist and perverse desires. Thus the cartoon 
shows Crimea as a “husband” who, tired of the debauchery and unfaithfulness of Ukraine, has decided to 
return to Russia where it used to belong. The rhetorical device used in this cartoon is opposition, which 
indicates a reduction of a complex problem to a binary struggle (Greenberg, 2002). In this drawing, the 
complex problem of geopolitical relationships 
is reduced to a simple binary choice of 
liberalism/promiscuity versus 
authoritarianism/faithfulness. 
Another cartoon by the same author 
(Figure 31) depicts a hairy-legged Angela 
Merkel scolding two women, a Ukrainian and 
a Russian, who are fighting over the Crimea-
man. Interrupting their fight, Merkel 
 
Figure 30. “I’m leaving.” (Original caption) Image 
credit Vitaly Podvitskyi (2014, March 6). 
 
Figure 31. “Black master.” (Original caption) Image 
credit: Vitaly Podvitskyi (2014, March 12). 
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proclaims, “Damned barbarians! In a civilized world, who lives with whom is decided by the black 
master!” Behind her, Barack Obama lies on top of the White House in BDSM attire, including a leather 
cap, pants, boots, and a chest harness. The Crimea-man is emasculated through his bewildered look, his 
submission to women, and his inability to stand on his own two feet. His emasculation is juxtaposed with 
the image of Obama as a leather-daddy in charge. Obama’s superiority is indicated by his position above 
other characters in the drawing and by Merkel’s words. Similar to the previous cartoons, the joke is on the 
non-heteronormativity of “the West,” depicted through the codes of Merkel’s lack of femininity, Obama’s 
leather attire, and his reign over family affairs. However, the introduction of Obama and the phrase “black 
master” points to an additional layer of incongruity—the joke is played not only through the reversion of 
gender roles, but also on the reversion of racial hierarchies. This racist rhetoric condenses the 
undermining of masculinity with an attack on the superiority of whiteness. At the same time, the artist 
repurposes discourses of modernity: the ironic use of the phrase “damned barbarians” ridicules the 
civilizational narrative that identifies the West as a space of cultural progress.  
The symbolic threat of race is further employed in the cartoon in Figure 32. This drawing 
portrays Ukraine as a woman in traditional attire—an embroidered white dress, with flowers and ribbons 
in her hair. The woman expresses a desire for Russia, symbolized by a speech bubble in the colours of the 
Russian flag, while the green and brown creature sitting on her head stabs that desire with the symbol of 
Ukrainian nationalism. The creature, with its colours 
and the symbol on its sleeve suggesting that it 
represents Ukrainian Insurgents, spits in anger and 
yells that the woman should choose the Ukrainian 
Revolution instead. The choice to represent Ukraine 
as a woman signals innocence, cultural tradition, and 
choosing with one’s heart. Similarly, the 
symbolization of the creature with its brown skin 
underscores the whiteness of the woman in distress. 
 
Figure 32. “Ban on Russian language in Ukraine.” 
(Original caption) Image credit: Igor Kolgarev (2017, 
January 26). 
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The imperial conquests of the Russian Empire have historically conceptualized expansion to new 
territories through the romantic discourse of men’s conquests of native women and the need to protect 
native women (see Shkandrij, 2001). They also echo similar tactics of gendering and sexualizing war 
elsewhere. For example, Feitz and Nagel (2008) analyze the employment of the damsel in distress trope 
by the US military in the Iraq War. Similarly, Bruce Grant (2005) describes construction of kidnapping 
myths in North Caucasus and argues that kidnapping myths naturalize violence in the conflict zone in 
ways that enable the public to frame their government’s military actions there as a moral imperative. The 
cartoon in Figure 32 continues this tradition, imagining the Ukrainian nation as a woman who is being 
abused by abstract military forces––the latter of which are, in this image, bordering on non-human. 
Recalling the media discourse on gendered and sexual violence used in the constitution of North 
Caucasus as a space of lawlessness in 2017 (see Chapter 4), the idiom of kidnapping of a woman that is 
invoked by this cartoon is a part of constituting Ukraine through similar tropes of Otherness. 
The employment of race/ethnicity to criticize Ukraine’s geopolitical aspiration is especially 
potent in the last cartoon that I discuss (Figure 33). This image, captioned “Once upon a time in Europe,” 
portrays a man with a cigar and a tea pot of Hennessy Cognac addressing a sex worker, who is portrayed 
as a khokhol dressed as a woman. Another jolly male character is looking out from the sewage hole, 
perhaps signifying the bottom of moral decay. The standing man says “Gulchatai, cover your face,” 
alluding to a well-known Soviet comedy film, The Prisoner of the Caucasus (Gaidai, 1967). In the film, 
one of the male characters repeatedly asked Gulchatai, a 
North Caucasian woman wearing a burqa, to uncover her 
face as he wanted to see her beauty. The comedic plot of 
the film heavily relied on the exotification and 
barbarization of North Caucasian Muslim traditions from 
the point of view of white Russians. The cartoon plays on 
the reversal of these racialized and gendered roles, 
substituting white Russian suitors with consumerist 
 
Figure 33. “Once upon a time in Europe.” 
(Original caption) No credits. Posted by 
Sergei Korsun (2018, August 25). 
122 
 
Europeans, and racialized Muslim women of North Caucasus with Ukrainian men forced to dress as 
women and sell sex in Europe. This joke is a racializing tactic, suggesting that joining the EU will cause 
Ukrainians to take the place of racialized women in the gendered and racial hierarchy. Therefore, this 
cartoon exemplifies the way in which sexual and gender liminality serves as a code for losing whiteness. 
In all of the above cartoons, metaphors create Ukraine as a target, but more specifically, they take 
aim at Ukraine’s relations with “the West” and “Russia” (or “the East,” of which Russia is the center). 
These cartoons create and employ several key messages through the use of metaphor: “the Ukrainian 
voter is like a lustful man,” “the Western world is like hell,” “the Russian world means culture and 
history,” “Ukrainian political confusion is like gender confusion,” “Crimea’s referendum is like choosing 
a wife,” and “Ukraine is like a battered woman.” The most often satirical representation of the Ukrainian 
choice of political alliance lays blame on the mass of ordinary Ukrainians, many of whom are unable to 
see the traps of the EU. Such traps are represented through a fixation on sex and through gender and racial 
“anomalies,” where culturally and historically established demarcations are blurred through capitalism 
and consumerism. 
As a result of these multiple portrayals that combine the derogatory and fictional image of 
khokhol with codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity, Ukrainians’ whiteness becomes contested. 
Aniko Imre (2005) writes that for Eastern Europeans claiming whiteness is a way to claim Europeanness. 
At the same time Zakharov (2015) demonstrates that for contemporary Russians white identity means 
distancing yourself from those engaged in manual labour and those making inappropriate, “lowly,” 
cultural choices. The humour of the political cartoons discussed in this chapter plays on both of these 
desires for approximation of whiteness. Metaphors of gender and sexual confusion, as well as of the 
reversal of the racial hierarchy, transfer the complex concept of Ukraine’s claims for Europeanness into a 
suggestion that Ukrainians embracing European values is inherently foreign, a marker of inferiority, and a 
blurring of all kinds of boundaries. At the same time, Russia is imagined as a superior space of clear 
boundaries, but also a space of exceptional whiteness as the Other is defined through the figure of a 
simple man. 
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Sara Ahmed (2002) refers to “the grotesque” in the context of racism, describing the grotesque 
excessive body as emphasizing orifices and shapelessness. The excess of the figure of cross-dressing 
khokhol is created through representations of a grotesque fat, gender-confused, and lustful body. Ahmed 
(2002) points out that with the help of representations of excessive body “others become racialized 
through economies of desire and repulsion” (p. 57). The constitution of the Ukrainian as Other here is 
indicative of the creation of Russia as a space of whiteness, and the creation of Europe as a space that is 
off-white. I also suggest that these cartoons actively engage with discourses of homonationalism, because 
they repurpose representational codes that exist in the homonationalist discourse—codes of gay marriage, 
merging of national pride with gay pride, celebratory rainbow capitalism—in order to create comedic 
effect and to portray Russia as a “naturally” heteronormative national space. 
 
Beyond the trivial: Crude humour as a means of heterosexualization in a conflict zone 
A visual analysis of political cartoons is not able to fully explain how these images are interpreted 
by viewers and what material effects they have on lived realities. For example, evaluations of whether 
these cartoons cause increasing levels of interpersonal aggression based on xenophobia, racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and/or transphobia cannot be made without empirical research on the interpretations of and 
effects on the viewers of these images. However, with this caveat, I suggest that, as minor cultural 
productions that are circulated on social media and interactive websites, these cartoons come to support 
banal nationalism, a daily and mundane reproduction of beliefs, assumptions, habits, and representations 
that maintain the ideology of nationalism (Billig, 1995). As such, these cartoons can be understood as 
fortifying other oppressive processes. Specifically, in this section I propose a connection between the 
political cartoons analyzed in this chapter and the Russian occupation of Crimea. 
Establishing Russia as an opposition to the “West” is particularly visible through Russia’s 
tourism policies and aggressive advertising campaign that seeks to bring tourists to the Crimean Peninsula 
(Ministry of Resort and Tourism, 2016). Beyond its function as simple commercial propaganda, the 
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campaign establishes Crimea as an inherently Russian land by spiritualizing it as a location of the Russian 
essence, underscoring the heteronormativity of the region by marking it as family-friendly, cool, and hip, 
by appealing to adventure-seeking and higher-income young people, and by romanticizing it. The 
campaign strengthens the image of Crimea belonging to Russian territory, Russian identity, and Russian 
history, while Russia is also rapidly developing infrastructure in Crimea, including a new bridge that 
connects Russia’s mainland with the peninsula and eliminates the need to travel through the territory of 
Ukraine. At the same time, the advertisements portray Crimea as a unique spiritual and healing resource 
available for Russian people and a spectacular tourist destination (Ministry of Resort and Tourism, 2016).  
The main justification provided by the Russian government for their military aggression in the 
Crimea and Donbass regions, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, was the need to protect 
ethnically Russian populations who reside in these territories. This has been popularized by the slogan 
“Crimea Is Ours!” and a rhetoric that reimagined these regions as inherently Russian land. For example, 
the multi-episode documentary Crimea: The Sea of Rus’ (Strizhak, 2013/2014) was devoted to locating 
the origins of the Russian spirit in Crimea. Building its argument on the history of philosophers, artists, 
and spiritual leaders of the region, it created a metaphysical explanation for the Russianness of the 
Crimean Peninsula. I suggest that such underlying spiritual explanations are further strengthened by 
attaching notions of heteronormativity, family, and white Russianness.  
In accordance with the Program of Resort and Tourism Development (Ministry of Resort and 
Tourism, 2016), the advertising campaigns underscore Crimea’s natural and historical beauty, luxurious 
services, and adventure sports. Judging from the images featured in one of the promotion videos 
(visitcrimea guide, 2016), the campaign targets the corporate class as well as young couples and families 
with enough money to spend on sky-diving, spa services, and yachts. Another video advertisement, “So, 
to Crimea!” (rusreklama, 2015), shows an eight-member Russian family having a meal in a sunny 
kitchen. The father asks, “So where are we going this summer?” All of the family members list their 
priorities for a vacation: sunny beaches and sightseeing attractions to luxury hotels, and a place where 
“everything is ours, familiar.” After all the wishes are listed, the dad pronounces “So, to Crimea!” Such 
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advertisements normalize Crimea as a space that is available for consumption by heteronormative Russian 
families and young heterosexual Russian couples. These advertisements create a simplification of the 
world that is similar to the dualistic world of Good/Evil in the political cartoons depicting Ukraine “at the 
crossroads” (Figures 25 and 26). As I proposed in my interpretation of these cartoons, the juxtaposition 
between Russia and the West in such binary images is not between two different cultures but between the 
clear demarcation of ethnicity on the Russian side and the “unnatural” absence of ethnic demarcation 
underscored by sexual perversity on the side of the West. Taking into consideration the parallel between 
these political cartoons and the heteronormative advertisements discussed here, it is clear that the 
outcome of advertisements that normalize the consumption of Crimea as a public space accessible to 
white Russian heteronormative subjects is the geopolitical establishment of Crimea as not just a 
heteronormative space but also a space of Russian culture in its supposedly pure spiritual form.  
Other kinds of cultural production engage in similar discourse 
through the romanticization of Russian–Ukrainian relations. For 
example, the film Crimea (Pimanov, 2017) romanticizes the peninsula, 
including its luscious vegetation and hospitable population, by creating a 
romance story between a young Russian man from Sevastopol (a major 
city in Crimea) and a young Russian woman from Kiev (see Figure 34). 
Their love affair is interrupted by the political crisis of 2014, and they 
must overcome their opposing views to continue their romance. The 
slogan of the film, “Don’t leave your loved ones,” points towards the 
didactic nature of the film that romanticizes human connection, plays on the old trope of juxtaposition of 
romantic and patriotic forms of love, and trivializes Ukrainian insurgence as disrupting the beauty of 
young love. 
In the context of Crimea’s annexation, reestablishing heteronormativity is particularly potent as it 
creates associations with familiar feelings of romance, the purity of love, the nationalistic trope of 
sacrificing love for Mother Russia, and opportunities to sustain and protect one’s family. At the same 
 Figure 34. Crimea movie 
poster. Image credit: Pimanov 
i Partnyory. (Pimanov, 2017). 
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time, the conflict regions are reestablished as both white and ethnically Russian—not only at the level of 
the population but also, perhaps even more importantly, at the level of their spirituality. What is being 
erased through these portrayals is the existence of non-heteronormative citizens, as well as the non-
Russian and non-white populations of Ukraine, such as Crimean Tatars. 
The strengthening of these heteronormative aspirations is also important given that Crimea has 
been known as a gay-tourism destination and a place with a significant LGBT population. After the 
annexation, Russian homophobic laws and reduced protections against violence and discrimination 
expanded to the annexed territories. Extensive research conducted by the human rights organization 
Memorial (2016) showed intensified violence on the basis of perceived gender and sexual orientation in 
the conflict zones of Donbass and Crimea, as well as heightened vulnerability of LGBTI refugees from 
these zones. The media also reported the closure of or difficulties in sustaining gay-friendly clubs, 
beaches, and organizations in Crimea (“Pod Radugoi,” 2018, September 20; “Vlasti Kryma,” 2016, April 
25).  
In this context, both romanticizing the region as heteronormative and making non-
heteronormativity invisible create and sustain the conflict zones in Ukraine as Russian territory, not only 
geopolitically but also symbolically and metaphysically. Aiding in developing of infrastructure and the 
ideological basis for occupation, political cartoons that use codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity 
establish the Otherness and inferiority of Ukrainians and the invisibility of other ethnic populations. 
Despite how trivial they may seem at first glance, the powerful effect of these cartoons is created through 
the repetition of codes. After all, Roland Barthes (1977) argued that the repetition of a code, however 
banal, binds the repetitive images into a coherent utterance that creates ideologically determined 
meanings as a result of this repetition. Moreover, in Mythologies, Barthes (1973) developed the concept 
of the “myth,” the diffuse process that condenses everything associated with a particular represented 
people, place, or thing into a single entity. The emphasis on non-heteronormativity in political cartoons 
adds the modes of gender and sexuality to the mythology of Ukrainianness that is created from the 
position of Russian imperialist superiority. In addition, when metaphors are routinely and powerfully 
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employed, it is possible for the message to be transformed from the metaphorical to the literal (El Refaie, 
2003). Although it is unlikely that the audience will truly believe all Ukrainian men are effeminate, the 
mundane homophobic, transphobic, and xenophobic humour present in these cartoons should be seriously 
considered as a building block of systemic and physical violence (see Boellstorff, 2004; Kimmel, 2003; 
Pascoe, 2005). Furthermore, the repetition of jokes about Ukrainian cross-dressers, European/Western 
depravity, and Russian sexual purity naturalizes heteronormativity, homophobia, and transphobia and 
entrenches the mechanism of banal nationalism. If we consider the question posed by visual 
anthropologist J. W. Mitchell (2005) about the desires of pictures, we could speculate that political 
cartoons desire attention: they want to be circulated on discussion boards, blogs, and social media; they 
want to cause visceral reactions of laughter or gasps. It is through these bodily reactions that they enter 
the realm of banal nationalism. Michael Billig (1995) writes, “An identity is to be found in the embodied 
habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language” (p. 8). If we consider 
political cartoons as a form of metalanguage for discourses about social order that exploits the code of the 
body, as I discussed in the beginning of this chapter, they should also be considered potent tools of 
habituation. In turn, the codes of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity employed in this metalanguage 
should be further deemed to be what Feitz and Nagel (2008) call “a critical libidinal infrastructure for 
war” (p. 217). 
Finally, the importance of trivial and mundane forms of humour, such as political cartoons, can be 
illuminated by the current political changes in Ukraine. In the spring of 2019, Volodymir Zelensky, a 
maverick politician, won the presidential election against Petro Poroshenko, who became the symbol of 
Euromaidan and the Ukrainian pro-EU movement. Until these elections, Zelensky had never participated 
in politics. Instead, he was famous as a comedian. The content of his lowbrow comedy skits rest on 
stereotypes and include joking about ethnic differences among various post-Soviet peoples (Ukrainians 
included), poking fun at his wife, and homophobic humour. During his election campaign, Zelensky did 
not present a clear political program and generally avoided any serious political discussion. Capitalizing 
on his outsider status, Zelensky built his campaign on criticizing political elites and posting light-hearted 
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videos on Instagram. His lack of political platform also means that he does not have a clear position on 
resolving the situation in conflict zones. Zelensky’s success in the 2019 presidential elections demonstrate 
the power of trivial humour such as that of the political cartoons discussed above. Such humour trivializes 
racism, xenophobia, sexism, and homophobia and establishes them as a repertoire of banal nationalism. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used a visual semiotic analysis of political cartoons that use codes of gender, 
sexuality, and race/ethnicity to articulate the Russia–Ukraine conflict from the perspective of illustrators 
who are critical of Ukraine’s geopolitical reorientation towards the European Union. The Otherness of 
Ukrainians is signified in these cartoons through representations of a Ukrainian peasant through an abject 
figure of khokhol and through a simplistic portrayal of the dualistic world, where the Good is signified 
through cultural belonging and proximity to Russia, and Evil is represented through the excessive 
consumption and sexuality associated with the West. I observed that in the cartoons, homophobic, 
transphobic, and racist representations are used as vehicles to make critical comments about Russia’s and 
Ukraine’s geopolitical belonging, and to position Russia as exceptional in its heteronormativity and 
whiteness. This exceptionality is coded primarily through articulations of clear gender, sexuality, racial, 
and ethnic boundaries. I proposed that, although I cannot draw conclusive statements about the reception 
of cartoons through the semiotic analysis alone, they should be seen as naturalizing heteronormativity in 
territories occupied by Russia through banal nationalism. 
I suggest that homophobic, sexist, transphobic, and racist codes, while located in Russian 
heteropatriarchal nationalism, can also be understood as a response to the homonationalist discourses of 
Western Europe and North America. These discourses fold homonormative subjects into ideologies, 
structures, and practices of nationalism. This is specifically identified in the cartoons by metaphors of gay 
marriage, performative celebration of gender-bending, and celebrations of gay culture. The cartoons 
address these practices by making them look ridiculous and by making them into the object of a joke. I 
suggest that without homonationalist discourses of the West such metaphors would not be accessible to 
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Russian artists. Homonationalism on the global scale, as many scholars have argued, relies on the idea of 
the homophobic Other, which includes racialized populations but also ethnically othered white 
populations, such as Russians. Therefore, in the political cartoons analyzed in this chapter, Russian artists 
respond to these processes of othering by the West to further perform and exaggerate homophobia. In 
doing so, they repurpose homonationalist discourses in order to distance Russia from the West and to 
justify the occupation of Ukrainian territories. In the next chapter, I offer another form of Russian 
response and participation in global homonationalist discourses by looking at the representations of the 
racialized/ethnically othered sexuality offered by the Russian media that is opposed to Russian 
heteropatriarchal nationalism. 
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Chapter 4 
Haunting Homonationalism: Russian Oppositional Media Discourses on the 
Persecution of Chechen Gay Men 
Introduction 
In April 2017, the Moscow-based newspaper Novaya Gazeta published an investigative report 
about the organized persecution of men suspected of homosexuality in the Chechen Republic20 
(Milashina, 2017, April 1). The anonymous testimonies of survivors and witnesses narrated stories of 
abduction, torture, humiliation, and killing perpetrated by Chechen state security agencies and Chechen 
government officials. The articles included information on a secret prison near the Chechen capital, 
Grozny, where men were detained for several weeks and were only released if they provided names of 
other gay men. Some were murdered in the prison; others returned to their families severely injured. 
Novaya Gazeta also reported that security agencies pressured relatives of suspected gay men to execute 
“honour killings.” Their investigation prompted other oppositional media in Russia and a variety of media 
abroad to cover the story, while Chechen and Russian officials actively denied not only that organized 
persecution was taking place but also that gay people existed in Chechnya at all. In this chapter, I examine 
the range of oppositional media discourses on this issue that emerged in January-December 2017. I argue 
that the coverage of anti-gay persecution appealed to white Russians’ feelings of heteropatriarchal 
national identity while simultaneously engaging with homonationalist rhetoric. I further claim that while 
this discursive practice was effective for mobilizing much-needed help, both from across Russia and 
internationally, and led to the evacuation of some21 persecuted people to countries in the EU and North 
America (LGBT-Network, 2018), it contributed to further ethno-racial othering of Chechens and the 
production of aspirational white Russian nationalism. 
 
20 The Chechen Republic – commonly called “Chechnya” – is a federal subject of the Russian Federation, and it is 
therefore under Russia’s jurisdiction.  
21 The report of the LGBT-Network (2018) informs that of about 200 people who contacted the organization, 119 
people were evacuated by the end of 2017. The total number of those targeted, threatened, or detained is unknown. 
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Russian oppositional media played a crucial role in pressuring Russian authorities to investigate the 
crimes in Chechnya and in mobilizing help from outside parties. The reports of the persecution drew 
international attention: media around the world (including The New York Times, The Guardian, Time, 
Vice, BBC, and CBC) published numerous articles on the topic; LGBTQ and human rights activists 
organized protests and demonstrations in multiples countries; and Canada and several of the EU states 
granted asylum to refugees from Chechnya. This attention came during an interesting time. Since the end 
of the Second Chechen War (1999–2009)—a devastating decade during which Russia ensured political 
control over the territory—the international public has not heard much about Chechnya. Chechen 
authorities, fiercely pro-Putin, have established the image of a rehabilitated, even somewhat prosperous, 
autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. During the last decade, the international public has 
been more concerned with Russian homophobia than other kinds of human rights abuses in Chechnya. 
When news of crimes in Chechnya picked up international attention, it was specifically and notably the 
anti-gay violence that prompted action. How, then, do the discourses on the persecution of gay Chechens 
and their evacuation fit into broader discussions on Russian homophobia, Russian–Chechen relationships, 
and Russia’s geopolitical positioning vis-à-vis the West? 
In this chapter, I suggest that Russian oppositional media discourses on the persecution in 
Chechnya illuminate the ways in which the issue of anti-gay violence accomplishes two key tasks: (1) 
animating articulations of geopolitical claims, and (2) positioning Russia on the map of sexual modernity. 
Moreover, I argue that the oppositional media’s framing of the persecution reveals important racial/ethnic 
and sexual hierarchies in the contemporary Russian state and the ways in which non-Western countries 
participate in homonationalist practices of the West. In order to support these arguments, I apply methods 
of critical discourse analysis to examine discursive and representational practices employed by Russian 
oppositional media in their coverage of the persecution. First, I demonstrate the ways in which media 
sources analyzed describe Chechnya as a geographical and cultural space. Through these descriptions, I 
argue, oppositional media (re)produces cultural heteropatriarchy in Chechnya by putting emphasis on 
constructions of lawlessness and racial/ethnic difference. Second, I analyze discursive constructions of the 
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figure of the gay Chechen and argue that the media analyzed portrays Chechen gay people through a 
framework of “haunting,” which symbolically annihilates, mystifies, and eroticizes them, and, in certain 
cases, trivializes persecution. Third, I examine stories of refugee migration from Chechnya. In so doing, I 
claim that the framing of gay Chechens’ narratives of escape rests on the homonationalist rhetoric of 
liberation and entrenches racial/ethnic hierarchies within Russia and on a transnational scale. However, 
because the racialized Other is portrayed as a mystical and unintelligible ghost, I name the Russian 
version of homonationalist rhetoric as “haunting homonationalism.” This chapter illuminates how and 
why the sexualized and racialized figure of the Chechen gay man has become valuable in the geopolitical 
context of Russia, including in Russian relations with Chechnya and with the West, and within the 
Russian national imaginary. I conclude with a discussion about the significance of homonationalist 
frameworks for oppositional discourse in a state where homosexuality is positioned as being outside of 
the national imagination. 
The theoretical framework of this chapter rests on three fundamental concepts: “heteropatriarchy,” 
“homonationalism,” and “homotransnationalism.” This chapter relies on an understanding of the Russian 
organization of governance as one that is fundamentally heteropatriarchal. In Chapter 1, I discussed how 
Russian gender and sexuality scholars explain heteropatriarchal organization of social and political life in 
Putin’s era. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated that heteropatriarchy dominates cultural representations and is 
firmly connected to Russian nation-making processes. Feminist theorists of colour have underlined the 
link between heteropatriarchy, colonialism, and white supremacy and use the term “heteropatriarchy” to 
theorize the “social systems in which heterosexuality and patriarchy are perceived as normal and natural, 
and in which other configurations are perceived as abnormal, aberrant, and abhorrent” (Arvin, Tuck, & 
Morrill, 2013, p. 13). This theory argues that heteropatriarchy is a building block of nation-state 
governance and serves to support other pillars of white supremacy—capitalism, (settler) colonialism, and 
imperialism/war (Smith, 2016). Specifically, Andrea Smith (2016) demonstrates that “in order to colonize 
peoples whose societies are not based on social hierarchy, colonizers must first naturalize hierarchy 
through instituting patriarchy” (p. 72).  
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I maintain that a similar understanding of colonization through heteropatriarchy can be applied to 
the case of Chechnya, though there is a lack of research on the details of these processes in this context. 
There are debates among scholars on whether Chechnya should be considered a postcolonial or 
neocolonial space given the dependency of Chechnya on Russian Federal authorities and the limited 
sovereignty it has (Reznikova, 2014). Regardless the precise terminology, the history of Russia’s military 
control of the territory (Politkovskaya, 2009), its economic and political dependency on the Russian 
centre, and its cultural representations that firmly re-inscribe the image of the Chechen as an ethnic/racial 
and religious Other (Russel, 2005) all suggest that Chechnya can undoubtedly be considered as existing 
under colonial political, economic, and administrative structure. The contemporary Chechen Republic, 
even though it enjoys relative political autonomy from the Russian state in exchange for loyalty to Putin 
(Sakwa, 2010), adopts Russian institutionalized heteropatriarchy through Russian Federal jurisdiction. Its 
political discourse also uses the hegemonic rhetoric of heteropatriarchy through sexist and homophobic 
statements by figures in positions of authority. The development of patriarchal gender orders in 
contemporary Chechnya is complex; some scholars link it to long periods of violent conflict and 
economic devastation (Szczepnaikova, 2012), while others show an increased entrenchment of patriarchal 
and heterosexist organization of everyday and political life that has been part of political processes of 
“Chechenization,” a Chechen national revival, especially under the governance of Ramzan Kadyrov 
(2007–current) (Erbslöh, 2016). While the detailed account of Chechen heteropatriarchy is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that coverage from Russian oppositional media (re)inscribes 
heteropatriarchy as a cultural category of Chechen society. 
Another fundamental concept of my argument is “homonationalism.” Coined by Jasbir Puar 
(2007), homonationalism refers to an assemblage of ideas and practices that include the homonormative 
subject into regulatory national and racial norms, structures, and ideologies. Homonationalism is 
embedded in regulatory state practices of neoliberal democracies, such as, for example, immigration 
controls that require non-heteronormative asylum seekers to adhere to homonormative models of sexual 
orientation and gender expression (Murray, 2016), or marketing police forces as gay-friendly through 
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their inclusion into gay pride celebrations while simultaneously increasing the violent and coercive 
policing of spaces used by racialized and poor queers (e.g., Kinsman, 2016, November 16). It also 
saturates individual practices of citizenship, such as, for example, queer reclamation of urban spaces 
inhabited by Muslim populations in order to challenge the supposed homophobia of these racialized 
communities (Bachetta, El-Tayeb & Haritaworn, 2015; Wahab, 2015). Homonationalism also circulates 
transnationally, through a wide variety of discourses and practices that reproduce racist hierarchies of 
queer subjects on a global scale and entrench neocolonialist and neoliberal ideologies around the world. 
Jin Haritaworn and Paola Bachetta (2016) theorize this as a process of “homotransnationalism” and ask 
how homonationalism travels across borders, and what makes it so transposable. In this chapter, I 
consider the ways in which homotransnationalism emerges through Russian oppositional media 
discourses on persecuted Chechen gay men. I argue that while homonationalism is not currently a 
building block of Russian nationalism, the rhetoric of opposition to homophobic persecution in Chechnya 
makes use of homotransnationalist ideologies, structures, and practices that place neoliberal Western 
states as an ideal model of gay nationalist citizenship. 
My methodology combines two approaches: the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse 
(SKAD) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). SKAD, as proposed by sociologist Reiner Keller (2011), 
is a sequential analysis of data, which includes step-by-step coding and mapping in order to identify 
interpretative schemes, classification categories, phenomenal structures, and narratives that organize 
meaning-making and legitimations for action in relation to a particular phenomenon or social problem. I 
code and analyze causal relationships, classifications, concepts, signs, symbols, images, and the writing 
style that is used to name and describe gendered, sexualized, and racialized groups of people. I examine 
the use of narrative structures, appeals to emotions, rhetorical devices (such as sarcasm, irony, 
sensationalization, hyperbole, metaphor, and comparison), visual elements (such as illustrations, 
photographs, and videos), and elements of evidence (such as photo-evidence and testimonies). I also pay 
close attention to how events are described and named, and what is implied in those descriptions. I find 
such a step-by-step approach to data analysis particularly useful, because it allows for an empirically 
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grounded and systematic way to identify how facts and claims are used and organized and how actions 
are legitimized. At the same time, SKAD is interested in revealing the power-effects of discourse––the 
way in which discourse is a part of the social infrastructure that works to solve a social problem––and 
thus it is also, in a sense, a case study, an observation, and even an ethnographic description (Keller, 
2011). In my analysis, a combination of this systematic and multi-method approach helps me examine the 
spectrum of meanings and connections between claims about race/ethnicity, sexuality, gender, and 
political regimes. 
However, since I seek to analyze processes of sexualization and racial/ethnic othering within 
discourse, my goal is not merely to identify the spectrum of claims proposed by oppositional media, but 
rather to analyze the role of discourse in the (re)production of and challenge to dominance (van Dijk, 
1993). Therefore, in accordance with the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis, I take a critical 
stance and seek to identify and examine hegemonic discourses and look for sites of resistance. I analyze 
the ways in which groups are named and described, whose agency is encoded in narratives, and whose 
voices are expressed. This plane of analysis is more interpretative rather than being an impartial analysis 
of grammar and semantics and is heavily influenced by my own political commitments to feminist and 
anti-racist social justice.  
The media sample of this study consists of 57 items published in 2017, from the first report on 
persecution on April 1, 2017, mentioned above, to a photo-essay on the lives of Chechen refugees abroad, 
published on December 27, 2017. My sample includes articles, video clips, and news snippets found on 
the websites of three media sources: the newspaper Novaya Gazeta (28 articles), the online-based 
newspaper and news aggregator Meduza (24 articles), and an online-based television channel Dozhd (5 
video clips with accompanying articles). These sources were chosen because they represent the most 
popular oppositional media sources for Russian audiences22 that, according to my comparison of a wide 
 
22 According to the Russian media monitoring company Medialogia, Novaya Gazeta is on the list of top-ten most 
popular newspapers in the country, Meduza is the most-often quoted internet-based news source on social media, 
and Dozhd is the most popular TV channel among non-government owned channels and the sixth in the popularity 
rating of all federal TV channels (“Top-10 SMI,” 2018). 
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variety of media sources, covered the story of persecution the most extensively. Sometimes these three 
sources are described as “liberal;” however, I suggest that it is more accurate to use the term 
“oppositional,” because what constitutes “liberal” in Russia at the present moment is a particularly vague 
and wide category of political positions  (for analysis of Russian alternative media spaces, see Edenborg, 
2017). Additionally, I describe these sources as oppositional to mark their independence from state 
funding and control as well as their critical stance towards Putin’s government. These sources covered the 
story of persecution in detail, each conducting complex investigative research and publishing interviews 
with persecuted people. In contrast to the oppositional media, major state-controlled media, including the 
national television channels Channel 1, Rossiya, and NTV, completely ignored the story, continuing the 
Russian government’s negation of the existence of gay people in Chechnya. 
Before presenting my findings, I will provide some important background on the sources used in 
this research, since the medium, political history, and reputation of each affects the way information is 
presented and received by audiences in Russia. Novaya Gazeta is an investigative newspaper that was 
founded in 1993 and has been critical of the Russian state apparatus and its politics in Chechnya ever 
since. The newspaper positions itself as an expert on Chechen politics due to its long history of 
journalism in the region. The newspaper originally broke the story on persecution on April 1, 2017, and 
since then has continuously put pressure on Russian authorities to start an official investigation. 
Throughout the year, Novaya Gazeta continued to publish details of their journalistic investigation, 
explanations of the context and reasons for the persecution, testimonies from survivors and witnesses, and 
criticism towards Russian authorities for their failures to address the situation in Chechnya. Novaya 
Gazeta was the leading investigative news source on the issue of persecution, and therefore it is more 
present in my analysis than the other two sources. Meduza often worked in collaboration with Novaya 
Gazeta on the story of persecution. The materials in Meduza consisted of commentaries on the issue from 
Chechen and Russian officials and original investigative research, including interviews with survivors of 
the persecution. The third source of oppositional media, Dozhd, is an internet-based television channel 
known for its positive coverage of anti-government protests in 2011, anti-corruption campaigns in 2016 
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and 2017, and other oppositional events. The channel affiliates itself with the liberal political opposition, 
Ksenia Sobchak and Alexey Navalny. Dozhd picked up the story of persecution one week after the 
original publication by Novaya Gazeta and conducted its own investigation. Although this media source 
published only five videos on the topic of persecution, the videos included extensive research and 
interviews with those who fled Chechnya. 
My analysis includes an examination of the investigative stories, opinion pieces, visual images, and 
factual information in these three media outlets, including news snippets on statements from public 
figures and state authorities. I pay close attention to the choice of this factual information itself because it 
provides important insight into the origins of the discourse and who controls it. For example, I consider 
that many of the testimonies—although presented as stand-alone monologues—are based on interviews in 
which the interviewer has shaped what has been asked and answered, and has later edited the text, 
probably omitting some of the details. Each news source has also carefully chosen which statements from 
public figures to include and which to exclude from their coverage. So, for instance, Novaya Gazeta only 
published a few statements from Chechen public figures, perhaps in an attempt to exclude homophobic 
statements, while Meduza published statements from both sides—those who negated that persecution was 
happening and those who called for the investigation. Therefore, I treat these statements not just as neutral 
objective facts, but rather as curated content that frames the discourse and systematically produces the 
objects of which it speaks (Foucault, 2002). In this study, my goal is not to compare these sources but 
rather to examine the general framing of the issue within the most popular oppositional Russian media. 
My choice of terminology to refer to those persecuted in Chechnya for their sexual orientation is 
deliberate in this chapter. Judging from the media reports, the majority of targeted people are cisendered 
men. All of the media sources in my sample used the terms “gay man” and “LGBT,” which are both 
direct transplants from Anglophone discourses as I discussed in Chapter 1. Despite the frequent use of the 
abbreviation “LGBT,” none of the sources analyzed mentioned lesbian women23 or bisexual people. 
 
23 The fact that the organized persecution in Chechnya targeted non-heterosexual ciswomen has been confirmed by 
my personal contacts. However, the information of persecution of Chechen women only appeared in the media in 
the end of 2018 (Khazov-Kassia, 2018, October 20) and thus is not included in my analysis. 
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Although it is possible for the reader to imply bisexuality in some of the stories—some testimonies, for 
example, mention gay men living happily in a heteronormative marriage—the term itself was never used. 
There were only two mentions of transgender people (Badanin & Zhuk, 2017, May 18; Vachedin, 2017, 
December 5), however in both cases these were people who left Chechnya and Russia before 2017. In 
light of this limited visibility of lesbians, bisexuals, and transgender people, I think that using the term 
“LGBT” in the analysis of specific stories would be misleading. Therefore, in this chapter I refer to 
persecuted people as “gay men,” unless quoting or paraphrasing from the media. 
It is important to mention that as a Russian-Lithuanian queer woman I am an outsider to the 
Chechen culture, and my understanding of it comes from scholarly and media texts like the ones I am 
analyzing in this chapter. Additionally, my position is informed by my experience of volunteering as a 
translator and advocate for Chechen refugees in Toronto in 2017–2019. These people know and support 
my research; nevertheless, I made an intentional decision to separate my volunteering from the research 
and not use these people as informants out of concern for their well-being. My position towards media 
discourses is a critical one. However, I do not wish to deny or downplay the violence that non-
heterosexual and gender-nonconforming people experience in Chechnya, nor do I want to imply that 
Russian oppositional media is insincere in their attempts to shed light on the corruption and cruelty that 
has occurred in Chechnya since (at least) 2017. By adopting a critical position, I seek to explore the 
modes through which media discourses are framed and imbued with constructions of gender, sexuality, 
and race/ethnicity and the ways in which discourses simultaneously challenge and reproduce hegemonic 
representations. 
Cultural difference as origin of violence: Reporting on lawlessness and patriarchy in 
Chechnya 
In the media discourse on the persecution of gay Chechens, Chechnya was described as a 
peripheral territory of the Russian Federation where cultural difference creates a state of lawlessness and 
exceptionally strong patriarchal traditions. The oppositional media emphasized the oppressive governing 
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of the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov and the backwardness of the Islamic moral 
traditions by using such descriptions of Chechnya as a country “stuck in the Middle Ages” (Sobchak qtd. 
in Tomin, 2017, April 23), as being filled with “backwards people with the Stone Age in their heads” 
(Vachedin, 2017, December 5), and as an exemplar of “the lawlessness of the previous century” (Sulim, 
2017, April 17). The most common explanatory frames for the levels of violence were “lawlessness” and 
“patriarchy,” while none of the articles used the term “homophobia.” Moreover, the oppositional media 
overwhelmingly claimed that the persecution of gay Chechens is a particular manifestation of the general 
massive and absurd character of repressions in Chechnya. Novaya Gazeta wrote about the overall 
insubordination of Chechen authorities to the Russian federal law and the expectation of impunity among 
Chechens. The journalists tended to attribute this heightened sense of impunity to unsolved crimes linked 
to criminal networks in Chechnya, such as the murder of opposition leader Boris Nemcov in 2015 
(Milashina & Gordiyenko, 2017, April 4; “Zayavlenie novoy gazety,” 2017, April 13). Novaya Gazeta 
claimed that the repressions resulting from a sense of impunity and a state of lawlessness took the form of 
persecuting people who are either critical of Chechen authorities, such as human rights activists and 
journalists, or those violating moral codes of behaviour, specifically drug users, women having 
extramarital relationships, and LGBT people (Milashina, 2017, April 24). 
Similar explanations also appear in other sources. In the video clip titled “The Third Chechen 
[War]” (Badanin & Zhuk, 2017, May 25), Dozhd juxtaposes the image of a post-war, prosperous 
Chechnya, promoted by Kadyrov, with accounts of repressions faced by those who have recently fled the 
republic for various reasons, including homosexuality and being targeted as rebel fighters. These accounts 
challenge the official narrative of a peaceful Chechnya and suggest that the repressions signal a 
continuation of the state of war. Meduza quoted several public figures who shared this position. For 
example, the Gender Officer of the Russian liberal party Yabloko, Galina Michaleva, stated that 
repressions in Chechnya remind her of the Islamic State or Third Reich and that the “situation over there 
has been outside of the legal field for a long time” (Sulim, 2017, April 3). Similarly, the Chief Editor of 
the radio station Echo Moskvy, Aleksey Venediktov, commented on Chechen authorities’ attempts to 
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silence journalists and stated that “while federal special investigation units chase after teenagers,24 they 
have overlooked the rising power within the state, which is impudent, uncontrollable, and hostile to the 
state, and which dares to threaten the citizens of Russia” (qtd. in Sulim, 2017, April 17). This statement 
clearly separates “the citizens of Russia” from “the rising power” in Chechnya, even though it doesn’t 
specify who is included in each category. It is significant that the oppositional media overwhelmingly 
sees the persecution of gay men in Chechnya as a symptom of an overall state of lawlessness in the 
republic; meanwhile, none of the articles use the term “homophobia” explicitly. The solution to the 
problem of lawlessness, according to the media and public figures it quotes, is to “promptly and 
rigorously” investigate the case of all missing and murdered people in Chechnya, including but not 
limited to those persecuted on the basis of sexual orientation (“Budte dobry,” 2017, April 18). 
What does it mean that this frame of violence is distanced from homophobia? I suggest that it is a 
discursive tactic that allows the oppositional media an avenue to address anti-gay violence from within 
political conditions of widespread homophobia and heterosexism. Under institutionalized and legalized 
heteropatriarchy in Russia, the explicit use of the term “homophobia” is not likely to prompt actions from 
authorities, while appealing to familiar accusations of lawlessness and patriarchy in Chechnya is seen as 
more legitimate. At the same time, because anti-gay violence is seen to be a taboo topic, the media 
attempted to use the attention attracted by the sensational tone of generalized news in order to inform 
about other cases of murdered and missing people in Chechnya and to put pressure on Russian authorities 
to open official investigations. In July, 2017, Novaya Gazeta published 27 names of people they believed 
to have been executed for minor crimes or with no charges at all (Milashina, 2017, July 10). This public 
naming of victims put pressure on Russian ombudsman Tatiana Moskalkova, the Investigative 
Committee, and the Prosecutor General to look into cases of missing people and start a pre-investigative 
assessment. Despite this effort, an investigation into missing people who were suspected of 
homosexuality had not yet been opened at the time of this writing. Novaya Gazeta published numerous 
 
24 Here, Venediktov is referring to the government’s campaign against youth participating in anti-Putin protests in 
recent years. 
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articles describing how Chechen authorities attempted to cover up the story by stalling the investigation, 
leaking sensitive information and intimidating relatives of missing, murdered, or detained people 
(Milashina, 2017, July 9). 
Gay Chechens are seen to be central in solving the problem of lawlessness, primarily because their 
persecution provided an opportunity to draw attention to other human rights abuses in Chechnya as well. 
As Novaya Gazeta claimed (Milashina, 2017, May 22; “Moskalkova Provela v Groznom,” 2017, 
September 19), the story of gay Chechens became a catalyst for bureaucratic and legal procedures, such 
as the pre-investigative assessment, that had not been possible in other cases of human rights abuses in 
Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov’s governing. However, contrary to the hopes of journalists, the pre-
investigative assessment did not go smoothly. In the report published by Novaya Gazeta in May, 2017 
(Milashina, 2017, May 22), the author described a malfunction in the pre-investigation that stalled the 
opening of a criminal case. It is explained that the main obstacle was the anonymity of the survivors and 
their reluctance to file complaints. Because the survivors had not filed official complaints, it was easy for 
perpetrators to cover up evidence, claim that missing people have emigrated, and continue negating the 
existence of gay people in Chechnya. The article concludes: 
For the first time, citizens of the [Chechen] Republic have hope for achieving justice. 
Unfortunately, the position of federal authorities is the following: in order to fulfill this 
hope and to open the criminal case, the complaints from specific victims are needed. So it 
seems that Chechens today are dependent on the bravery of that category of Chechen 
citizen that includes the most unprotected, ostracized, and persecuted by the authorities as 
well as the society. All Chechens are dependent on the bravery of Chechen gays. 
(Milashina, 2017, May 22)25 
Here, the emphasis is on remedying a state of lawlessness, and I will return to the way in which this 
discourse puts responsibility for change on Chechen gay people in the next section.  
 
25 All translations from Russian in this chapter are my own. 
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Although journalists frequently blamed administrative and legal failures for the persecution of gay 
men in Chechnya, the lawlessness was not the only explanation provided. Much journalistic labour is put 
into providing visual and textual explanations of how the roots of the tragedy can be found in the Chechen 
culture and its aversion to change. Many scholars have analyzed the simultaneous romanticization and 
demonization of people of the North Caucasus in discourses ranging from Russian literature (Friedrich, 
2003; Hope, 2008) to anti-terrorist rhetoric (Banner, 2008; Russel, 2005). Congruently with these 
discourses, the story of persecution of gay men in Chechnya continues a tradition of describing Chechen 
culture as exotic, mysterious, temperamental, tradition-bound, and fundamentally patriarchal. This is 
particularly evident in the illustrations that accompany publications on persecution (Figures 35-38). The 
  
Figure 35. “Traditional Chechen clothing. Museum, 
Grozny” (Original caption). Photo credit: RIA Novosti. 
Illustration to the article “Honour killing: How the 
ambitions of a famous LGBT activist awakened a 
terrifying ancient custom in Chechnya” in Novaya Gazeta 
(Milashina, 2017, April 1). 
Figure 36. No caption, no photo credit. Illustration to 
the article “Reprisals against Chechen gays: We 
publish the stories of surviving witnesses” in Novaya 
Gazeta (Milashina & Gordiyenko, 2017, April 4). 
 
 
Figure 37. No caption. Photo credit: Valery Sharifulin, 
TASS. Illustration to the article “Whether you kill him, or 
we will kill him, your choice: Monologue of a 
homosexual who fled Chechnya” in Meduza 
(Kostyuchenko, 2017, April 16). 
Figure 38. No caption. Photo credit: Aleksandr 
Astafyev. Illustration to the article “Mass media 
announced that a deadly purge of homosexualists is 
happening in Chechnya” in Moskovsky Komsomolec 
(Nedugin, 2017, April 1). 
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illustrations include Chechen culture exhibit in a museum, traditional Chechen warrior clothing, the 
mosque in Grozny, and stock-pile images of camouflage trousers and military boots. Without directly 
relating to the events of human rights abuses, these illustrations set the story of persecution in the context 
of cultural customs, traditions, and ethnographic knowledge about Chechnya. It seems that in order to 
comprehend the reasons for the persecution of gay people in this part of the world, readers need to have a 
firm understanding of the domains of cultural history, military, and religion, which are seen to be 
organizing elements of everyday life in Chechnya. It is precisely these elements that are seen to be the 
sources and conduits of strict policing of heteronormative gender roles and gender hierarchy. The 
patriarchal aspects of Chechen culture are fundamental assumptions that significantly impact the way the 
story of persecution was framed. 
Besides the illustrations placing persecution in the context of a militarized and strict culture, the 
often-repeated metaphor of “suddenly awakened danger” also alludes to cultural inflexibility in relation to 
the patriarchal order. An example can be found in the article by Novaya Gazeta that broke the story, 
entitled “Honour killing: How the ambitions of a famous LGBT activist awakened a terrifying ancient 
custom in Chechnya” (Milashina, 2017, April 1). This article informed readers that a careless action of a 
Moscow-based LGBT activist, Nikolai Alekseev––namely, his knowingly futile request to organize 
marches for tolerance in four cities in the North Caucasus––prompted violence against gay men. In 
March, 2017, Alekseev petitioned local municipalities for permission to organize the marches. The 
petitions were promptly denied. Alekseev did not consult with local LGBT people prior to filing the 
requests, which, according to Novaya Gazeta, showed that his purpose was not representing the interests 
of those LGBT communities but, rather, to create precedents for filing claims of discrimination with the 
European Court of Human Rights for personal gain. Even though Alekseev’s requests were denied by the 
authorities, the newspaper claimed that they prompted a public outcry against homosexuality in the form 
of public protests and the organized detention of suspected gay men. The article stated, 
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The issue is that having significantly shaken up patriarchal Caucasus, [Alekseev] did not 
secure at least some minimal shelter, at least some sort of a way out for his allies over 
there. Having absolutely no knowledge and understanding of local specificities, he 
obviously didn’t take into account what kinds of consequences people would face after a 
simple mention of such intentions, even if no one was going to act on them. The problem 
is that in Caucasus they still take your words seriously. (Milashina, 2017, April 1) 
The journalists maintained that Alekseev did not consider cultural differences when he requested 
permission for his marches, nor did he account for the supposed incompatibility of Islamic cultural 
patriarchy and gay visibility. Within such narrative constructions that focus on cultural difference, 
Chechen people are seen to be a tightly-knit ethnic collective that exemplifies the Muslim culture of the 
North Caucasus—bound by tradition and “ancient customs,” static, averse to change, a sleeping danger 
that has been “shaken up” and “awakened” by claims for gay visibility. They are also described as unable 
to comprehend the world as different from itself, as if they didn’t and couldn’t understand that Alekseev 
wasn’t going to actually organize the marches and “took his words seriously.” 
An emphasis on cultural difference and collectivity also found its way into grammatical 
constructions. Many articles described the events of persecution using verbs in the passive voice or not 
specifying the grammatical subject in the text: “In Chechnya, they use similar methods not only for 
fighting terrorists, Salafis, and homosexuals, but also for drug users and even traffic offenders” 
(Milashina & Gordiyenko, 2017, April 4); “Mass capture of gays was arranged in Chechnya” 
(“Genprokuratura Nachala Proverku,” 2017, April 17); “Ahmed is not being threatened only because his 
phone number hasn’t been found yet” (Yapparova, 2017, April 8) (emphasis added). On one hand, these 
rhetorical devices pointed towards the systemic and institutional origins of violence and harassment, 
suggesting that the persecution was organized by Chechen authorities and state security agencies. On the 
other hand, the use of passive voice combined with emphases on the customs, collective shame that is 
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inflicted on the culture by homosexuality, and retaliation that relatives would bring on gay members of 
their families pointed towards a collective responsibility of the Chechen culture.  
Even though some of the articles named individuals executing arrests and torture, the publications 
in the oppositional media underlined that what is most terrifying in this story is the role of family 
members in the violence. According to the media, torture and humiliation have not only been not 
condemned by relatives of the accused, but it is often relatives who eventually murder a person suspected 
of homosexuality in order to “wash the stain off the family’s name with blood” (Borisov, 2017, June 20). 
The following explanation from the leader of the LGBT-Network, Igor Kochetkov, exemplifies this 
reasoning: 
Yesterday I talked to one of those who escaped. And he was saying that the most 
dangerous people for them are their relatives. I was just shocked by this; they love their 
relatives, they worry about them. But at the same time, they clearly understand that 
relatives are ready to kill them. And they don’t condemn [their relatives]! Their reasoning 
is that, well, that’s how it is, what can you do, there’s nowhere to run. But they do have 
somewhere to run. (qtd. in Kostyuchenko, 2017, April 16a) 
In this passage, Kochetkov suggests that people can run with the help of the LGBT-Network. However, 
this narrative also produces the Chechen body as an object of torture through the discursive repetition of 
violence and through positioning this violence as a regular occurrence in Chechnya, which underlines the 
Chechen Republic as a space of exception within the Russian federation. Achille Mbembe offers an 
understanding of necropower, as the power of controlling the death of populations through particular 
destinations for death. Mbembe (2003) considers the notion of sovereignty and writes that “the ultimate 
expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live 
and who must die” (p. 11). The sovereignty of Chechnya, within the state of Russia, is granted through 
permission for the torture and killing of undesirable populations with support from the Russian 
government. Chechnya illustrates perfectly the operation of sovereignty as the right to kill and the right to 
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decide on states of exception, wherein the laws are lifted. Analyzing the discourses on sexual torture of 
perceived Muslim terrorists in Abu Ghraib prison and building on Giorgio Agamben’s theorization of the 
state of exception, Jasbir Puar (2007) writes that neoliberal discourses surrounding events of sexual 
violence rely on three rhetorical practices: (1) positioning sexual violence as an exception to regularly 
occurring violence, (2) understanding sex and body as sacred and, therefore, as the sites of extreme 
violation by comparison with other violations of individual rights, and (3) imagining sexual violence as a 
clear overkill in relation to other wartime violence (p. 81). This analysis is applicable to the discourses 
perpetuated by the Russian oppositional media discourses. While Chechnya is not currently described as a 
zone of military conflict, many have observed that the aftermath of the Second Chechen War and 
establishment of Kadyrov’s government kidnapping, torture, and intimidation of regular citizens points to 
Chechnya as a place of permanent proximity to war (Erbslöh, 2016; Politkovskaya, 2009). The torture of 
gay men, however, stands out among these other crimes in the discourses of oppositional media and the 
LGBTQ activists. While the LGBTQ activists in Russia are very vocal about homophobic violence that 
happens across the whole country, the particular framing of violence against gay men in Chechnya as an 
effect of the Chechen culture points to framing Chechnya as the state of exception. 
Narratives that underscore cultural responsibility for persecution and those that highlight the 
participation of family members in violence both attempt to create empathy for the persecuted people who 
have “nowhere to run,” as Kochetkov put it in the quote above. These explanations attribute blame to the 
significance of clan relations in Chechnya. A scholar of Chechen society Gisela Erbslöh (2016) notes that 
Chechen identity rests, among other things, on “strict morals and customs linked to clan hierarchies, and 
an ancient code of ethics based on holding one’s word” (p. 204). The significance of clan relationships 
and the moral code supported by them have been mostly eroded during the Soviet rule through 
displacement of Chechen people and Soviet politics of annihilation of ethnic and cultural differences 
(Katz, 1999; Sokirianskaia, 2005). However, in the last decade, Kadyrov attempted to revive Chechen 
traditions and the moral code, especially the shared responsibility of the family for a crime committed by 
a family member. As Erbslöh (2016) argues, the kinship-based liability has been revived in a badly 
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distorted form that includes punishing the family in addition to punishing the criminal relative. This 
distortion leaves criminalized people particularly vulnerable to blackmail, threats against their families, 
and the inability to seek justice via legal means. In the oppositional media covering the persecution of gay 
Chechens, this social vulnerability is easily converted into a discourse that gives prominence to ethnicity 
and Islamic faith through racialized terms such as “honour killings,” and a narrative of the Chechen 
culture as being stuck in the past, as seen in phrases such as “backwards people with the Stone Age in 
their heads” (Vachedin, 2017, December 5) and “the lawlessness of the previous century” (Sulim, 2017, 
April 17). These discourses further naturalize the relationship between cultural difference and 
heteropatriarchy. 
The assumption that heteropatriarchy is a fundamental aspect of Chechen culture can also be seen 
in discursive representations of gender in oppositional media articles on the issue of persecution. In the 
articles from my sample, Chechen women were described as vulnerable, traditional, submissive, and 
emotionally unstable, while Chechen men were represented as extremely protective, controlling, tough, 
and violent. According to the testimonies of men who managed to escape detention by authorities, the 
persecution was continued in the family and perpetrated by fathers, brothers, and uncles. By contrast, 
female family members would often beg forgiveness for the person accused of homosexuality. For 
example, one of the articles provides the following testimony from one of the survivors: 
My mom gifted me life for the second time. My father and brother locked me in a room 
for four days. They were debating whether to kill me or not. My mom was on her knees 
begging them, crying, “Let him out! He won’t do it again! He will marry!” My mom 
managed to persuade them. (Deny, qtd. in Milashina & Artemyeva, 2017, December 27) 
This image of a caring Chechen mother sits in juxtaposition with another common image: that of a 
mentally unstable, perhaps hysterical, Chechen woman in a position of authority, exemplified by Kheda 
Saratova, a member of the human rights council in Chechnya. Commenting on the first media coverage of 
the persecution of gay people, she stated, 
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I am Chechen, I live in this society, and this thing you are saying [homosexuality] is even 
worse than war. […] I can tell you that in our Chechen society, a person who has respect 
for himself, for traditions and customs, he will on his own, without any institutions, 
engage in persecution and do everything so that these people do not exist in our society. 
(“Chlen SPCH Chechni,” 2017, April 1) 
After vigorous criticism ensued in Russian oppositional media, Saratova claimed that she was 
misunderstood—that she was so stunned by the very topic of homosexuality that she wasn’t able to think 
clearly:  
That these people [gays] exist in the world, of course, I knew that, but I never heard that 
they exist in our society. All of this put me in great shock. Perhaps I was even a bit 
mentally unwell when I was giving that interview. (“Kak chlen SPCH,” 2017, April 3) 
Each of the quotes from Saratova were published seven times in the media sources I analyzed, which is 
more often than any other statement, save those from Kadyrov. Saratova’s last statement was also 
included on the page “In One Image” on Meduza, a rubric that describes the most telling news or 
statements of the week in a form of a snapshot (“Kak chlen SPCH,” 2017, April 3). Clearly, these 
statements were identified by oppositional media as exemplary of the hostility towards gay people in 
Chechnya and of the malfunction of the justice system: What would you expect from ordinary people if 
even the human rights council member, a woman, says that they deserve persecution? However, the 
reiteration of these quotes also portrays Saratova as overly emotional, the emphasis on her ethnicity 
creates a clear causal relationship between her being Chechen and her absurd justification of hostility. In 
order to make sense of Saratova’s comments, oppositional media sources framed the justification of 
violence supported by Chechen women primarily through mental instability.  
While Chechen women appear in these narratives only as either caring mothers or mentally 
unstable women in positions of authority, Chechen men likewise occupy two narrow positions, either as 
enactors of patriarchy or as its effeminized gay victims. The primary image of heteropatriarchal leader 
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can, of course, be found in the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, who is primarily marked 
as an ethnic Other. Kadyrov is often quoted in Russian media, perhaps because of his direct and non-
diplomatic manner of speaking that provides a lot of scandalous material for publications. His words in 
Russian are often quoted verbatim, including his awkward grammatical sentence construction and 
utterances that interrupt his speech. These editorial choices emphasize his ethnic difference. His 
statements are usually peppered with the use of mythological and religious references, as well as with 
nationalistic bravado. In an article titled “Kadyrov suggested Canada should take gays out of Chechnya if 
they exist there,” Novaya Gazeta quoted his words from an interview for the HBO channel:  
“America is not strong enough to be considered an enemy of Russia,” Kadyrov said. “We 
are a strong country, a nuclear state. Even if our country was completely destroyed, our 
nuclear missiles would strike automatically. We would turn the whole world on its head 
and bend it over. (“Kadyrov predlozhil Kanade,” 2017, July 15) 
Kadyrov’s reference to (homo)sexual violence in the threat to “bend the world over,” paired with 
his nationalist rhetoric, supports a hegemonic masculinity that relies on threats of emasculation, not unlike 
the hypermasculinity of President Putin (discussed at length in Chapter 2). Journalists from oppositional 
media attempt to undermine Kadyrov’s authority by portraying him as a corrupt, lying, manipulative, and 
unintelligent leader, describing him as “vassal”26 (Milashina, 2017, October 16); the leader trying to 
impose Sharia law on his people (Vachedin, 2017, May 22); and a regional authority who “tests the limits 
of what is allowed in our country” (Sulim, 2017, April 3). Although both President Putin and Ramzan 
Kadyrov can be seen as heteropatriarchal leaders, it is through such culturally marked descriptors of 
Kadyrov that Chechen anti-gay violence is explained as being rooted in ethnic Otherness.  
The dominant image of the Chechen, as the racialized Other of the Russian national self, has 
always been significant for Russian political discourse, from the beginning of the Russian Empire through 
the Soviet period and into contemporary Putin’s Russia. The notion of the Oriental Other examined by 
 
26 A person who has been granted land by a lord in feudal society. 
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Edward Said (1979) is helpful in illuminating Russia’s discursive construction of the North Caucasus in 
general, and the Chechen people in particular.27 Said’s term “orientalism” is “ultimately a political vision 
of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the 
strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’)” (p. 43). Orientalist discourse, as a rich body of anthropological, 
literary, and psychological knowledge about the “Orient,” constructed the racialized ethnic Other in 
essentialized, exoticized, homogenized, and sexualized terms as an opposite to the “Self,” which 
simultaneously relies on the image of the excluded Other. Said (1979) writes:  
On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are Arab-Orientals; the former 
are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, 
without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things (p. 49).  
In an Orientalist fashion, Russian literature, art, and scholarship homogenized the ethnically and 
culturally diverse region of the North Caucasus, of which Chechen people are just one of many, and 
painted a monolithic picture of “temperamental mountain warriors” (Nagorny, 2017; Pyanzina, 2011). In 
mass media as well, as Valerya Achmetyeva’s (2007) broad analysis of media representations of 
Chechens demonstrates, “Chechens are understood and described in a rhetorical tradition of the Middle 
Ages: as something strange and unintelligible” (p. 209). 
The racialized otherness of Chechens is particularly visible in Russian political discourse on anti-
terrorism, where it has also been bolstered by the focus on the body and sex. In the beginning of the 
 
27 In this chapter, I rely on the term “Other” that was developed by a wide array of psychoanalysts, feminists, and 
queer studies theorists. Besides Said’s significant contributions to our understanding of how the notion of the Other 
buttressed the post-eighteenth century colonizing and civilizing projects of European empires and continues to do so 
today, it is important to note several others. Julia Kristeva (1991), for instance, eloquently theorized the relationship 
between the foreigner and Otherness, by discussing that living with the foreigner, seeing and understanding 
foreignness, requires a citizen to be able to find an Other within oneself, to occupy the space of alienation from the 
self, to feel discomfort through one’s own sexual, national, political, or professional identity. My understanding of 
the Other is also informed by the rich literature based on lived experience and phenomenology from the position of 
racialized and queer otherness, including Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (1986) critique of the generic construction of 
the “Third World woman,” Gloria Anzaldua’s (1999[1987]) examination of “mestiza consciousness,” bell hooks’ 
(1992) critique of commodification of ethnic otherness, and Sara Ahmed’s (2007) analysis of the phenomenology of 
whiteness. What is particularly relevant in this scholarship is that it demonstrates the paradoxical and simultaneous 
position of the Other as an object of animosity and as an object of fascination, obsession, and fetish. 
151 
 
Second Chechen War—Russia’s major anti-terrorist campaign that was devastating for both Chechens 
and Russians—prime minister and soon-to-be president Vladimir Putin became internationally known for 
his harsh rhetoric aimed at Chechen terrorists. At a press-conference in 1999, Putin commented on his 
intentions to fight Chechen Islamic terrorism: “We will pursue terrorists everywhere. [If they are] in an 
airport, we will pursue them in the airport. Pardon my expression, but we will catch them on the toilet, we 
will rub them out in the outhouse if need be” (Rod TV, 2013). In 2002, frustrated with a French journalist 
who had critiqued Russian military activity in Chechnya, Putin snapped,  
If you’d like to become an Islamic radical and take the step of getting yourself circumcised, 
then I invite you to Moscow. We are a multiconfessional country, we have experts on this 
issue as well, and I recommend having this procedure done in such a way that you will never 
have anything growing out down there again” (Kremlin, 2002).  
Several scholars have analyzed this “tough guy” rhetoric with its abundant references to body parts and 
bodily secretions to explain Putin’s deployment of masculinity as a strategy for establishing political 
dominance (Riabova & Riabov, 2010; Sperling 2014; Wood, 2016). Unfortunately, these analyses say 
nothing of the image of the Chechen that has been central in these discourses for creating a 
hypermasculine image of the Russian leader. Putin’s statements have simultaneously marked Chechens as 
objects of sexual humiliation through references to catching them at their most vulnerable (e.g., on the 
toilet) and as monsters capable of castrating the enemy. Putin’s toughness relies on these particular 
images of the ethnic other, which also points towards the deployment of corporeal politics and 
sexualization in Russian-Chechen relationships. Chechens in this discourse emerged as hypermasculine, 
dangerous, and monstrous, but also as highly vulnerable, particularly in the realm of the body. Although 
oppositional media wants to subvert certain discursive constructions of vulnerable people, they rely on 
similar portrayals of the monstrous Chechen. 
As historians of Putin’s Russia have noted, it was the Second Chechen War that propelled Putin, 
then barely known by the Russian public, to presidency (Gessen, 2012). The War also justified the 
152 
 
increasingly authoritarian means of Putin’s governing. During his governing years from 2000 to the 
present (2019), Russia established federal control over Chechnya and ensured the loyalty of Chechen 
authorities to the Kremlin. The Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, worked to establish the 
image of a peaceful and prosperous Chechnya that is well-integrated into the Russian Federation 
(Erbslöh, 2016). For Putin, today’s Chechnya is also an example of the successful coexistence of the 
Russian Orthodox Christians and Chechen Muslims (Markosian & Matloff, 2012). Yet, Russian 
oppositional media that reports on human rights abuses significantly subverts this image. Investigative 
journalistic and research centers, such as Novaya Gazeta, Kavkaz-Centr, and Memorial, continue to 
publish materials that demonstrate the harsh repressions in Chechnya and Russian authorities’ complicity 
in it. Threats and silencing have been common responses of the state—both in Chechnya and on the 
federal level—to these reports. 
So far, this chapter discussed how the problem of persecution of gay men in Chechnya has been 
framed by the oppositional media. The three main interconnected framings include the overall state of 
lawlessness in Chechnya, cultural heteropatriarchy that sanctions violence against gay men, and blaming 
Moscow-based LGBT activists for provoking the “patriarchal Caucasus.” Journalists’ illustrations, 
grammatical choices, narrative constructions, and framing and selection of quotes are the discursive 
devices that point to a collectivity and emphasize cultural responsibility for the persecution of gay men in 
Chechnya. This, as well as the focus on cultural heteropatriarchy, firmly secure the image of the Chechen 
other as culturally static, tradition-bound, and ultimately racially/ethnically different. Within this framing, 
gay men are seen as having a unique ability to interrupt this ethno-racial difference. In the next section, I 
turn to an analysis of those portrayed as victims of lawlessness and cultural heteropatriarchy in Chechnya. 
Activists or ghosts? Constructing Chechen gay men in oppositional media discourses 
The understanding of homosexuality that dominates the reports on the persecution in oppositional 
media is that you can’t change your sexual orientation (similar, in media’s framings, to how you can’t 
change your skin colour), and therefore that LGBT people have no other choice but to fight repressions. 
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In my sample, journalists expressed this view with passion and firmness, which was emphasized by a 
frequent use of modal verbs and expressions. For example, in one of the first reports on persecution, 
Novaya Gazeta journalists wrote, 
The problem is that members of the LGBT community differ from all other activists and 
human rights protectors. You can stop being a human rights activist, you can change your 
political views, you can even change your faith. But it is impossible to change your skin 
colour or your sexual nature. This is why LGBT activists and black people in America 
became the engine of the movement for human rights. This is why persecuted 
homosexuals in Chechnya are starting to break the silence. (Milashina & Gordiyenko, 
2017, April 4, emphasis added) 
As shown in this quote, LGBT people are seen to be exceptionally fit to fight lawlessness and injustice. 
The journalists, however, see only certain kinds of fighting for human rights as valuable. This is evident 
through the condemnation of the actions of Nikolay Alekseev (discussed above), who was accused of 
prompting violent retaliation against gay people in Chechnya because of his activism (Milashina, 2017, 
April 1; Sulim, 2017, April 3). In my article sample, Alekseev was portrayed as selfish, greedy, and 
driven by his personal ambitions. Articles stressed the amount of compensation Alekseev had previously 
received as a result of his complaints to the European Court of Human Rights and claimed that “by 
requesting permits to organize parades in various regions of Russia, he is fighting for his own 
constitutional rights, freedom of assembly, and abolition of the gay-propaganda law” (Milashina, 2017, 
April 1, emphasis added).  
A photo of Alekseev accompanying the article (Figure 39) is telling: Immaculately dressed in a 
business suit, he is shown talking to journalists. His self-confident and theatrical pose and the limp wrist 
of his hand clearly and stereotypically mark him as a gay man. This image sits in stark contrast with the 
pictures of anonymous Chechen gay people included in other articles, whose bodies express vulnerability 
and suffering (discussed further below). Portraying Alekseev in such stereotypically gay manners is in 
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accordance with the condemning tone of the article, which 
accused him of cultural insensitivity. In this way, 
journalists suggested that activism prioritizing LGBT 
visibility is necessarily harmful to LGBT people in 
“patriarchal Caucasus” (Milashina, 2017, April 1). The 
image, the tone, and the arguments presented by the 
journalists all discredited Alekseev in his role as an expert 
on LGBT issues in Chechnya. 
Representations of Chechen gay men, the central 
figures in the story of persecution,28 are undoubtedly 
complex. The subject of the gay Chechen interrupts the two fundamental assumptions of Russian cultural 
imaginary: the heteronormativity of Chechen people and the whiteness of LGBT people in Russia. This 
interruption, as I show further in this section, has had significant effects on their representation. On one 
hand, published testimonies, photographs, and interviews gave Chechen gay men a much-needed voice 
and space in the public discourse. On the other hand, this anonymity, which was crucial for their safety, 
impacted how their stories were framed by figures of authority, journalists, and media editors. In 
particular, there are three processes that shaped the representation of gay Chechens: (1) symbolic 
annihilation through the denial of their existence; (2) the mystification of their lives; and (3) the 
trivialization of persecution. In what follows, I discuss these three processes in detail. 
As the story of persecution unfolded, Chechen authorities firmly maintained that the information 
presented by journalists was a part of a smear campaign that sought to hurt the Chechen people (“V 
 
28 There were only two mentions of transgender people, one being the story of Leila, a Chechen transwoman living 
as a refugee in the U.S. (Badanin & Zhuk, 2017, May 18). Leila migrated to the U.S. prior to the 2017 wave of 
persecutions in Chechnya. In the video, her face was blurred out to preserve her anonymity. Leila’s narrative was 
illustrated by close-ups of her body that underscored stereotypically feminine behaviour, such as making tea or 
choosing dresses at a clothing store. Another article featured Deny, a young Chechen transman living in Germany 
(Vachedin, 2017, December 5). Similarly to Leila, he migrated abroad before 2017. The article featuring Deny’s 
story described the process of his gender transition, his estrangement from his family, and his persecution within the 
Chechen diaspora in Germany. 
 
Figure 39. Nikolay Alekseev. Photo credit: RIA 
Novosti. Illustration to the article “Honour 
killing: How the ambitions of a famous LGBT 
activist awakened a terrifying ancient custom in 
Chechnya” in Novaya Gazeta (Milashina, 2017, 
April 1). 
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Groznom nazvali,” 2017, April 1; “Kadyrov schitaet,” 2017, July 13). Kadyrov and his representatives 
repeatedly announced that “there are no gays in Chechnya, but if there are any, Canada may take them 
away” (“Kadyrov predlozhil,” 2017, July 15). Several religious and political figures in Chechnya 
threatened journalists of Novaya Gazeta with reprisals for even suggesting that some Chechens might be 
gay (“Sovetnik glavy,” 2017, April 14), and other Chechen public figures claimed that the mere 
proposition of gay people existing in Chechnya would provoke feelings of injury and disgust against 
Chechen Muslim identity (Kotova, 2017, April 22). Russian federal authorities have also dismissed the 
issue; Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, said that problems of homosexuals are not a priority for the 
Kremlin and that survivors should file lawsuits if they have any complaints (Obuhov, 2017, April 3).  
Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, and Dozhd all refrained from reporting on statements that were directly insulting 
to LGBT people. However, pro-government media sources exploited the homophobia and xenophobia of 
some public figures to produce more sensational texts. A telling example of such sensationalization is an 
article published by Moskovsky Komsomolec titled “The Minister of Press of Chechnya cursed demons 
hiding in journalists and liberals: He claimed that with one glance at him they would drop dead instantly” 
(Obuhov, 2017, May 18). In this article, the newspaper quoted a Facebook post from the Chechen state 
official wherein he engaged in passionate homophobic speech, claimed that those who sympathize with 
gay people are possessed by demons, and wished death upon human rights defenders. This symbolic 
annihilation (Gerbner & Gross, 1976) of gay people in Chechnya, enacted through injurious speech, 
attempted to cast gay Chechens as phantoms created by human rights activists and foreign interests 
seeking to undermine Chechnya.   
Another way to describe what was happening in the Russian oppositional media in 2017 and how 
the figure of the gay Chechen emerged in the public imagination is through the notion of haunting. Avery 
Gordon (1997) explains haunting as a sociopolitical-psychological state of animation, in which an 
unresolved social violence makes itself known. One need not look hard to find unresolved violence in 
Chechnya: massive displacement of people during the Soviet period, excessive violence of two wars and 
their mass graves, kidnapping and disappearance of people during the 1990s, and secret prisons, the 
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existence of which are denied by the state (Katz, 1999). By covering the persecution of gay men, Novaya 
Gazeta has attempted to lift the story of state repressions out of the domain of denial, out of the “shadowy 
knowledge,” to use Gordon’s words (1997, p. 79). Journalists sought to provide evidence to the crime 
through pictures of injuries and multiple testimonies that described specific places, people, and actions of 
persecution. However, the limited representations of persecuted gay Chechens did not fully bring them 
out into the world of the living and known. Fearing retaliation for testifying, people who fled concealed 
their identities. Despite multiplying evidence of the crime, the figure of the “gay Chechen” remained 
ghostly as it emerged through the statements by public figures and representatives of the state, the 
faceless photographs of injured bodies, and the anonymous testimonies of those who had fled the 
violence. 
Perhaps the figure of a ghostly homosexual is always present in homophobic discourse. David 
Murray (2012), in his analysis of homosexuality in the Barbadian media, proposes a term “spectral 
sexuality,” which denotes the image of homosexuality that is associated with “a threatening, perverted, 
and/or sick sexualized body or group of bodies [that] are continually incarnated in discourse but never 
fully instantiated in the flesh” (p. 17). Similarly, Adi Kuntsman (2009) examines haunting figures in the 
wounding words of homophobic discourse among Russian diasporic subjects in Israel. One of the figures 
that Kuntsman describes is the “Shadow by the Latrine,” a figure of a passive homosexual in the Soviet 
Gulag whose social position at the bottom of the prisoners’ hierarchy was marked by designation of the 
sleeping place next to the toilet. Kuntsman shows how this figure of the Shadow and its symbolic 
placement by the latrine returns again and again through hateful name-calling, expressions of disgust, and 
imagery originating in Gulag through the injurious speech of the Russian-language media in today’s 
Israel. Following Gordon’s positioning of the ghost as a social figure that serves as an epistemological 
tool for comprehending the past and the present, Kuntsman proposes that “it is the circulation of Gulag 
imagery and the use of Gulag language that makes the Soviet past part of the Israeli present” (2009, p. 
59).  
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A similar kind of ghost is present in the negation of existence of homosexuality in Chechnya. 
However, it can also be found in the oppositional media discourses which portray the survivors as strange, 
ambiguous, and anonymous. The readers see these people’s tortured bodies and close-ups of their bruises, 
but they always turn their backs on the audience and their faces are never included in the picture. Their 
stories can be heard in video clips, their words are included in the testimonies, but their voices are 
distorted, and their testimonies are so repetitive with details of abduction and violence that they seem to 
blend into one. 
One of the ghostliest visual representations of Chechen gay men can be found in the web-project by 
Novaya Gazeta entitled “Acceptance,” published at the end of December 2017 (Milashina & Artemeva, 
2017, December 27) (see Figures 40–43). I suggest that the “Acceptance” project represents gay 
Chechens as mysterious, difficult to know, and unintelligible. The website hosts twelve pages, eleven of 
them containing anonymous pictures and testimonies of persecuted Chechens who have successfully 
escaped to elsewhere. The project takes the form of an online archive; readers can click through the pages 
containing photographs of the characters, texts of their testimonies, and short looping videos of mostly 
urban landscapes from destination countries of Chechen gay refugees. The photographs portray the 
protagonists against a static silent darkness, showing each person from the back or with their faces 
concealed by shadows. The photos are very expressive through only shadowy body postures and details: 
they convey masculinity, secrecy, anonymity, and hiding. The testimonies tell of their arrests, 
interrogations, releases, and evacuations with the help of the LGBT-Network, as well as their settlements 
in host countries. Placed in between the testimonies, the looping videos portray different bodies of water: 
birds flying across Niagara Falls in Canada; snow falling on the Neris River in Vilnius; cars rushing 
across the bridge over the Seine in Paris. The sound and movement of the looping videos provide a stark 
contrast to the silent and static media of text and photographs. Such visual format of the project alludes to 
the darkness of suffering, movement of water, migration, fluidity, and change.  
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Figure 40. One of the pages from “Acceptance” project, a snapshot of a looping video. Photo credit: Anna Artemyeva. 
https://chechnyagate-eng.novayagazeta.ru/country_1/ 
 
 
Figure 41. A testimony page from the “Acceptance” project. Photo credit: Anna Artemyeva. https://chechnyagate-
eng.novayagazeta.ru/tarkhan/ 
159 
 
 
Figure 42. A testimony page from the “Acceptance” project. Photo credit: Anna Artemyeva. https://chechnyagate-
eng.novayagazeta.ru/deny/ 
 
 
Figure 43. The page from the “Acceptance” project featuring Maksim Lapunov. Photo credit: Anna Artemyeva. 
https://chechnyagate-eng.novayagazeta.ru/maksim/ 
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The only non-anonymous figure in the project is found on the last page: this is a photograph of 
Maksim Lapunov and a short blurb about his legal case (Figure 43). Lapunov was the first and so far, 
only, survivor who made a non-anonymous public statement about his experience and filed a complaint 
requesting an official investigation of his detention (“Moskalkova vidit osnovaniya,” 2017, November 1). 
Unlike all other survivors, Lapunov is ethnically Russian and has no family in the Chechen Republic. 
This, I suggest, placed him in a less vulnerable position and allowed him to give public testimony and 
pursue legal action.29 Inadvertently, the different visual and discursive representation of Lapunov in the 
“Acceptance” project underscored the racial/ethnic hierarchy in oppositional media. 
Although the figures in the “Acceptance” project are not directly represented as threatening or as 
objects of humiliation, the qualities that homophobic discourse ascribes to spectral sexuality, their 
framing in the static silent darkness, marks them as subjects beyond what is known and can be 
intelligible. Although the subjects are represented as victims of persecution, their suffering remains out of 
this world, excessive, mysterious, incomprehensible, and is thus reiterated again and again in their 
repetitive stories of torture and humiliation. The juxtaposition of eleven anonymous gay Chechens against 
one open (“out”) face of a gay Russian on the last page suggest a trajectory, an expectation—Chechen gay 
ghosts might at some point acquire a face, just like this one Russian gay person does, but not yet, not 
while their culture—and, the unmentionable, their race/ethnicity—is keeping them stuck in the dark 
clutches of the past. 
There is another discursive device that works to mystify the gay Chechen subject: the framing of 
the story of persecution as a story of dark irony. By repurposing familiar children’s storytelling devices—
namely, those of fairytales and “scary tales”—media coverage in my sample sometimes worked against 
itself to trivialize the severity of gay persecution. For example, a video clip published by Dozhd with the 
sensational title “Some were killed, some were tortured: Confessions of Chechen gays” (Yapparova, 
2017, April 8) included two stories of gay refugees from the North Caucasus: Ahmed, a Chechen man 
 
29 Unfortunately, despite this less risky position, by the end of 2018 the legal case came to a dead end and Lapunov 
had to leave Russia because of the threats of retaliation (Radio Svoboda, 2018, November 27). 
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from Grozny living in Berlin, and Dalgat, a Dagestani30 man living in New York City. In the short 
interviews, these two migrants recounted finding out about persecution through social media and coming 
to terms with their gay identity despite the hostility they faced. The narrative voiceovers between 
interview snippets frame the story. This narration is quite peculiar: the voice uses a tone that is strangely 
fairytale-like in terms of its choice of phrasing, sentence construction, and intonation. 
The video opens with a person scrolling through Facebook while the narrator explains: “Every 
evening before bed, Ahmed sits down in front of his computer and reads scary tales on social networks.” 
Ahmed is shown, his face concealed, as he describes living with the fear of being caught. Then the 
audience is introduced to the second protagonist: “A bullet will not reach a Dagestani man Dalgat. On 
New York streets, he walks without hiding.” After Dalgat talks about his newfound feeling of freedom, 
the narrator finishes the video with concluding remarks: 
The most important thing [for a gay Chechen] is to gain freedom in such a way that no 
one knows about it, because far away, across the ocean, across a really black city, hurries 
a really black convoy. That drives Ramzan Kadyrov, the only male love object of the 
Chechen people. (Yapparova, 2017, April 8) 
The metaphor “scary tales” at the beginning of the narration indicates the way this journalistic reporting is 
framed in reference to short horror stories, a genre of oral storytelling that was popular in Soviet and post-
Soviet society. The most recognizable feature of a scary tale story is the repetitive use of the mysterious 
phrase “really black,” sometimes multiple times within the same sentence.31 The repetition of this phrase 
creates a slow monotonous development of the story in order to scare the listener with an abrupt violent 
ending; for instance, a “really black hand” would jump out of a “really black box” and choke a 
 
30 The Republic of Dagestan is a subject of Russian Federation, an ethnically heterogeneous territory that neighbours 
Chechnya in the North Caucasus. The politics and histories of both republics are closely intertwined and, although 
inhabitants of Dagestan are not necessarily ethnically Chechen, media often conflates the two.  
31 I translate the phrase here as “really black,” but the literal translation would be “black-black” (chornyi-chornyi) or 
“black-extrablack” (chornyi-prechornyi). A typical scary tale would be a variation on the following: In a really black 
city, on a really black street, there was a really black house. In that really black house, there was a really black room 
with a black box in it… 
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protagonist. The video clip employs some of the conventions of this popular genre: The narrator creates a 
tone of tension and suspense through the inverted sentence construction using a prepositional phrase first 
(“On New York streets, he walks”). The tone of the narration is melodic, fairy-tale like. The tension is 
further dramatized by the use of hyperbole and repetition (“across a really black city hurries a really black 
convoy”). This hyperbole, as well as the sentence construction that emphasizes the importance of the 
grammatical subject (“that drives Ramzan Kadyrov”) marks Kadyrov as the villain of the story. However, 
unlike in a usual scary tale, the video clip ends not with an abrupt violence but with a joke played on 
Kadyrov. The narrator ridicules Kadyrov’s power and homophobia by describing him as a male love 
object of the Chechen people. 
What does such a choice of framing mean? The content and tone of this video, despite its 
peculiarity, is sympathetic to the persecuted people and is congruent with Dozhd’s usual position of 
moderate criticism towards Putin’s government and political regimes, in both Russia and Chechnya. The 
framing of the information in the video quite tellingly reveals tensions surrounding the gay Chechen, the 
clash and seeming unintelligibility of the subject that occupies a position of both racialized other and 
antithetical queer, which is a category associated with modernity and whiteness.  
On one hand, framing the grim story of persecution as a scary tale, a genre of horror fiction 
intended for children, can be read as a form of trivialization, i.e. a disavowal of violence by expressing it 
through banal, ordinary, and humorous language. Analyzing ironic and kitschy popular culture 
representations of Guantanamo Bay prison, Marita Sturken (2011) observes that trivialization of torture 
“provides the means for consumer-citizens to feel ‘authentically’ close to traumatic events while also 
feeling innocent and detached.” (p. 425) The format of a scary tale marks the story as absurd, laughable, 
involving characters who are odd: Chechen men who instead of presenting the familiar form of masculine 
brutality talk about their feelings and the leader of Chechnya with his exaggerated performance of power. 
Such trivialization marks the subjects of the story as peculiar but simultaneously relieves the Russian 
audience from feeling too concerned by keeping torture as a moral problem at a comfortable distance.  
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On the other hand, the scary tale framing can be seen as an attempt to interrupt the official 
discourse that negates the very existence of gay Chechens and prohibits the so-called propaganda of 
homosexuality. Placing the characters of the real-life story into the conventional form of a scary tale 
brings the figure of the gay Chechen into the cultural imaginary through employing a familiar and 
mundane framing. This framing has the potential to interrupt the symbolic annihilation within mainstream 
discourse that assumes heterosexuality of the racialized/ethnic Other and thus renders the gay Chechen 
impossible. 
This framing is exemplary of the “dead irony” aesthetics that was a significant part of late Soviet 
popular culture along with the practice of stiob discussed in Chapter 2. Cultural theorist Alexei Yurchak 
(2005) describes the aesthetics of dead irony as a form of humour of the absurd that refuses to accept 
boundaries between seriousness and humour, state support and opposition, sense and nonsense. Yurchak 
found such irony in a variety of cultural forms: from folkloric poetic genres of the nineteen-seventies and 
eighties to public performances that took the form of spontaneous public events that meant nothing and 
had the sole purpose of confusing the viewer. Dead irony can be characterized by grotesque connections: 
describing little children as agents or objects of extreme violence, spontaneous bursts of aimless 
collective action, and imitating forms of authority in a way that neither supports nor criticizes it. The 
scary story form, mixed with journalistic reporting on state-sponsored violence, could also be interpreted 
as a form of dead irony. Framing the story of persecution as a scary tale, Dozhd takes up a position that 
neither negates the existence of gay Chechens nor fully engages with them as subjects of political and 
human rights. Although the content of the video is sympathetic to the suffering of Chechen gay men, the 
narrator creates distance between the audience and the protagonists in the story by adopting the style of 
children’s fiction.  
In addition to mobilizing the scary tale and dead irony, media sources in my sample emphasized the 
strangeness and absurdity of gay people in Chechnya themselves. This is a similar mechanism of 
trivialization that simultaneously works to bring the topic of homosexuality and Chechnya into the 
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domain of the cultural imaginary. Narrating the story of Maksim Lapunov, a Russian survivor of the 
persecution in Chechnya, a journalist explains, 
Maksim is an incredibly soft and well-mannered person. Maksim is an ordinary person, a 
small entrepreneur. Maksim, in addition, is a very naïve person. A gay person selling 
balloons in Chechnya. What a surreal story. (Milashina, 2017, October 16) 
Here, the emphasis on valuable qualities of his character—softness, good manners, simple naivety—are 
used to invoke empathy in the reader. However, through the exclamation “What a surreal story,” the 
author points to the surprise of the situation, the unlikely juxtapositions of gay desire and brutal 
machismo of Chechnya, perversion of marginalized sexuality and the childishness of a person selling 
balloons in this gruesome place. Similar to the framing of the scary story, employing affects of surprise 
and wonder works to humanize the subject, to bring it from the domain of the unimaginable to the domain 
of possible, even if the subject remains strange and peculiar to readers. In addition, this underscoring of 
the surrealism of the situation reinscribes Chechnya as a space of Other, in which naivety, softness, 
simplicity, and childishness are fundamentally out of place.  
Within the story of persecution of gay men in Chechnya, Russianness emerges as an unmarked 
category, which is only reflected upon in the case of exception. Such a case of exception is, of course, the 
story of Lapunov, who is the only non-anonymous survivor of the persecution. The journalists explain 
that Lapunov was only able to lift his anonymity because he is less vulnerable than Chechen gay men: 
unlike them, he doesn’t have any family in Chechnya that could be endangered by his public statements, 
and the social repercussions of the stigma are less harmful to him than to Chechen gay men (Milashina, 
2017, October 16). This acknowledgment of Lapunov’s privilege is important, however the radically 
different way in which he is portrayed in the oppositional media—with his open face gazing back at the 
audience, on the final page of the “Acceptance” project, with detailed descriptions of his occupation and 
soft character—demonstrates that his whiteness further organizes the Russian racial/ethnic imaginary and 
supports mystification of Chechen gay lives. Unfortunately, the Russian ethnicity of all journalists 
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investigating the story, as well as their sexual identity, was never discussed or reflected on. Claudia 
Rankine and Beth Loffreda (2015), in their analysis of fiction writing, propose to think about race as a 
structure of feelings, imagination, and embodiment and discuss a culturally set repertoire of narratives 
that is available to authors writing about racialized people. The Russian media narratives about Chechen 
gay men create the set repertoire of the racial imaginary in Russia through narratives of sexuality and 
sexual violence. The normalization and invisibility of Russian ethnicity in discourses on anti-gay violence 
points to the ways in which questions of racialization/ethnic othering are intimately connected with 
questions of sexuality. The way in which the oppositional media mystified and trivialized Chechen gay 
men through discursive and representational practices which I explained in this section suggests the 
peculiar position that Chechens occupy in the Russian racial imaginary: even though the reader reads 
testimonies from gay Chechens, their sexuality still remains mysterious, ghostly, and at odds with their 
race/ethnicity. 
Chechnya vs modernity: Narratives of liberation in refugee migration stories 
Kathi Wiedlack (2017) has shown in her work on the representation of Russian gay youth in 
Anglophone media that Western reporters are quick to place Russia in the developmental scale of moving 
away from religious fundamentalism and towards gay liberation. In particular, Wiedlack analyzes the 
creation of “Russian gay martyrs” in Anglophone media. These martyr figures resignify the West as 
progressive and gay-friendly, and Russia as backward and heteropatriarchal. Wiedlack argues that “such 
discourses miss the problem at hand, which, arguably, is not the majoritarian homophobia of Russian 
people, culture or the state, but the propaganda of heterosexuality, procreation and the family as a Russian 
nation-building project that uses homophobia as expedient” (p. 14). However, the representation of 
Chechen gay men in Russian oppositional media adds another complex layer to the developmental scale, 
which, I argue in this section, points towards the participation of Russian oppositional media in the 
discourses of homotransnationalism. In other words, I claim that Russian oppositional media appeals to 
models of the nation-state which include homonormative LGBTQ subjects in its ideologies, structures, 
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and governing practices by marking the Muslim North Caucasus as inherently heteropatriarchal and 
homophobic and by calling for an alternative vision of the Russian state which distances itself from the 
Muslim North Caucasus and adopts the Western forms of homonationalism. 
The inclusion of a particular brand of homosexuality into national projects in North America and 
Europe—what has been coined “homonationalism” by Jasbir Puar (2007)—emerges in non-Western 
spaces as an aspiration for a specific kind of modernity, the kind that marks homosexual inclusion as a 
necessary attribute of civilized modern society and names anti-gay violence as non-modern and non-
white. What has been named “homotransnationalism” refers to “specifically transnational circulation of 
neocolonial, orientalist, sexist and queerphobic discourses, such as about persecuted Muslim women or 
queers” (Haritaworn & Bachetta, 2016, p. 134) For the Russian subject whose whiteness is often 
implicitly questioned on the global political arena, and who, due to Russia’s authoritarianism, is 
frequently positioned as being on the fringe of modernity, participation in the homotransnationalist 
project is particularly seductive. This is because, as Aniko Imre (2014) writes, “East European nations’ 
unspoken insistence on their whiteness is one of the most effective and least recognized means of 
asserting their Europeanness” (p. 82) Therefore, by portraying Chechen gay men as victims of a regime 
that is even more authoritarian than that of Russia and of a culture that is more distanced from whiteness 
than Russian culture through its connections with Islam, the ascendancy of Russian whiteness through 
queerness is maintained. I further suggest that we should recognize these discourses in Russian 
oppositional media as homotransnationalist and not just homonationalist. This is because they elevate 
North American and Western European homonationalist inclusions through claims of Western superiority 
and call on Western-based and corporate-sponsored homonationalist activists (e.g. Rainbow Railroad in 
Canada) to rescue Chechen and Russian queers. Under the conditions of the heteropatriarchal nationalism 
of the Russian state, homonationalist aspirations in Russia emerge in forms that seek to first fold 
homonormative subjects into the models of neoliberal West, and then later demand that the Russian state 
replicate Western ideologies and nationalist structures. 
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The discourse of Russian oppositional media produces racial/ethnic difference through detailed 
explanations of torture and imagining who gay Chechens are. The result of this particular framing of the 
persecution of gay Chechen men is, to use Puar’s words, “the reintensification of racialization through 
queerness” (p. xii). As I explained in the previous sections, this effect is particularly visible through the 
way homophobic violence in Chechnya is tied to tradition and Chechen heteropatriarchal brutality. Since 
the ethnic Other is assumed to be straight, Chechen gay people are seen to be exceptional to Chechen 
culture, not because they are outside of the sexual heteronorm, but rather because they are placed outside 
of the racial/ethnic norm. At the same time, the figure of the gay Chechen in the oppositional media also 
subtly reinforces the failure of Chechens at heteronormativity, as it reports on Chechens’ excessive cult of 
masculinity expressed through performative devotion to Kadyrov and Putin, pathological homosociality 
through popularity of fighting clubs and martial arts, impossibility of feminism, and polygamous familiar 
structures32. Therefore, paradoxically, Chechens—not unlike other Muslims-ascribed-terrorists within the 
global neoliberal discourse (Puar & Rai, 2002)—are simultaneously excelling and failing at 
heteronormativity in these discourses. In this section, I demonstrate how the homotransnationalist logic is 
further perpetuated in the oppositional media stories that focus on the lives of Chechen gay men after they 
have fled Chechnya and Russia. 
In relation to these stories of persecution, the LGBT-Network, a country-wide organization for 
advocacy around gay issues, established a hotline for those experiencing persecution and organized their 
evacuation from the Chechen Republic. By the end of 2017, the LGBT-Network helped more than one 
hundred Chechen men escape to Moscow, and, subsequently, to several countries in the EU and to 
Canada (LGBT-Network, 2018). Within the media analyzed in this chapter, many articles focused on 
what happened to Chechen gay refugees after their emigration. Some of the articles focused on the cases 
of those Chechen men who were evacuated in 2017 after being aided by the LGBT-Network. However, 
 
32 One of the other issues of Chechen society often mentioned by Russian oppositional media (and media abroad) is 
polygamy and arranged or forced child marriage (e.g. see Tetrault-Farber, 2015, May 18)). Although the detailed 
analysis is out of the scope of this chapter, it can be argued that the critical discourses on Chechen polygamy and 
forced marriages are also reverberations of homotransnationalism. 
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there were also numerous articles that focused on migrants who fled Chechnya and Russia prior to the 
persecution wave of 2017. These stories give an opportunity to see how Russian oppositional media 
describes the lives of Chechen gay migrants in their host countries. 
David Murray (2016) examines the repetitive hegemonic narrative of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity (SOGI) refugee migration to Canada, which positions refugees’ countries of origin as 
places of acute homophobic hostility in contrast to host countries, which are depicted as places of 
freedom, safety, and acceptance of queerness. He calls this framing “queer migration to liberation nation” 
(p. 19). This narrative can also be found in the way Russian oppositional media frames stories of Chechen 
migration. For example, this is how the article published by Dozhd describes the experience of one of the 
survivors after migration to the West: 
The first public employee, whom Ahmed met after emigration, left a lasting impression 
on him; the German taught the [North] Caucasian to pronounce the phrase ‘I am gay.’ 
[Ahmed says,] ‘I just couldn’t say this phrase by myself, and he just looked me in the 
eyes and said that I shouldn’t be scared, shouldn’t hide. [He said,] “You deserve respect. 
You are not worse than everybody else.”’ (Yapparova, 2017, April 8) 
This discourse frames the migration as a didactic experience, during which a Chechen man learned from a 
German citizen not only self-respect but also what to name himself. Therefore, migration here is 
described as a transformation of the self. Further, the web-project “Acceptance” (Milashina & Artemeva, 
2017, December 27) offers an abundance of queer migration to liberation nation narratives: 
I was supposed to be born here. This is the place for me. People are calm here. They 
couldn’t care less if you wear a tutu. It’s your life and they have no reason to care what 
you do with it. They won’t blackmail you or fire you from your job because you are gay. 
You can be whoever you want. If a person feels good this way, he should live the way he 
wants. After all, he doesn’t harm anyone. I am in love with this country. As if for twenty 
years I was on a contract that said that I had to live in fear and disdain for myself. And 
169 
 
now, boom! This contract has expired. And I have magically appeared in a place where 
my life is starting anew. Just me and my life. (Deny) 
I always thought that people are scary here. But they were the first ones to offer us a 
helping hand. And not even once have I felt that we are out of place here. Every desire of 
yours, every fantasy or wish are acceptable and are not frowned upon. It is your own 
private life. No one will judge you. Everybody is tolerant. Everyone belongs here. 
Nobody will hurt you here. On the contrary, they will smile, help you, and then still 
apologize for something ten times. It’s peaceful here. Would I want to press charges 
against them [the perpetrators]…? There will never be any justice. Even if someone gets 
punished for this, the people will never accept you and say, ‘Here, this person has really 
suffered, he is worthy of respect and support.’ If you are gay, you are a second-class 
person. Your own relatives won’t understand why you pressed charges. If you make it 
public, you put shame on your kin. In Chechnya, we have our own code of responsibility. 
The oldest one is always responsible for his family. It’s not like brothers have their own 
separate lives and don’t care about each other. Everyone is responsible for each other. 
Even if they are not keeping in touch. You just can’t break those ties. (Usman) 
When you are Chechen, you have to understand that you will never be able to be free and 
safe. You always have to think, ‘What will happen if my parents see this? What will 
happen if Chechens see this?’ […] Somebody has to tell Chechens that they have to 
respect every life like their own. (Yusuf) 
All of these testimonies show that to come to terms with one’s gay self means to detach from the Chechen 
culture, familial ties, and what they call “responsibility,” even as some interviewees attempted to still hold 
on to their Chechen identities. If familial attachment and tradition are central for Chechen people, what 
does it mean to become accepted as a gay refugee for these people? Can they remain Chechen and still 
enter this state of acceptance? This is a primary tension in the coverage of gay persecution. 
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There is a strong emphasis on familial and clan ties in narratives of persecution. Chechens are seen 
as particularly vulnerable subjects because of their relations with their families and the strong cultural 
valuing of responsibility. In the majority of testimonies, interviews, and journalists’ coverage of gay 
Chechens, a lack of individualism in Chechen culture is a crucial component of the story. Explaining 
Chechen culture through a lack of the individual as an autonomous free subject is meant to evoke 
emotions of shock, pity, and compassion from the (presumedly non-Chechen) audience. Since the human 
rights framing of the global LGBT subject is conceptualized through an ability to exercise free will, 
individuality is crucial for the global sexual liberation project. To quote Puar (2007), “Queer secularity 
demands a particular transgression of norms, religious norms that are understood to otherwise bind that 
subject to an especially egregious interdictory religious frame. The queer agential subject can only ever be 
fathomed outside the norming constrictions of religion, conflating agency and resistance” (p. 13). 
Essentially, for Chechen refugees to be rescued means to adopt the narrative of individualism and 
separation from the family, clan relations, religion, and ethnicity. 
There was only one moment in my media sample and discourses analyzed where testimonies 
diverged from the “queer migration towards liberation” narrative. This is the criticism that one of the 
transgender refugees commenting on the persecution expressed towards the United States. In the video 
coverage of her story (Badanin & Zhuk, 2017, May 18), transwoman Leila expressed her frustration with 
the legislation and bureaucracy of the asylum-seeking process, being stuck in the shelter for many 
months, and her inability to receive a work permit. As she says, she expected more protection of her 
freedom from powerful states such as the U.S. This opinion, however, is the only exception and drowns in 
the endless repetition of the narratives with celebratory attitudes towards the West. 
The story of persecution of gay Chechens provides a particular view of the world, one in which 
Chechnya, Russia, and the destination countries for Chechen refugees have particular positions on the 
global geopolitical and geotemporal maps. The oppositional media discourses, however, paint several 
distinct maps at the same time. The first map is created by representatives of the state, who deny the 
existence of gay people in Chechnya and the importance of homosexuality as a political issue. This frame 
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marks the West as overly concerned with sexuality and, thus, as perversely overdeveloped. It refers to a 
self-positioning of Russia as an alternative modernity—a happy middle ground between an overdeveloped 
West and an underdeveloped East. This can be exemplified in the following statements by government 
officials:  
Yunus-bek Yevkurov was surprised that leaders of France and Germany, Emmanuel 
Macron and Angela Merkel, are bringing up the topic [of homosexuality]. He emphasized 
that the LGBT movement is included in the list of traditional values of Europe. ‘These 
are their traditional things. This notion [of homosexuality] doesn’t even exist in 
Caucasus, or in Russia, or among Slavic people. We never had that in our traditions. We 
have to understand that we will never be Europeans,’ said the Head of Ingushetia. 
(“Glava Ingushetii,” 2017, June 11) 
This quote also exemplifies what I analyzed in Chapter 3 as an ideological square, the positioning of 
“our” Slavic heteronormativity as the natural opposite of “their” Western homosexuality. By contrast, 
oppositional media discourse attempts to provide an alternative mapping of Russia. The producers of this 
discourse maintain that Chechnya is backwards because of their repressions and that Russian authorities 
and law are ineffective in addressing these repressions. Metaphors of time (e.g., “Middle Ages,” “people 
with the Stone Age in their heads”), used alongside descriptions of culture focused on collective 
responsibility, religion, and familial relationships, mark Chechnya as permanently stuck in the past and as 
oppressive. This mapping of Chechnya as hopelessly stuck in the past and Russia as still on the road to 
modernity is particularly poignant in the following op-ed by Alexander Melman, a Russian observer for 
Moskovsky Komsomoletc, titled “Chechnya is an ideal Russia that has reached its limit of absurd”: 
If you can easily rehabilitate us, ‘Europeans,’ by setting TV on rewind, vainakhs33 are 
indeed the way they are. Traditional to the bone. Allah help them! But what for 
 
33 “Vainakhs” is an ethno-linguistic term that refers to people of the North Caucasus speaking Nakh languages, 
including Chechen and Ingush languages.  
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Milonov34 is fun, for Chechens is deadly. All those European laws—they hate them with 
all their guts. But Sharia—that’s a different story! Their leader Kadyrov knows what’s 
trendy currently. Therefore, Chechnya is an ideal Russia that has reached its limit. The 
limit of absurd. So now we have to choose. Either we make the laws of the Russian 
Federation universal on the whole territory [of Russia], which is impossible in our 
circumstances, or we all have to start living like they do in Chechnya. Can you offer a 
third solution? (Melman, 2017, April 14) 
This commentary is written in a hyperbolic, exclamatory, and somewhat incoherent style that is typical of 
this tabloid. By contrast, the oppositional discourse marks Western destination countries as modern and 
ethical through narratives of freedom, democracy, tolerance towards queerness, and individual 
expression. I suggest that the quintessential question that emerges through the stories of gay persecution 
and liberation covered by Russian oppositional journalists is “Are we with Chechnya, or are we modern?” 
This question, however, is not just a question of geotemporal belonging; this question is also a question of 
contemporary Russian ascendancy of whiteness, as the violent heteropatriarchy is ascribed to Chechens as 
inherent, unredeemable quality by comparison to Russia, that still has potential to transform. 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the data I have analyzed in this chapter that addressing the state of lawlessness in 
Chechnya was a key goal for journalists writing for Novaya Gazeta, Meduza, and Dozhd. Their framing 
of the violence and persecution served several purposes: First, to rescue Chechen gay men and enlist 
diverse and powerful allies in this process. Second, to prompt investigations into the frequent violent 
repressions in Chechnya—not only against gay men but also against other vulnerable Chechens such as 
human rights activists, people accused of extremism, those executed without trial for drug use or minor 
crimes, and anyone else targeted by Chechen authorities as an enemy, a rebel, or otherwise as undesirable. 
 
34 Valery Milonov is a member of the Russian Parliament who is famous for his anti-gay rhetoric. He was also the 
initiator of the anti-gay propaganda law in 2013. Here, the author ironically suggests that Milonov’s struggle against 
“gay propaganda” is just for fun. 
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This second goal became more possible specifically because of the folding in of non-heteronormativity 
into the idea of modernity in the West through ideas, structures, and practices of homo(trans)nationalism. 
Journalists were not merely asking for justice for Chechen gays, they were mobilizing progress narratives 
by using this discourse strategically, since violence on the basis of sexual orientation invites certain 
affects that prompt action in Western neoliberal states if it is expressed in the right terms. The global 
neoliberal gay movement, which constitutes a part of nation-building project in all Western countries, has 
resources that can be accessed and employed through participation in particular gay discourses. These 
discourses are most effective when aligned with homotransnationalist projects, processes of racialization 
through queerness, and death-life frameworks that underline a specific conceptualization of modernity. 
Therefore, through this particular framing of the stories of persecution and refuge, the Russian 
oppositional media appealed to the exceptionalism of Western countries framing these places in utopian 
terms through the juxtaposition of persecution and liberation, there and here, Chechnya and the West. 
The failures of the justice system and bureaucratic inefficiencies, also at the center of journalists’ 
attention, resonate with what has been discussed by social and queer theorists as a way of governing so-
called superfluous populations. The aim of this type of governing is to manage the superfluous population 
in such a way that it remains low-skilled, dependent on the system, always in proximity to death, and 
close enough to inflict bodily and psychological harm through violence and torture. The preoccupation 
with state repressions means that Chechens are likely to remain an anonymous mass of religious fanatics, 
maniacal brutes, and murderous leaders committing heinous crimes. The Russian government here is not 
only complicit; rather, it is an active agent in creating and maintaining these conditions. 
Mbembe (2003) points to the fact that “colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness,” 
because savage life is just another form of animal life, and “they” behave like a part of nature (p. 24). As 
the media analysis in this chapter illuminates, both oppositional media and state-owned discourse portray 
the drive to persecute, torture, and kill as an inherently animalistic part of Chechen nature. The 
oppositional media points to it as a state of horror, but nevertheless finds an inherent logic to it. For 
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Chechnya, necropolitics manifests in the ways that Russian law fails to function on its territory and the 
ways in which Chechen citizens are submitted to excessive surveillance, torture, and premature death. 
The figure of the Chechen gay refugee represents the violent excess of Chechnya as the 
racialized/ethnic Other. I suggest that this figure serves two purposes: first, it supports the oppositional 
media’s call for Russia’s intervention and control of Chechnya; and second, it creates an alternative image 
of homonationalist Russia. This image, of course, is just a fantasy, as Russia’s current legal system and 
hegemonic political discourse are based on heteropatriarchy and exclusion of non-heteronormativity from 
modes of nationalism. However, by participating in global homonationalist discourses and exploiting the 
haunting figure of the Chechen gay man, oppositional media creates an image of the progressive and 
more “civilized” Russia, providing an alternative to heteropatriarchal nationalism. 
With this discussion, I want to point our attention to the ways in which local politics of queerness 
and racialization are embedded in the matrix of global processes of sexual politics, such as 
homotransnationalism, queer migration, sexual orientalism, and global LGBT rights frameworks. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I propose that what is happening in Russia can be understood as a “haunting 
homonationalism.” By this I mean that Russian oppositional media appeals to homotransnationalist 
politics through evoking the ghost of the gay Chechen as a signifier of the exceptionalism of neoliberal 
West, as a measure of homonormative queerness, and as a tool for sustaining the exceptional whiteness of 
the Russian ethnic subject. The homonationalism in Russia is haunting because LGBTQ people are not 
fully folded into the state at the current moment—they are seen as oppositional, but oppositional media is 
seeking for them to be folded in as a method of dealing with the supposed lawlessness, excessive 
religious devotion, authoritarianism, and repressiveness of racialized others.
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Conclusion 
  
In this dissertation, my goal was to examine how issues of gender and sexuality animate the 
positioning of Russia vis-à-vis the rest of the world, how representations of gender and sexuality intersect 
with Russian nationalism and racial/ethnic hierarchies, and how discursive and representational codes of 
gender and sexuality are employed in resistance to heteropatriarchal nationalism. My main thesis is that 
within Putin’s Russia, the hegemonic political discourse on gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity is one of 
nationalist heteropatriarchy, which is then used to assert Russian exceptionalism against the West and 
justify colonial expansion. In this context, I identified three types of resistance: (1) scholarship and 
activism that seeks to decentralize white Russianness and build coalitions among post-Soviet diaspora; (2) 
Russian countercultural movements that satirize Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism; and (3) 
oppositional media that appeals to Western forms of homonationalism via marking Russia’s 
racialized/ethnic Other as backwards, sexist, and homophobic.  
In Chapter 1, I explored the history and development of gender and sexuality studies in the Soviet 
Union and Russia, establishing the socio-political context for codes of gender and sexuality in Putin’s 
Russia (2000–Present). Providing a comprehensive literature review, this chapter demonstrated that 
theory and research on gender and sexuality in Russia has been significantly affected by political 
climates, especially those surrounding sexuality, gender, and nationalism in the Soviet and post-Soviet 
periods. Most significantly, the processes of opening borders and international collaboration during the 
period of democratization in the nineteen-nineties ensured the establishment of gender centers and 
boosted research in gender and sexuality studies from non-medical, feminist, and LGBTQ perspectives. It 
also, however, brought orientalizing sexuality research to Russia that continued to “invent” (Wolff, 1994) 
Russian sexual difference from the West. As my overview of recent Russian gender and sexualities 
studies scholarship showed, the discipline of gender and sexualities studies during Putin’s era faced a 
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broader decrease in Western support for research institutions in Russia, as well as a hostile political 
climate, censorship, and pressure on feminist and LGBTQ scholars and activists that forced many of them 
to leave the country. With the passing of the law in 2012 that required institutions and organizations 
collaborating with researchers in countries of Western Europe and North America to register as “foreign 
agents,” gender and sexuality studies centers were fundamentally positioned as non-Russian entities, or as 
interfering with Russian national interests. In this situation, gender and sexuality scholarship became not 
only about education and research but also, importantly, about forms of activism, as activist and academic 
worlds continued to intertwine and share common goals. I discussed the conference “Fucking Solidarity: 
Queering Concepts On/From a Post-Soviet Perspective” as an example of collaborative work that unites 
feminist and LGBTQ scholars and academics across the post-Soviet region and diaspora working from 
anti-oppressive perspectives. As I argued, under the unfavourable political conditions in Russia (as well 
as, to varying degrees, abroad), feminist and LGBTQ scholars and academics have worked to challenge 
not only Russian repressive regimes and centralization of white ethnic Russians in research and activism 
but also Western-centric perspectives and solidarity projects that exotify, objectify, and orientalize 
sexualities in Russia and other post-Soviet countries. 
Chapter 2 continued to explore the politicization of gender and sexuality in Russia and its 
intersections with Russian nationalism by examining the use of codes of gender, sexuality, and 
race/ethnicity in popular culture representations. The cases analyzed in this chapter further illustrate what 
I have identified in Chapter 1 as the constructed “foreignness” of non-normative representations of gender 
and sexuality. Analyzing case studies of popcultural representations, I demonstrated that Russian popular 
culture of the Putin era is characterized by close links between nationalism and heteropatriarchy. These 
links are continually secured by the creation of iconic images of white Russian national heteropatriarchal 
masculinity and subservient femininity and the racial/ethnic subject. Additionally, iconic images are 
engrained by using sexualization, humour, and the Soviet ironic representational practice of stiob to 
increase circulation of hegemonic representations. Further, the case analysis of public scandals around 
“offensive” representations of sexuality––including the ballet Nureyev, the feature film Matilda, and the 
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parody video by the male students of Ulyanovsk Institute of Civil Aviation––showed that censorship and 
expressions of public contempt are routinely employed in Russia to regulate representations of gender and 
sexuality that contest the dominant symbols of nationalism and patriotism. Finally, I provided three 
examples of countercultural production by art-activists Voina, Pussy Riot, and Piotr Pavlensky, which 
target the link between heteropatriarchy and nationalism in three ways: (1) by playfully exposing and 
grotesquely exaggerating heteropatriarchal nationalism, (2) by revealing mechanisms of censorship and 
policing and creating alternative images of masculinity; and (3) by producing alternative images of public 
femininity that name and mock patriarchy, sexism, and homophobia. While these representations have 
importantly challenged repressive cultural mechanisms, they should also be viewed critically; some of 
them reproduce sexist and white-centric discourses by failing to decentralize masculinity and/or white 
Russianness. Finally, as I argued in this chapter, rather than seeing Russia as a place of radical cultural 
difference in relation to/against the West or as following (read: as lagging behind) the West in women’s 
emancipation and gay liberation, we should take into account the ways that Western audiences are 
strategically considered in Russian cultural productions. Furthermore, we should understand that in 
Russian cultural spaces, historically and locally established representational practices––such as stiob––
enmesh with representational practices borrowed from Western public spaces––such as the Riot Grrrl 
movement. I offered the case of Pussy Riot as a particularly poignant example of such strategic 
maneuvering between codes of gender and sexuality that can be read differently within Russia and 
through the Western gaze. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I turned to examining how gender and sexuality are employed for 
maintaining the symbolic borders of Russian national whiteness. Chapter 3 investigated how codes of 
gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity were exploited in political cartoons created by pro-Russian artists 
within the context of the Russia–Ukraine conflict (2014–Present). My focus was on sexist, 
transmisogynist, and racist representations created in response to Ukrainian geopolitical orientation 
towards the European Union. My semiotic analysis of the selected cartoons showed that artists used ideas 
of Russian white heteropatriarchal exceptionalism to rewrite the historically popular narrative of 
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sameness between Russian and Ukrainian nations, and to mark Ukrainians as both geopolitically confused 
and as a racial/ethnic Other of Russia. In the cartoons analyzed, this was expressed through 
representations of the historical figure of khokhol (Ukrainian peasant), signified by the “lowly” pleasures 
of the body, sexual and gender confusion, and proximity to Blackness and Muslim femininity. As I 
discussed, these representations also create a simplified vision of the world, in which Russia is a space of 
uncorrupted heteropatriarchal whiteness and European and North American whiteness is compromised by 
multiculturalism and decreasing sexual and gender normativity. This chapter also examined how these 
representational practices work to sustain the normalization of heteropatriarchy in the Ukrainian 
territories occupied by Russia and enable the development of tourism and infrastructure in these 
territories, and, therefore, should be understood as key tools of occupation. 
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzed the discursive and representational practices in coverage by Russian 
oppositional media regarding the persecution of Chechen gay men in 2017. My discourse analysis of three 
oppositional media sources revealed three important tactics with which journalists sought to drive 
attention to the problem of persecution and lawlessness in Chechnya and aid in the rescue of persecuted 
persons: (1) identifying heteropatriarchy in Chechnya as an outcome of “pre-modern” Chechen culture 
and Islamic tradition through the racialization/ethnic Othering of Chechens, (2) producing exotification 
and mystification of Chechen gay men as “ghostly,” and (3) adopting the narrative of “queer migration to 
liberation nation” (Murray, 2016) in stories of Chechen gay refugees. I identified these tactics as each 
being related to homotransnationalism (Haritaworn & Bachetta, 2016), the constantly changing processes 
of including homonormative queer subjects into the ideologies, structures, and practices of nation-
making, and expanding North-Western imperialism and the ascendancy of whiteness on a global scale. 
The discourses of “haunting homonationalism”––as I named these practices of Russian oppositional 
media––work to resist Russian heteropatriarchal and homophobic regimes and involve Western neoliberal 
governments in the mission of rescuing Chechen gay men. However, as I argued, one dangerous outcome 
of these practices is the entrenchment of Russian white supremacy and the deepening of 
racialization/ethnic Othering of Chechnya. 
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My analysis in these four chapters has shown that questions of gender, sexuality, and 
race/ethnicity are read as metrics of modernity and are used to symbolically and physically circumscribe 
the Russian nation and its frontiers. Russian nationalism and identities occur in a multifaceted cultural 
field which cannot be characterized as radically different from the West, nor can they be read as being in 
the process of “catching up” with Western ideas of multiculturalism and gay liberation. Criticizing 
heteropatriarchy in the Russian public sphere should be done cautiously and only when taking into 
account historically rooted cultural practices. As Julie Hemment (2015) cautions, Russian responses to 
sex in public culture require understandings of sex, gender, satire, and politics that are quite different 
from Western feminist approaches, and Russian uses of public sex and feminist critiques are enmeshed in 
global systems of power and political economies that redefine our relationship to and understandings of 
authoritarianism, liberalism, and capitalism. In this dissertation, I provided careful readings of cultural 
cases that take into account discursive and representational practices that are necessarily grounded in 
Russian history and culture, such as stiob, dead irony, and Russian traditions of representing 
race/ethnicity. At the same time, I highlighted how some feminist and sexual Russian subjects are 
recognized by Western audiences as being “global” or “universal”—for example, a riot grrrl, an LGBTQ 
activist, a gay Muslim refugee. There is a danger in reading these subjects as globally universal and, 
therefore, as already familiar to Western audiences: the reinscription of the West as progressive, liberated, 
and ethical. As I argued, these figures of representation in Russian cultural spaces are complex and are 
often created in a sort of, as Alexei Yurchak (2005) wrote, “double-speak” (p. 287): they are created 
simultaneously for the Russian audience and for the Western one and run the risk of recreating both 
Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism and global transnational hierarchies. 
My dissertation offers an insight into the ways in which Western hegemonic 
homo(trans)nationalist discourses circulate in non-Western contexts. My readings of Russian nationalism, 
its engagements with intersecting issues of gender, sexuality, and race/ethnicity, and the ideas and 
movements emerging in opposition to it propose an alternative to the civilizational narratives which mark 
Russia as lagging behind the West. By contrast, I suggest that Russian heteropatriarchal nationalism is 
180 
 
Russian modernity in itself as Putin’s Russia actively engages with homo(trans)nationalist discourses and 
positions itself as the space of exceptional white heteropatriarchy between the multicultural and gay-
friendly West and the excessively violent racialized/ethnic Other. 
In such geopolitical contexts, where variously marginalized people are subjected to oppressive 
powers of heteropatriarchal white-centric nationalism and, simultaneously, to neoliberal and neoimperial 
Western gaze and homotransnationalism, it is particularly important for scholars to work from 
intersectional, anti-oppressive perspectives and create coalitions that resist these simultaneous 
oppressions. Therefore, further scholarship should prioritize collaboration in research and activism among 
those working from a variety of post-Soviet spaces and with post-Soviet diasporas in the West. Any 
critical interrogation of the intersections between Russian nationalism and heteropatriarchal, racist, and 
xenophobic cultural representations must come with an analysis of the global processes which reinscribe 
the imperialist, white supremacist, and homotransnationalist ideologies that function in post-Soviet 
spaces. 
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